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The thesis explores official information-gathering and colonial rule during the transition which 
led to the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, between 1797 and 1822. It studies more 
closely the official anxieties that played a crucial role in the protectorate’s early development, 
placing these in the framework of British official concerns after the Napoleonic Wars related to 
retrenchment and security associated with a militarist ethos. Overwhelmingly, previous 
historiography on the islands has focused on the controversies which brought the end of the 
protectorate. It has also, to some extent, exaggerated the transformative characteristics of 
imperial rule. Unlike previous studies of British rule in the islands (Anglokratia in Greek) which 
focus on its end and the ultimate cession of the islands to Greece in 1864, this thesis focuses on 
the early period of British rule, analysing the origins of the protectorate in a Mediterranean, as 
well as an imperial, context. British officials were ambivalent about the place of the 
protectorate in the empire from its very beginning. Yet, despite the recurring political and 
economic crises going on in the islands during the period under study, the British were adamant 
on maintaining control over the islands. Taking the Ionian Islands as a case-study of early 
nineteenth century imperial rule, this thesis argues that the reasons for maintaining control 
over the islands were more directly related to the wartime origins of the protectorate than of 
what is often assumed in the historiography on the islands. Similarly, as in other parts of the 
empire, crucial aspects of the governance of the islands, such as the control of information and 
the compilation of statistics, consistently followed official mentalities of the period, which 
should not be conflated with the subsequent ‘information revolution’ of the 1830s. In order to 
illuminate this argument further, the thesis focuses on key themes including disease-control, 
information-collection and security imperatives. By re-examining the origins of the protectorate 
and its ‘logic’ of rule in the earlier period this thesis revises our understanding of the nature of 
British rule in the islands and offers for potential comparison with other wartime acquisitions. 
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This thesis analyses the origins of the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, from the 
first official connection between Britain and the islands, until its cession from Britain to Greece 
and the early years of its development as a protectorate. The United States of the Ionian Islands, 
as the new protectorate was named, was a peculiar political and legal creation: nominally it was 
an independent state, but in reality it was governed like a colony. The historiography of the 
islands has traditionally focused on the period of the protectorate from the cession of the islands 
to Britain in 1815, until its end and the transfer of the islands to Greece in 1864, as a single 
coherent period.1 The chronological frame of this study reflects a different approach: unlike the 
existing literature on the islands that deals with the period as a whole, this thesis focuses on the 
earlier years, and places them in a comparative perspective by relating them to the wider 
background of early-nineteenth century empire, and in particular to developments in the 
Mediterranean region.   
The first aim of the thesis, then, is to draw out continuities and changes in British 
involvement in the region during the period following the Napoleonic Wars and the French 
Revolution. In regards to the origins of the protectorate, traditional accounts focus their 
analysis on the beginning of the protectorate in 1815, drawing their attention to the diplomatic 
negotiations that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars.2 In fact, British military 
commitments started to increase in the eastern Mediterranean much earlier, in terms of 
military aid and information-collection, and began to penetrate Ionian politics well before 1815. 
Instead of considering the formal cession of the islands as a starting point, this thesis considers 
it more as a new phase in Britain’s connection with the islands and the wider region. It argues 
that, contrary to traditional accounts of the history of the islands, the creation of the 
                                                     
1 Sakis Gekas, Xenocracy. State, Class and Colonialism in the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864 (New York, 2017); Maria 
Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities: The Ionian Islands in British Official Discourses; 1815-1864’ (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University College London, 2009); Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and 
Power in the British Mediterranean (Indiana, 2002); Eleni Calligas, “‘The Rizospastai’ (Radicals-Unionists): Politics and 
Nationalism in the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864”, (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
London 1994); Tumelty, J.J., ‘The Ionian Islands under British Administration, 1815-1864’ (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1953). 
2 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’; Calligas, ‘The Rizospastai’; Tumelty, ‘The Ionian Islands’. 
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protectorate in 1815 was not merely a diplomatic gambit that came out of the post-Napoleonic 
settlement, but more the outcome of previous British engagement in the region, which had 
resulted in the cultivation of significant information networks. The origins of the protectorate 
also reflected Britain’s broader imperial concerns regarding counter-revolutionary movements, 
security, financial expenditure, and metropolitan interference in the conduct of colonial 
governors. 
The second aim of the thesis is to examine the consolidation of imperial rule during the 
first years of the protectorate, and particularly how British officials employed new forms of 
knowledge in the establishment of colonial governance. Here, the thesis will reveal the level of 
involvement of local actors and ‘native informants’ in the transition from an unofficial British 
connection to the consolidation of British rule. Studies of how information networks were 
formed into power structures as part of the transition into colonial rule have been central to 
this thesis.3 Furthermore, this study is concerned with the ways that British officials used 
information and particularly how they employed ‘modern’ ways of collecting and organizing 
information in the Ionian Islands. This included the increasing use of statistics and the 
establishment of a professional state bureaucracy in the islands. The period between the 
Napoleonic Wars and the information revolution of the 1830s in Britain was particularly 
formative in the change of mentalities and approaches to governance. The thesis engages with 
relevant works on imperial as well as on British history, examining the use of information by the 
modern state.4 Studying the Ionian case in concert with developments in Britain reveals the 
chronologically parallel processes which took place in both locations in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. Until recently, historiography on the Ionian Islands has shown little 
interest in these processes, instead paying exclusive attention to issues of cultural 
representation and race as the organizing principles of British rule in the islands.5  
                                                     
3 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information. Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1996]). 
4 Joanna Innes, Inferior Politics. Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford, 2009); Zoe 
Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-1845. Patronage, the information Revolution and Colonial Government 
(Manchester, 2005); David Eastwood, ‘Amplifying the Province of the Legislature’: the Flow of Information and the 
English State in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Historical Research, 62: 149 (October, 1989), pp. 276-294. 
5 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’; Gallant, Experiencing Dominion. 
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As mentioned above, there has been a general trend in recent literature (influenced by 
Foucauldian notions of ‘colonial governmentality’) towards identifying the characteristics of the 
logic of colonial rule in the islands beyond cultural representations and stereotypes.6 In this work, 
practices of governance through the employment of statistics, public works and the classification 
of Ionian society into economic divisions have been interpreted as elements of a liberal project 
to ‘improve’ and transform Ionian society, which were also generated from within Ionian society 
itself. While the thesis builds upon such work, it questions the coherence of such modernizing 
projects at the beginning of the protectorate. British rule certainly claimed to be an improvement 
on the islands’ Venetian past, but it also built on some ‘traditional’ aspects, and did not break 
entirely with earlier approaches to colonial governance. 
The Ionian Islands are a group of seven main and a little more than twenty smaller 
islands in the Ionian Sea, located between Greece and Italy. The principal islands are Corfu 
(Kerkyra), Zante (Zakynthos), Santa Maura (Lefkada), Paxi, Cephalonia and Ithaca (Ithaki), and, 
as an administrative paradox, Cerigo (Kythira). This particular island, which now belongs to the 
modern region of Attica, is located to the south of the Peloponnese, southern Greece. In Greek 
they are known as 'Heptanesa' (Seven Islands). Today the islands are popular tourist 
destinations and sustain a population of about 200,000; they are also famous in Greece for the 
legacies of Venetian, French and British cultural influences, such as ginger beer and the 
occasional game of cricket in Corfu.  
In terms of architecture, the islands are heterogeneous and reflect the diverse history of 
the region. Corfu town is distinctively Italian, mixed with neoclassicism and typical Modern 
Greek architecture, while Zante was rebuilt after the earthquakes that practically levelled the 
buildings of the island with many casualties in 1953. In terms of geography and strategy, the 
valuable location of the islands at the entrance of the Adriatic and at close proximity to the 
mainland explains why they changed rulers all too often. Historically, the islands were 
                                                     
6 Gekas, Xenocracy. Also on governmentality: Simon Gunn, ‘From Hegemony to Governmentality: Changing 
Conceptions of Power in Social History’, Journal of Social History, 39:3 [Special Issue on the Future of Social History] 
(Spring, 2006), pp. 705-720; Peter Pels, ‘The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History, and the Emergence of 
Western Governmentality’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 26 (1997), pp. 163-183; David Scott, ‘Colonial 
Governmentality’, Social Text, 43 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 191-220. 
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incorporated into the Venetian Republic after the fourth crusade (1204), and remained part of 
its dominions in the eastern Mediterranean for roughly 400 years until French revolutionary 
troops marched into Venice in 1797 and brought the republic to an end. After that, the islands 
changed rulers four times within fifteen years. The islands passed through, successively, 
Venetian (roughly between 12th and 17th centuries-1797), French (1797-1798), Russian-
Ottoman (1798-1807), and French again (1807-1814), before finally being occupied by British 
forces during the Napoleonic wars.  
 
Character and scope of the project 
Studying and researching the origins of British rule in the Ionian Islands has been an 
interesting as well as a daunting experience. Political and constitutional changes, as well as the 
administrative chaos that often followed during the period under study, make the history of the 
islands a particularly challenging prospect:  between 1797 and 1815 the islands had four 
different rulers, and each one of them applied their own respective systems in administration. 
State officials in the Ionian Islands used Italian, French, Greek and English, while the majority of 
official correspondence, preserved in Britain, is in English. This includes correspondence 
between British officials and the Ionian authorities, as well as Ionian newspapers (most notably 
the Ionian Gazette) and the annual statistical returns of the Colonial Office Blue Books of 
Statistics.7 Even more dispersed and fragmented are the archives consisting of the proceedings 
of Ionian political bodies like the Senate, which are kept in Corfu.   
Spread across each one of the Ionian Islands, archives have suffered from natural 
catastrophes such as the earthquake of 1953 which practically flattened almost all buildings in 
the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, including the archives. Moreover, the archives in 
Corfu took extensive damage during the Second World War. Today, archival research in Corfu 
suffers from a long-term lack of funds, especially since Greece was hit by the recent crisis. 
                                                     
7 For the period under study, the reference in the Blue Books of Statistics is in The National Archives (henceforth 
TNA), Colonial Office records (henceforth CO) 136/1391. 
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Problems in the classification of archives in Corfu persist, particularly in terms of continuity. But 
even before the twentieth century, since the union with Greece in 1864, archives of the period 
of British rule were saved by the persistent work of individuals who preserved them without 
external funding. For example, from 1884 the Corfiote Markos Theotokis spent 28 years 
cataloguing the archives of the Ionian Senate, which had contained all the proceedings of the 
executive body of the state during British rule. The challenge of cataloguing the huge archive 
produced under the Venetians is still ongoing.8 Despite the problems that researchers have to 
contend with when dealing with the history of the islands, Ionian historiography – by ‘Ionian 
historiography’ is meant all the historical works that have been written about the islands – has 
been a vibrant field in historical writing, even though it often lacks a broader context.  
Most historical works on Anglokratia focused on the reasons that brought the end of 
the protectorate and the union with Greece in 1864, debating the inherent political and 
economic controversies of British rule in the islands.9 The reasons given for the collapse of the 
Ionian State vary, from constitutional deadlock10 to extraordinary levels of debt (at the time 
exceeding £200,000). Gekas, for example mentions four reasons: first, the indebtedness of the 
peasants (a chronic problem which was never entirely solved), state bankruptcy (with a debt 
reaching 150 per cent of the state’s annual revenues), the lack of public works in the later years 
which led to wide dissatisfaction amongst the population, and the emergence of a class of 
liberal Ionians who started putting pressure on the British administration for Union with 
Greece, especially after 1840s.11 However, a recurring tendency in Ionian historiography is the 
fact that many historians have viewed the end of the protectorate as a foregone conclusion, 
which was supposedly looming from the beginning. As a result, the earlier period of British rule 
                                                     
8 Information taken from the site of General State Archives Corfu (GAK Kerkyras), in Greek: 
http://gak.ker.sch.gr/Hist/istor-01f_1864ke.htm  
9 On the end of British protectorate see for example the discussion in: Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The British 
and the Hellenes. Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960 (Oxford, 2006), pp. 46-80 or Gekas, 
Xenocracy, pp. 325-337; Bruce Knox, ‘British policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864: nationalism and imperial 
administration’, English Historical Review, 99: 392 (July 1984), pp. 503-529; C.C. Eldridge, ‘The Myth of Mid-Victorian 
“Separatism”; the Cession of the Bay Islands and the Ionian Islands in the Early 1860s’, Victorian Studies, xii (1969), 
pp. 331-346; Tumelty, ‘The Ionian Islands’, pp. 324-362. 
10 Tumelty, ‘The Ionian Islands’, pp. 249-286. 
11 Gekas, Xenocracy, p. 327; also, Calligas, ‘The Rizospastai’. 
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is often seen as a mere prelude to the political and constitutional crisis starting in the 1840s, 
which brought the final end of the protectorate in 1864.  
The protectorate was a peculiar legal creation, but at the same time presented 
similarities with broader developments in the empire which are often neglected in relevant 
historiography, or entirely left out. The period under study was the interval between the 
seismic shifts of British expansion taking place in India and the later development of free trade 
throughout the British Empire. This was a period of transition between the collapse of old 
structures and the establishment of new ones, which too remains relatively uncharted in 
imperial historiography.12 Instead of approaching the period 1797 – 1815 as a prelude, this 
thesis read the period on its own terms. It argues that in the post-Napoleonic era there were 
imperatives and unresolved issues coming from wartime and diplomatic settlements that 
persisted during early British administrations in the islands. Moreover, British officials shared 
similar concerns in the islands as those in other wartime acquisitions elsewhere in the empire 
after 1815: retrenchment, fear of revolutionary movements, security imperatives or controlling 
sea lanes and ensuring maritime rights. The thesis builds on relevant works on the post-
Napoleonic period, particularly in British history.13  
Unlike historical works that study the consequences of World Wars of the twentieth 
century for example, the worldwide impact of the Napoleonic Wars has received far less 
interest, despite its length and scale. This thesis argues, that this is not only due to a lack of 
interest, but also due to a wide assumption that the period after 1815 was much more linear 
than it actually was. There have been works particularly in British history which challenge this 
view.14 
                                                     
12 C.A. Bayly, ‘The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
26:2 (1998), pp. 28-47 and Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the world, 1780-1830 (London: Longman group, 
1989). 
13 Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1783-1846 (Oxford, 2006); David Eastwood, ‘The age of 
uncertainty: Britain in the early-nineteenth century,’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 8 (1998), pp. 91-
115; John D. Post, ‘A Study in Meterological and Trade Cycle History: The Economic Crisis Following the Napoleonic 
Wars’, The Journal of Economic History, 34:2 (June 1974), pp. 315-349.  
14 Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People; Eastwood, ‘The age of uncertainty’; John D. Post, ‘A Study in 
Meterological and Trade Cycle History: The Economic Crisis Following the Napoleonic Wars’, The Journal of Economic 
History, 34:2 (June 1974), pp. 315-349. 
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The period after 1815 is often read as Britain’s ascendancy to global hegemony. The 
tendency of ‘post-Waterloo euphoria’ is also followed in relevant works on the Ionian Islands.15 
Yet, such views on the early nineteenth century and especially before the ‘Age of Reform’ have 
been under criticism, including of course social and economic processes taking place in Britain 
at the time.16 In fact, uncertainty and insecurity were more common in imperial thinking than 
triumphant notions of Britain’s place. Particularly amongst diplomats and statesmen, fears 
about the revival of the French revolution, for example, sparked extended cooperation 
between European authorities to monitor revolutionary movements; what is defined rather 
provocatively as ‘Age of Imperial Revolutions’.17 Triumph was also less the sense amongst 
contemporary British officials, whose generation had seen the loss of the American colonies, 
the seismic shifts of imperial expansion in India, in what has perceived to be also by 
contemporaries, as still a ‘remarkably underinstitutionalized world’.18  
Three central arguments are advanced in this thesis. First, by focusing on the early 
period of British rule on its own terms, the thesis pays greater attention to the immediate 
impact of the Napoleonic Wars on imperial rule and how formative were security concerns and 
a militarist ethos which insisted in colonial governance. Building upon other works on imperial 
rule in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the thesis reads the period in its own 
terms, both in an imperial and a Mediterranean context. In this sense, contemporary official 
concerns such as anxieties over Russia’s conduct and the impact of war can be analysed in  
greater detail, compared with studies in Ionian historiography which focus on the whole period 
of British rule (1815-1864). Fundamentally, official anxieties about the renewal of a military 
conflict in the region show how closely connected were strategy and governance in shaping 
British administration in the islands. This was particularly the case during the Greek Revolution 
of 1821.  
                                                     
15 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, pp. 74-76; The quote is in Calligas, “‘The Rizospastai’, p. 22. 
16 Eastwood, ‘The age of uncertainty, pp. 91-115. 
17 Jeremy Adelman, ‘An Age of Imperial revolutions’, The American Historical Review, 113:2 (April, 2008), pp. 319-
340. 
18 John McAleer and Christer Petley (eds.) The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c. 1750-1820 (London, 
2016), p. 3; Quote from Trevor Burnard, ‘The British Atlantic’ in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (eds.), Atlantic 
History. A Critical Appraisal (Oxford, 2009), p. 127. 
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Second, influenced by theories of governmentality, there has been an increasing 
attention in Ionian historiography focusing on studying the consistent efforts of British officials 
to organize Ionian society into categories of rule by integrating new forms of knowledge in 
governance. Drawing on ‘colonial governmentality’ literature, such work has rightly suggested 
that British officials placed greater emphasis on political economy, statistical information and 
legal culture than previous administrations in the islands. On the other hand, this literature 
assumes that the development of colonial governance was a much more systematic and 
coherent process than it actually was. Such an emphasis on systematic or institutional forms of 
power may describe the period after the 1820s more accurately, but this certainly is not the 
case for the earlier period. Even though there was a tendency to gather and classify 
information, which increased dramatically across the empire after metropolitan pressures 
multiplied in the 1820s, in the earlier period the collection and organization of information 
about the islanders was essentially the product of political and social interaction between 
British and Ionians, and depended on individual governors gathering ‘affective’ knowledge 
through their direct involvement.      
To a large degree, Ionian historiography has traditionally highlighted the peculiar 
character of the protectorate as a ‘half-colony’.19 However, imperial presence in the islands was 
part of a greater imperial project, and the islands were integrated in multiple ways even since 
wartime with other parts of the empire. This thesis builds upon relevant works on imperial 
networks.20 Emphasizing connectivity, the third point argues about the importance of networks 
                                                     
19 Works of British rule in the Ionian Islands during the period under study such as Bayly, Imperial Meridian or 
Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’ have focused on power dynamics between the British and the Ionians, 
discussing tendencies on colonial governance and how similar these were with elsewhere in the empire inn early-
nineteenth century, like Malta, Ireland, or the Cape (Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 194-200; Paschalidi, ‘Constructing 
Ionian Identities’, pp. 76-79. Only Gekas’ recent work has drawn analogies and comparisons with colonies elsewhere 
in the empire (Xenocracy). 
20 The works listed here are selective: John McAleer, ‘‘A young slip of botany’: botanical networks, the South Atlantic, 
and Britain’s maritime worlds, c. 1790-1810’, Journal of Global History, 11:1 (March 2016), pp. 24-43;  Bell, David A., 
‘This Is What Happens When Historians Overuse the Idea of the Network’, New Republic, October 26, 2013, Online 
version: https://newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-
metaphor; Simon J. Potter, ‘Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth-Century British Empire’, Journal of British Studies, 4 (2007), pp. 621-46; David Lambert and Alan Lester 
(eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire (Cambridge, 2006); Laidlaw, Colonial Connections; Wendy Jepson, ‘Of 
Soil, Situation, and Salubrity: Medical Topography and Medical Officers in Early Nineteenth-Century British India’, 
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and discourses in cementing the protectorate in the empire, and especially in terms of 
gathering and processing various information from the islands in regards to customs, climates, 
populations etc. Such examples were medical officials who used imperial networks out of a 
genuine scientific interest in disease, as well as for career advancement. These professionals did 
not necessarily work directly for imperial ends, but nevertheless created networks which 
effectively cemented imperial connections and culture, often by displacing local knowledges 
and superstitions in favour of scientific reasoning and a belief in ‘objective’ statistical 
knowledge, as seen in medical debates taking place in the metropole at the time. To illuminate 
this point further, the thesis discusses the case of a plague that broke out in Corfu in 1815.  
 
Statistical forms of knowledge in governance and Ionian ‘governmentality’: from 
Venice to Britain 
Recent literature in imperial history has been particularly influenced by the concept of 
‘colonial governmentality’, examining the employment of bureaucratic systems and scientific 
methods (such as statistics) in colonial governance by Europeans.21 Historical writing has  
challenged the assumption that centralized and quantitative information was a product of 
modernity.22 Imperial historians have also explored the intersections between pre-colonial and 
colonial forms of knowledge in systems of information, like in India, or communication systems 
across the empire, particularly in South Asia.23 Of course, the practice of accumulating 
quantitative knowledge was not exclusive to colonialism or the modern age; it has existed for as 
long as there have been states. If we want to go further back, practices of manorial record-
                                                     
Historical Geography, 32 (2004), pp. 137-155; Alan Lester, Imperial Networks. Creating identities in nineteenth-
century South Africa and Britain (London, 2001). 
21 S. Gunn, ‘From Hegemony to Governmentality’; Pels, ‘The Anthropology of Colonialism’; D. Scott, ‘Colonial 
Governmentality’; Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect. Studies in 
Governmentality (Chicago, 1991). 
22 Edward Higgs, ‘The Rise of the Information State: the Development of Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in 
England, 1500-2000’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 14:2, June 2001, pp. 176-178. 
23 Tony Ballantyne, ‘Colonial Knowledge’ in Sarah Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire. Themes and Perspectives 
(Oxford, 2008), pp. 177-197; Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, 
1996), especially Nicholas Dirks, ‘Foreword’; Bayly, Empire and Information, passim. 
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keeping and surveying were a governing strategy since medieval times.24 Instead, we need to 
examine the particular ways in which quantitative knowledge was deployed in colonial 
contexts, which varies from place to place and over time. The aim of this section is two-fold: 
firstly, it will provide a historical background for the official use of information in the period 
before the protectorate. Secondly, it shall explain that, to a significant extent, processes of 
official information-gathering in Britain and in the islands were parallel and culturally very 
similar: ‘governmentality’ was not necessarily ‘colonial’ in nature.25 Above all, this section 
emphasizes an overarching theme throughout this thesis: despite the assumptions about a 
supposed all-pervasive state, in the period under study British official knowledge of the Ionian 
Islands – either in terms of population or political information – was not only incomplete, but 
was also controversial.   
Although the direct comparison of Venetian, French and British governing practices is 
not the subject of this thesis, it would be useful to take into account just how similar they 
actually were. The case of the Ionian Islands contributes to such relevant discussions on 
transitions in imperial historiography more broadly. To start with, British officials collected 
information based on institutions and practices inherited from previous rulers and employed 
the local population of the Ionian Islands.  
There have been plenty of studies on the value that Venice put in systematized 
information systems, from demography to political information and espionage.26 As for 
statistics, Venetian administration had long employed numerical knowledge along with a 
sophisticated print culture.27 According to Frederick Lane, ‘the Venetian government was the 
first to take statistics seriously’, with the earliest fragments of census records dating to 1509.28 
                                                     
24 Paul Griffiths, ‘Surveying the People’ in Keith Wrightson (ed.), A Social History of England, 1500-1750 (Cambridge, 
2017), p. 39. 
25 Gekas, Xenocracy, passim.  
26 Ioanna Iordanou, ‘What News on the Rialto? The Trade of Information and Early Modern Venice’s Centralized 
Intelligence Organization’, Intelligence and National Security, 31:3 (2016); Filippo de Vivo, Information and 
Communication in Venice. Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford, 2007) Eftychia Kosmatou, ‘Plithismiaka megethi 
ke geografiki kinitikotita sta Eptanisa (18os – 19os aionas)’ in [‘Population and geographical mobility in the 
Heptanese, 18th – 19th centuries’], Proceedings of 7th Panionio Synedrio, Lefkada 26-30 May 2002 (Athens, 2004).  
27 Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge. From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 22-23. 
28 Frederick C. Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973), p. 19. 
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For example, in the Ionian Islands during Venetian rule ‘cadastral sources’ had been compiled 
since the fourteenth century (the exact date varying by island, as not all islands passed under 
Venetian authority at the same time), seeking to quantify the islands’ military capacity, 
revenues, population movement, land, climate, and customs. Censuses described broader 
changes in population and were not detailed, at least compared to the nineteenth century 
versions. While the Venetian administration accumulated information for surveys or 
surveillance, Gekas wrote, ‘no Venetian Proveditore [the Venetian governor who managed 
criminal and civil affairs] used these sources to achieve the sophisticated level of nineteenth-
century colonial governance, to use a population as a resource for economic development at an 
empire-level’.29 But even more than numerical knowledge, Venice relied on state surveillance 
and a very sophisticated system of gathering and diffusing information: secrecy and a system of 
bureaucracy, diplomacy and intelligence-collection ensured Venice’s maritime supremacy until 
the eighteenth century.30  
The Venetians possessed a pioneering postal system (‘Compagnia dei Corrieri’) and a 
‘deeply-rooted international business network of merchants, brokers and agents’.31 Venice had 
also become an urban centre of diffusing information.32 The Venetians had developed 
sophisticated systems of information, particularly in terms of disease-control and medical 
practice. Directly addressing their patients in their private sphere, private physicians, for 
example, played a crucial role in monitoring as long as treating the population, and many of 
them were working closely with the state.33 We will return to this in the next chapter. Our 
knowledge of Venetian systems of information in the islands, however, is by no means 
complete, partially due to the incomplete nature of the archives. For the period when central 
                                                     
29 Gekas, Xenocracy, chapter 4, especially p. 103. 
30 Iordanou, ‘What News on the Rialto?’, p. 308. 
31 Iordanou, ‘What News on the Rialto?, p. 311. Also, on the Venetian postal system see: Eric R. Dursteller, ‘Power 
and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean, 1573-1645’, in From 
Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho (Florence, 2009), pp. 601-623. I would like to 
thank Reinard Gluzman for suggesting me this article.  
32 De Vivo, Information and Communication, pp. 200-269; Peter Burke, ‘Early Modern Venice as a Center of 
Information and Communication’ in J. Martin and D. Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization 
of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797 (Baltimore, 2002), pp. 389-419. 
33 On the relation between medical marketplace and official informants in Venice, see for example De Vivo, 
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administration withdrew and the Venetian Republic was in full decline the evidence is even 
more scant. Yet, at the same time, the period after the collapse of the Republic in 1797 was also 
formative for the islanders, as well as for different mentalities in governance.    
As mentioned previously, the islanders experienced an extended period of political and 
social turmoil over the course of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, rife with armed 
conflict between aristocratic factions. By the end of the eighteenth century, Ionian middle and 
upper classes – also partly due to extensive cultural and intellectual links with their 
counterparts in Europe – shared similar mentalities in governance with western Europe, 
especially Italian cities and France. A particularly knowledge-rich society was emerging in the 
urban centres, giving shape to what recent work on the islands has characterized as ‘Ionian 
governmentality’.34 These changes were parallel to the emergence of a public sphere and class 
consciousness, particularly amongst the middle-classes who provided the new administration 
with public servants.35 In 1808 for example, under the French administration, Ionian 
intellectuals founded the Ionian Academy where medicine and other subjects were taught. The 
Ionian Academy commissioned the first ‘statistical’ register of Corfu during the French 
administration to measure its population. This book, titled Statistikai – Istorikai peri Kerkyras 
Eidiseis (Statistical – Historical News from Corfu) was published in 1822 and the author was 
Stylianos Vlassopoulos.36 The Academy, which had quickly enhanced strong intellectual 
networks between the islands and France, was subsequently abolished by the British governor 
James Campbell.  
During the British administration, works that built on earlier Venetian practices of data 
collection included a ‘statistical historical’ account of Zante published in 1811 by P. Mercati 
(Saggio Storico Statistico della Citta et Isola di Zante).37 Dividing the population into three 
classes (the nobili, cittadini and plebeii) between the town and the country, Mercati’s work 
                                                     
34 Gekas, Xenocracy, pp. 29-36. 
35 Nikos Karapidakis, ‘Apo ton koinotismo stin politiki: koinoniologia ton dianooumenon kai ton anthropon tis politikis 
drasis ston eptanisiako choro (teli tou 18ou aiona arches tou 19ou) in Aliki Nikiforou (ed.), Eptanisos Politeia (1800-
1807): ta meizona zitimata (Corfu, 2001), pp. 33-41.  
36 Gekas, Xenocracy, p. 104. 
37 Gekas, Xenocracy, pp. 104-105. 
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drew together valuable information relating to the exact occupations and trades in the 
countryside and the towns, as well as information on age and sex, and details of the island’s 
Jewish community. John Davy, a British medical official who served in the Ionian Islands, 
incorporated Mercati’s work in his own acknowledging the latter’s ‘valuable’ work.38 As is 
mentioned above, the employment of statistical methods in governance was parallel to a 
broader social and political process in the islands, and the emergence of a ‘commercial 
bourgeoisie’ characterized by its involvement in global trade, cultural transfers with Europe and 
an aspiration towards reforming legislature and establishing public education.39 Although not 
yet self-defined as a cultural and social formation, there were already popular demands from 
many Ionians to be ‘modernized’ by the British. This interest in statistical information shown in 
the Ionian society and administration during wartime had parallels to Western Europe, 
especially in France and Britain.  
In Britain, statistics were considered to be the means by which the lives of ordinary 
people could be improved, in terms of effective agricultural methods, for instance. As one 
contemporary put it, ‘statistics is a term lately invented, to convey an idea of that department 
of science, which has been defined “the knowledge of the present state of a country, with a 
view to its future improvement”.40 Statistical accounts were compiled earlier – like for example 
Sir John Sinclair’s 21-volume Statistical Account of Scotland (1793) – but the first census by Act 
of Parliament was conducted in 1801 directed by John Rickman.41  
When looking at the use of data and social enquiry in the early-nineteenth century, 
works on British history have been particularly useful to this study. For example, Joanna Innes 
distinguishes ‘power’ from ‘happiness’ as two broadly defined, but also interconnected, lines of 
enquiry when conducting administrative enquiries in Britain. On the one hand, political 
                                                     
38 John Davy, Notes and Observations on the Ionian Islands and Malta with some remarks on Constantinople and 
Turkey (London, 1841), pp. 32-35. Unfortunately, due to my lack of knowledge, I was unable to consult the original 
work by Paolo Mercati which is in Italian.  
39 Sakis Gekas, ‘The commercial bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands under British rule, 1830-1864: class formation in a 
semi-colonial society’ (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex, 2004). 
40 William Shaw Mason, A Statistical Account of Parochial Survey of Ireland, drawn up from the communications of 
the Clergy (Dublin, 1814), p. vii. 
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arithmeticians were concerned with power and the wealth of the state, ‘conceived as deriving, 
in significant part, from the size and wealth of the social aggregate on which it rested. Men of 
this generation talked a good deal about “happiness” … happiness being conceived as 
‘membership in a powerful social body’.42 ‘Alongside the statistics of power’, Innes continues, 
‘there meanwhile developed a second line of enquiry. This was not aggregative but 
disaggregate. It focused on local and social difference, on the health and prosperity of 
communities and members of different social groups—in general, on the distribution of 
happiness and pain across the social body’.43 By ‘happiness’ Innes states that she follows the 
definition by Sinclair from his Statistical Account who illuminates the ‘quantum of happiness’ 
for example arising from the ‘availability of education’.44 Such observations coming from British 
historiography can be useful also in imperial history, this study argues, as similar mentalities 
can be traced also in the context of British administration in the Ionian Islands; most 
characteristically, a shift in official attitudes throughout the nineteenth century, from 
addressing the membership of a powerful body to addressing a whole ‘population’ and 
compiling statistics for its improvement.    
As for the population itself, despite the censuses taken through the years by Venetians, 
French, or Ionian officials, there was no consensus amongst contemporaries on the exact 
number of the population of the islands at the beginning of Anglokratia: despite writing as late 
as 1841, Davy’s mentions of censuses in the islands were few and far between.45 John Hennen, 
another medical official, wrote about Corfu in 1830: ‘There are great diversities of opinion as to 
the present population of Corfu, both in the city and the more remote villages’.46 Moreover, as 
we will see later, British and Ionian state officials met with significant resistances in disclosing 
information, especially in rural areas. Above all, official initiatives for gathering information 
involved class antagonisms and cultural tensions, even when British and Ionian officials sought 
                                                     
42 Innes, Inferior Politics, p. 111. 
43 Innes, Inferior Politics, p. 112.  
44 Innes, Inferior Politics, p. 112; John Sinclair, Specimens of Statistical Reports: Exhibiting the Progress of Political 
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45 Davy, Notes and Observations, pp. 158, 212. 
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to collect information on population or land: this thesis examines such cases, for example in the 
plague in Corfu in 1815, or the peasant rebellion in Santa Maura in 1819.  
 
Class antagonisms and Ionian society: main issues in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century 
By the time of British occupation in 1809, the feudal system of the Ionian Islands 
survived with small changes since Venetian times, involving rigid social stratification.47 In terms 
of the economy, the Venetians encouraged local monoculture instead of self-sufficiency.48 But 
the differences were also cultural as well as local. Nobles from Corfu, for example, mostly spoke 
Italian. A traveller at the time mentioned that a stranger would have difficulty in believing them 
to be Greeks.49 Although with significant variations from island to island, the relationship 
between the cultivator and the landowner were similar to serfdom in western and central 
Europe. There is evidence of peasants being tied to the soil while in many cases the nobles had 
exclusive jurisdiction over their tenants.50 In terms of the status of property, colonial officials 
and travellers of the time found the islands to resemble a 'veritable jungle'.51 The rigid social 
                                                     
47 Calligas, 'The Rizospastai,' p. 21; David Hannell, ‘The Ionian Islands under the British Protectorate: Social and 
Economic Problems,’ Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 7 (1, May 1989), p. 108. 
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49 Davy, Notes and Observations, p. 128. 
50 George Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society in the Ionian Islands, 1800-1830' in Richard Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society 
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stratification was all too clear in the friction caused by class antagonisms.52 Class antagonisms 
amongst the islanders played a crucial role in the relationship between central administration 
and Ionian society, as well as to the British understandings of Ionians.  
In 1610 the wealthy and upper classes were prohibited by the Venetian authorities from 
engaging in trade. In 1641 another Venetian law forbade them from voting in the council of 
nobles unless they owned a house within the city.53 Therefore, the nobles – called signori – took 
up residence in the towns, further increasing the gap between them and the lower orders who 
were living in the countryside. There were also differences between the middle and the upper 
classes of the Ionian Islands, which started to diminish, however, during the last phase of 
Venetian rule in the islands. Yet, until 1849 the franchise for the Ionian legislative assembly was 
restricted to only 1% of the city population, the richest members of the Ionian society.54 The 
peasants (called villani during the Venetian era) had no political rights. The peasants were 
‘worse off under this feudal system’ than their counterparts living under Ottoman rule and they 
were summed up in the capitulations at the time along with other 'movable and immovable 
goods of their lords'.55 Occasionally they expressed their discontent through petitions to Venice 
or insurrection.    
 The nobles, being absentee landlords, resided in the cities while persons loyal to them 
became agents on their estates, and were sent to enforce the payment of debts in case this was 
needed.56 Moreover, the villani living in the countryside retained their customs and language, 
further deepening the gap between them and the urban elites who were educated overseas in 
Italian cities. Antagonism between the countryside and the city intensified during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Intermarriage and education in Venice or other Italian 
cities created strong cultural bonds as well as social mobility between the middle-classes and 
aristocracy. Local landlords were granted a significant degree of autonomy and thus the 
                                                     
52 On Ionian economic and social institutions during Venetian rule see Calligas, ‘The Rizospastai’, pp. 3-21; William 
Miller, ‘The Ionian Islands under Venetian Rule,’ The English Historical Review, 70 (Apr., 1903), pp. 209-239. 
53 Gallant, Experiencing Dominion, p. 4. 
54 Hannell, 'The Ionian Islands,' p. 107. 
55 Miller, ‘The Ionian Islands,’ p. 217. 
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Venetian state was able to rely on collaboration with them. Hired armed groups, called bravi, 
were employed by the Ionian upper classes to gather revenues, enforce the payment of debts 
or wage wars between the opposing factions of the signori. Little is known from which class the 
bravi were recruited, but it would be fair to speculate that they may have been peasants. The 
structure of Ionian aristocracy reflected the feudal organization of society, and the various 
aristocratic factions exercised their power effectively, especially during the years of Venetian 
rule. In fact, Venice relied on the Ionian elites for military manpower and funds. A characteristic 
example is the defence of Santa Maura in the Ottoman-Venetian war in 1715 solely by a 
military force that was enlisted by a single aristocrat, Konstantinos Typaldos.57 Gang wars 
between aristocratic factions were also common. In any case, the presence of the nobility was 
essential in Venetian politics as the power of local elites was utilized by Venice so that 'both 
parties co-operated in sustaining a system that preserved' their rule.58 
Relations between the countryside and the city were extremely tense. The power of 
landlords had grown during the last years of Venice’s decline, when there was no central 
authority in the islands. The excesses of landlords varied, but a constant source of tension was 
the creation of debt, one of the thorny issues British authorities had to tackle during 
Anglokratia. The landlords could threaten their tenants with eviction to secure better terms 
when negotiating rents. Moreover, the same happened with production of commodities for 
export such as currants, wine or olive oil. The peasants relied on these products as their main 
sources of income. Important food products such as grain were not produced in sufficient 
quantities to meet consumption requirements in the Ionian Islands. Therefore the peasants had 
to buy them.59 As exported products of the Ionian Islands, like oil and currants, were highly 
speculative in terms of the incomes they generated, the peasant producers relied on 
moneylenders to bridge gaps between income and expenditure. The terms of borrowing were 
unfavourable for the peasants: they had to offer their tenancy as security without any legal 
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protection.60 The peasants often borrowed from their landlords in anticipation of their crop 
yields: in cases of bad harvests the debt was perpetuated at mounting rates of interest.61 The 
dissatisfaction caused by this intense level of dependency is most evidently seen in the case of 
peasant rebellions during Venetian rule, when violence was directed against the moneylenders 
and the nobility. Coupled with heavy taxation and poverty, indebtedness endured under British 
rule and often caused explosive conflicts that resulted in rebellions; one example was the Santa 
Maura rebellion of 1819.  
The British colonial state did very little legislatively to improve the condition of the 
indebted tenants, or to improve future negotiations between tenant and landlord. The use of 
an archaic legal mechanism of seizure for default meant that the debtor could press for the 
tenant's arrest and confinement if he was not able to settle his debt. There were some 
attempts to amend the Penal Code of the Ionian Islands in 1841, but no changes improved the 
position of the indebted tenant.62 It was extremely difficult to legislate over the matter, as 
doing so threatened to cause a direct confrontation between central administration and the 
moneylenders (who could be merchants or landlords), although during Maitland's tenure (the 
future High Commissioner of Malta and the Ionian Islands between 1813 and 1824), money for 
loans became available to the tenants from the general treasury for specific periods of time.63 
No consistent policy, however, tackled the issue of indebtedness and it would take until 1839 
when the Ionian Bank was founded.  
The excesses of the elites troubled central authorities, especially during the successive 
French, Russian, and British administrations. Class antagonism, customary law and armed 
violence were often inseparable. A general proclivity towards violence seems to have been 
perceived as a general trait of Greeks, and Ionians in particular, by many Europeans at the time. 
In hindsight, some depictions of Ionians by British contemporaries might seem comical, yet they 
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were no different from the stereotype of the ‘noble savage’, combining violence and virtue. 
One traveller writing in 1799 for example, wrote about ‘the Greeks of Zante and Cephalonia 
subject to the Venetians’ were ‘famous for stabbing with knives’, despite them ‘having grand 
and noble features … and the heads of Apollo’!64  
It might be obvious that for the British who landed on the islands for strategic reasons, 
powerful elites and armed locals posed a threat and a potential security concern, when the 
former established a central administration. This exact threat was highlighted by Count 
Mocenigo, a high-ranking Corfiote aristocrat, to William A’ Court – the British ambassador in 
Naples – when he told the latter ‘if General Maitland expects to keep them in good humour for 
any length of time, he will be greatly disappointed’.65 The British, who sought the monopoly of 
violence in colonial society, had encountered similar systems to the private ‘bravi’ armies 
elsewhere, most characteristically in India. The peasants there were often recruited into groups 
of armed men hired by landholders for their protection, and were called ‘thugs’ by colonial 
authorities. Resistance by these groups to attempts by colonial administration to impose 
control was common across Northern India during the early-nineteenth century.66 In the 
contemporary experience of British in the Mediterranean, and perhaps more similar to the 
Ionian system of bravi, were the Sicilian hired gangs. These gangs that belonged to an old 
communal tradition and were a response by the village communities to central intrusion during 
the brief British occupation of the island during 1811-1814.67 Arguments about the real or 
perceived ‘violent’ nature of Ionians aside, cultural representations were often used to 
legitimize imperial presence and the establishment of ‘a strong and executive Government 
supported by the authority of the Protective State’, as James Campbell the civil commissioner 
of the Ionian Islands at the time (1812-1815) mentioned to London.68 
                                                     
64 W. Eton, A Survey of the Turkish Empire (London, 1799), pp. 342, 346. 
65 W.C. Dixon, The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland (New York, 1969 [1939]), p. 180. 
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Anglo-Ionian connection and British governance in the Mediterranean 
Connections between England and the Ionian Islands, particularly Zante and Cephalonia, 
date back to the early-sixteenth century when a consulate was established. These commercial 
connections were the result of the currant trade, which was yielding an annual profit of 
£11,500.69 Epstein dates the beginning of the currant trade to 1533.70  In these trade networks, 
the English consulate in Zante created connections with other consulates and various trading 
outposts across the Ottoman Empire: Aleppo, Smyrna, Salonica and elsewhere.71 Merchants 
brought currants and olive oil to England from mainland Greece and the Ionian Islands in 
exchange for tin, wool, and cloth.72 There are examples in the late eighteenth century of 
currants being bought in the fair of Senigallia on the Adriatic coast by manufacturers from 
Manchester.73  
British travellers and adventurers also journeyed the eastern Mediterranean and the 
Balkans for all sorts of purposes; from spying to traveling for leisure and the collection of 
classical antiquities (with the last two being often indistinguishable). Perhaps one of the most 
famous cases is Elizabeth Mortley Montagu’s letters on her travels in the Ottoman Empire and 
her introduction of the smallpox inoculation to Britain, based on her observations there.74 The 
beauty of the Ionian Islands was noted by many European travellers, sometimes in stark 
                                                     
69 W.D. Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821-1831 (New York, 1988), p. 45. 
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contrast to the ‘industrious’ but also ‘violent’ nature of Ionians, particularly in Zante and 
Cephalonia.75   
The British presence in the Mediterranean at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
however, was markedly different than the perhaps romanticized version of peaceful 
coexistence that characterized previous periods. The exact nature of the British connection with 
the Ionian Islands during the early nineteenth century is still a contested issue, begging to 
answer the difficult issue of whether this connection was colonial or not.76 Such a 
preoccupation with the nature of British rule in the islands is most evident in the discussions in 
Ionian historiography about the constitution that was drafted for the islanders in 1817. Most 
works have placed an overwhelming emphasis on either the character of the British governor or 
the legal culture that British officials sought to impose on the islands. While both of these 
aspects were important, we do need to illuminate other aspects that also played a significant 
role. This thesis argues that the constitution in the islands was not a mere exercise of imposing 
British constitutional culture, but was shaped by other realities as well.  
Constitutional experiments took place in Corsica, Sicily, Malta and the Ionian Islands 
during wartime. Most works on the nature of British rule in the early nineteenth century 
downplay significantly the broader context of the British presence in the Ionian Islands and the 
Mediterranean in general, where British officials had to consider other regional, but 
nevertheless more pressing concerns, like strategic objectives or military expenditures. 
It needs to be emphasized here, that the thesis does not treat these constitutional 
experiments as parts of a coherent intellectual project in imperial thinking comprising the 
British Mediterranean as a whole, but rather as individual outcomes of wartime pressures, 
presenting similar strategic and political concerns. Such an example is the little studied case of 
the Anglo-Corsican kingdom, from 1794 until the Royal Navy’s temporary withdrawal to 
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Gibraltar in October 1797.77 Another example is Sicily, where another short-lived constitutional 
experiment took place in 1806 under William Bentinck’s administration.78 Of immense strategic 
importance for the British during the Napoleonic Wars, Sicily was the main outpost and a 
crucial entrepôt, the Headquarters of British troops in the Mediterranean.79 The failure of the 
constitution in Sicily caused negative reactions towards Bentinck’s administration from other 
British officials, including Thomas Maitland. Strategic considerations were as significant – and 
surely more immediate – in these constitutional experiments in wartime than a ‘desire to 
universalize the Anglo-Saxon way of life’.80  
In any case, one might understand very little about British constitutional experiments in 
the Mediterranean, unless these endeavours in the area are considered within their historical 
and military contexts. This premise is essential when we will consider the wider implications of 
British presence on the Ionian Islands later on. In short, this thesis is more concerned with the 
history of the British Mediterranean not as an intellectual project and a coherent political unit 
in imperial thinking, but rather as a site where varied imperial projects presented similar 
characteristics; not a history of the Mediterranean as a regional unit, but a history in the 
Mediterranean, a crucial difference in studies on the Mediterranean. 
 
                                                     
77 Compared to others, English-speaking literature on the Anglo-Corsican kingdom is seriously lacking. For example, 
see Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom and Its Role in Britain's 
Mediterranean Strategy During the Revolutionary War, 1793-1797 (London, 1985); Elisa A. Carrillo, ‘The Corsican 
Kingdom of George III’, The Journal of Modern History, 34:3 (Sep. 1962), pp. 254-274. 
78 Roselli, Lord William Bentinck. 
79 I would like to thank Robert Holland for informing me of the British Headquarters in Sicily. The discussions I have 
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Map I. The Ionian Islands in 1830. Source: Robert Holland, Blue-Water Empire. The British in the 
Mediterranean since 1800 (London, 2013), p. xviii 
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Literature Review and conceptual frameworks  
  Earlier historiography on the islands was influenced greatly by the Union with Greece in 
1864 and the Greek irredentist Megali Idea (Great Idea) of the nineteenth century. Anglokratia 
has been the topic for many works in Ionian historiography. In the nineteenth century, almost 
all of them were preoccupied with the union of the islands with Greece, Enosis. Historical-
writing in the late nineteenth century on the islands was dominated by works of writers such as 
Panayiotis Chiotis or Ermannos Lountzis.81 Works in Greek by historians such as Chiotis’ History 
of the Ionian State (1874-1878), who came from the island of Zante, have formed a historical 
canon on the history of the islands under a nationalist light.82 These works are still considered 
standard authorities on the period of British rule (Anglokratia in Greek), also because of the 
irreplaceable primary material they utilized, since lost to German bombings and the destruction 
of libraries in Zante and Corfu during the Second World War.83 
Admittedly, one cannot help but note that even in Modern Greek historiography the 
islands are struggling to find their place: although ‘designed to give a general overview of the 
recent trends in Greek historiography’, for example, Kitroeff’s 1989 overview article only 
mentions an Ionian historian once, and does not mention the history of the islands at all.84 
Some works have adopted a strong focus on the islands’ connections with the Greek state after 
the 1830s, while others consider the wider developments across the empire and tend to view 
the protectorate as an example of a failed colonial experiment; both tendencies, however, take 
the union with Greece as a major milestone.  
 
                                                     
81 Chiotis, Panagiotis, Istoria tou Iouniou Kratous apo systaseos aytou mechri Enoseos (eti 1815-1864), 2 volumes 
(Zante, 1874-1878), [History of the Ionian state from its formation until the Union with Greece (1815-1864)]; H. 
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83Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 17; Calligas, “‘The Rizospastai’, p. 302. 
84 Alexander Kitroeff,  ‘Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography,’ European History Quarterly, 
19:2 (April 1989), pp. 269-299. 
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Historiography of the Ionian Islands: Key Issues. 
The historical works mentioned below have provided different perspectives in Ionian 
historiography, following nevertheless a certain trajectory throughout time, the period of 
British rule (1815-1864): James Tumelty’s thesis ‘The Ionian Islands under British 
administration’ for example, was essentially a work on the history on foreign relations, colonial 
policy and their impact on ‘British administration’, focusing exclusively on official 
correspondence. His story was a story of failures and mistakes from the British perspective, 
which ended in the union with Greece. Eleni Calligas’ thesis ‘The Rizospastai’ (the Radical-
Unionists) chose a perspective closer to Greek history, with a sharper focus on social, rather 
than political, history. More recent works were the works by Thomas W. Gallant and Maria 
Paschalidi. Both of these works followed a cultural and postcolonial turn, discussing at length 
modes of discourse, everyday forms of resistance, and cultural representations. Lastly, Sakis 
Gekas’ recent work has been closer to the interests of this thesis, but also focused on discussing 
the economic and political controversies of the protectorate mentioned above, which led to the 
union with Greece. This section discusses these works and summarizes the key issues in Ionian 
historiography. 
Largely because of the protectorate’s peculiar place as a half-colony, historiography of 
British rule in the Ionian Islands has often perceived the place of the islands in the empire as 
anomalous, with the phase of state-formation passing through a long period of 
experimentation. Historians of the islands have been at pains to find parallels and establish 
comparisons between similar state structures, globally or across the empire at the time. In 
many ways, the present thesis argues that this is the case in Ionian historiography because of 
two major conceptual paradigms dominating historical writing on the islands: the creation of 
the Greek State and the assumption that there was a uniformity of the British Empire 
throughout the nineteenth century. This section will analyse the problems occurring from the 
first approach.   
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 Following the same chronology of the whole period of Anglokratia, Tumelty’s thesis was 
explicitly about British administration on the islands.85 His thesis was submitted in 1952, when 
decolonization was well under way across the empire. Although often neglected, Tumelty’s 
thesis remains a standard text on the subject.86 British rule and the constitutional character of 
the administration was the main topic of his work, tracing how the political nature of the 
protectorate was deeply influenced by its first governor, High Commissioner Thomas Maitland. 
His study was influenced by contemporary tendencies in historical writing which favoured the 
history of international relations and Britain’s role worldwide.87 Following a similar approach in 
chronology as later studies, Tumelty’s main argument was that the protectorate was 
problematic from the beginning; governing the islands became even more difficult after the 
Greek Revolution of 1821 as the impact of political nationalism grew also on the islands. His 
thesis has been used by other historians as a main source for understanding the Anglo-Ionian 
government (or Ionian State). C.A. Bayly, for example, drew on it to explain Maitland's system 
as an ideal example of 'proconsular regimes' developed in the Mediterranean, South Africa and 
elsewhere, after the Napoleonic Wars.88 But Tumelty’s study had also problems: his starting 
point seems also to be the union with Greece, describing the union as a culmination of an 
inevitable process. Perhaps he was influenced by debates on decolonization and the transfer of 
power from colonial to nation states in Britain during the 1950s. Also, in terms of the wider 
literature, his thesis was written before seminal developments in imperial history took place, 
such as Robinson and Gallagher's famous article on the imperialism of free trade.89 As expected 
for a work of his time, this study was not concerned much with the wider politics of the empire, 
nor with technologies of power such as new forms of knowledge in colonial governance.   
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 Written considerably later, Eleni Calligas’ thesis was interested in the development of 
the radical-unionist movement of ‘Rizospastai’ (Radicals) in the islands. The thesis, which was 
submitted to the University of London in 1994, also studied the period of British rule as a 
whole.90 Calligas’ thesis was about the growth of nationalism in the Ionian Islands, and the 
political struggles of some Ionians for union with Greece from the 1840s onwards, the Radical-
Unionists. Influenced by studies on nationalism so prominent among leading scholars at the  
London School of Economics at the time, the aim of Calligas’ study was to historicize Greek-
Ionian nation-building and to trace its origins in Ionian politics. Again, although the period of 
the thesis was 1815 and 1864, her starting point seemed to be the union with Greece and thus 
her work was preoccupied with tracing the origins of the political movement of the Unionists. In 
short, Calligas’ thesis was a useful case-study of how local social and political aspirations were 
related to political nationalism in Greece, but offered very little on imperial networks or official 
thinking in Britain.  
Since the time of Calligas’ thesis, historians of the Ionian Islands such as the works 
discussed next, have placed a greater focus on cultural and social history. Works on the Ionian 
Islands have been concerned with the impact of colonialism overall, and narratives of 
modernity. 
 With a strong background in the fields of archaeology and anthropology, Thomas 
Gallant’s book Experiencing Dominion (2002) is essentially a compilation of articles published 
during the 1990s, on the colonial period of Ionian history.91 Evidently inspired by the ‘golden 
age’ of social and cultural histories, as well as by a post-colonial form of analysis, the essays 
examine how colonialism operated on different levels. Gallant looks at different aspects of daily 
life on the islands during Anglokratia, including popular protest, Ionian stereotypical 
characteristics, gender roles or charitable institutions. Put together, and drawing on theories 
from cultural history and anthropology, Experiencing Dominion wants to explain what Gallant 
calls 'colonial experience'. Rather descriptively, the book acknowledges three consecutive 
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phases during Anglokratia: the early period from the beginning of the protectorate in 1816 until 
the creation of the Greek State in 1832, the ‘Reformist’ period in the islands (1832-1848), and 
the period when the islands became ‘ungovernable’ until the final union with Greece (1848-
1864).92  
However, in reality there is little interest in explaining the ‘colonizers’ view, even though 
the book wants to capture ‘the experience of imperial rule shared by Britons and Greeks’. This 
book was seminal more for the inspiration of engaging more with cultural history and 
anthropology, than for its coherence of argument. Gallant’s book has been criticized since then, 
for the use of evidence it presents, for ‘downplaying contradictions and ‘privileging continuities’ 
in the primary material.93 Similarly, and with good reason, the book has been criticized for 
taking little account of the diversity of Ionian society, which consisted of Jewish, Catholic and 
Greek Orthodox religious communities, and Italian, Turkish and Greek elements.94  
 Maria Paschalidi’s thesis Constructing Ionian Identities (2009) can be located within the 
new imperial history approach. More concerned with wider politics and cultural 
representations across the empire than was the case for earlier scholars, Paschalidi stated her 
interest in examining colonial ‘difference’ from the outset. Clearly influenced by post-colonial 
and post-structuralist forms of analysis, Paschalidi’s thesis discussed metropole and colony 
within a single analytical frame. Her work was influenced by older as well as more recent works 
on national identity and the relation between metropole and the colony: Catherine Hall's work, 
Edward Said's Orientalism, Frederick Cooper and Anne Laura Stoler's Tensions of Empire, to 
name just a few.95  
Like earlier work, Paschalidi's thesis addressed colonial governance during the whole 
period of British rule (1815-1864), but placed a greater emphasis on the connections between 
political practices, colonial discourses and power. She claimed that British understandings of 
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the Ionians 'led to complex negotiations of otherness, informing the development of varieties 
of colonial rule’.96 The thesis is generally written around two main themes: official discourses 
concerning race and ethnicity, and the global dimension of colonial rule ‘set in the context of 
political reforms that occurred in Britain and the Empire during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, especially in the white settler colonies, such as Canada and Australia’.97 However, it is 
worth mentioning here, that there is in fact very little information in Paschalidi’s thesis on 
colonial expansion during the early nineteenth century, nor on any parallels with other 
colonies. The impression is almost as if colonial expansion started during Victorian times. 
Paschalidi provides some very useful insights regarding the free rein from London that some 
colonial governors had to experiment with different forms of government in the islands. 
However, like Gallant, she drew an overwhelming focus on cultural representations, with little 
explanation of how stereotypes on Ionian people actually worked to produce colonial power on 
the ground.    
Most recently, the political and economic contradictions that made the islands a ‘failed’ 
colonial experiment are also the main concern of Sakis Gekas’ recent book, Xenocracy (2017).98 
Drawing from a wide range of primary material in Greek and British archives, Gekas’ book was 
well-researched and discussed developments with a consistent comparison to similar 
developments across the empire. Xenocracy is more economically and socially oriented than, 
for example, Paschalidi or Gallant’s work. The book focuses more on the deteriorating 
conditions and contradictions between ‘colonial liberalism and local radicalism’ in the islands, 
instead of colonial discourse over Ionian identities, as Paschalidi did.99 In regards to the early 
period of British rule in the islands, however, Gekas’ book has been particularly useful for the 
writing of the present thesis due to his analysis of the Ionian ‘commercial bourgeoisie’, which 
was the topic of Gekas’ PhD thesis.100 We would expect more explanation, however, on the 
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political involvement of the Ionian ‘commercial bourgeoisie’ in Ionian political scene, or their 
connections with the elites.    
 All the works mentioned above have sought to explain the reasons for Britain ceding the 
islands to Greece in 1864. From a Greek perspective, the discussion on the circumstances for 
the union of the islands with the mainland offer a fresh, decentralized approach from 
conventional accounts which have systematically neglected regions in modern Greece that 
were under Christian and European rule. For years, historians of the Ionian Islands have 
debated how and why the islands indeed became ungovernable for Britain, creating at the 
same time a precedent in imperial policymaking in the Mediterranean, especially considering 
British entanglements in Cyprus or even Crete during the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.101 
However, to view the origins of the protectorate from the perspective of the union with Greece 
is misleading. In terms of periodization and chronology, the present thesis took to heart the 
warning stated in Xenocracy, that historians on the islands failed to avoid ‘the cardinal sin of 
the profession and consider transitional what at the time seemed indefinite’.102 On the 
negative, Xenocracy has been using the term ‘colonial governmentality’ to describe very 
different social and economic processes. For example, in Chapter four (‘Colonial Knowledge and 
the Making of Ionian governmentality’) he associates themes which are assumed to 
encapsulate the characteristics of the modern state (i.e. state surveillance, regulation of 
movement, integration of statistics in governance) but offers no sufficient evidence that these 
were consistent policies of the Ionian State, or why these were different from previous 
rulers.103 At the same time, notions of governmentality are not entirely clear: on the one hand, 
the book recognizes that ‘colonial modernity in the Ionian Islands … was very much the result of 
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Ionians’, but on the other the term is frequently used to describe the ‘rule of difference’ or how 
the Anglo-Ionian State was regulating Ionian lives to conform with European modernity.104 
 
Categories of rule, colonial knowledge and governance in early-nineteenth century  
There is another strand of literature in imperial history that explores the relationship 
between cultural representations, stereotypes and colonial rule.105 Similar concerns appear in 
Ionian historiography. The aim of this section is two-fold: first to discuss how Ionian 
historiography has explored colonial knowledge and rule, and second, to discuss some works in 
imperial history that helped to shape the framework of the thesis more broadly.  
Two problems are recurring in Ionian historiography: firstly, the tendency to read 
travellers accounts and official correspondence in the same field; and secondly, the assumption 
that British officials were using stereotypes solely to create categories of rule. This was not only 
the case, and British officials were often heightening such knowledge, playing out on widely 
accepted notions of Ionians amongst British officials in London, but to defend their own 
reputation. Such an example is the case of Parga in chapter five. Finally, the section looks at 
relevant literature on colonial governance in the early-nineteenth century that illuminate 
broader tendencies of colonial rule at the time of the British protectorate in the Ionian Islands.  
Regarding cultural representations, in Experiencing Dominion, Gallant’s book examined 
stereotypes and cultural analogies that he perceived British officials sought to construct 
identities and categorize Ionians in order to rule them: ‘whether it was as Oriental poohbahs in 
bourgeois garb, Balkan Hottentots, or swarthy Paddies, one overarching conclusion flowed 
from any one of these identities: the Greeks were a baser, uncivilized race that was unworthy 
and incapable of self-rule’.106 Cultural representations, however, were rarely homogenous or 
even applicable in the Ionian case, and the mere fact that Experiencing Dominion presents 
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42 
 
diverse British approaches to Greek (and as an extent, Ionian Greek) cultural identities as a 
coherent project, is quite problematic.  
There is little question of the existence of cultural stereotyping in the British world 
during the nineteenth century, but we do need to question whether the existence of 
stereotypes explains everything there is to know about colonial rule. Therefore, the emphasis 
placed in Experiencing Dominion on ‘swarthy Paddies, Black Irish’ etc. is not entirely helpful. 
Indeed, during the early years of British rule in the islands, it is in fact anachronistic, as it gives 
very little evidence that cultural analogies were a recurring practice amongst officials in the 
empire, especially between Ionians and the Irish. Gallant’s book reflects a broader excessive 
focus on colonial discourse and cultural depictions of Ionians, drawn almost exclusively from 
travellers’ accounts. Experiencing Dominion is thus little concerned with official views of 
Ionians.107 Connections between stereotypes, colonial knowledge and rule are at best implicit, 
and there is little evidence to show how cultural stereotyping directly influenced governance. 
The present study addresses the question whether such stereotypes were utilized in colonial 
governance to create social and cultural categories, looking for more explicit mention in official 
correspondence of these stereotypes and their influence on policy.  
Maria Paschalidi similarly views identity-formation and specifically the ways that Ionian 
identities were articulated in official discourse, as a central prerequisite in forming a logic of 
government.108 More explicitly, for Paschalidi, such stereotypical characteristics often seemed 
to be justification amongst British officials of why the islands should be under British 
protection: because, according to the British ‘colonial discourse’, they were unable to govern 
themselves. However, this study argues that in the case of the islands, such overemphasis on 
colonial difference and Ionian representations in order to explain colonial rule, is largely 
misplaced. Clearly, many British officials were as freighted as many other Europeans who 
travelled to the islands and the mainland with preconceived ideas, who expected to see 
descendants of ancient Greeks, and were often disappointed. However, British perceptions of 
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the Ionians were hazy and rarely uniform. After all, a myriad of cultural, religious, social and 
political differences were prevalent amongst Greeks themselves, not only in the Ionian Islands 
but also across the Greek-speaking world.  
To bring an example on the methodological issue on travellers’ accounts and official 
correspondence. Many British who travelled in the islands and published travellers’ accounts 
after – most of them military and medical officials who served in the Ionian Islands – had been 
very vocal in characterizing Ionians and Greeks in general. All of them distinguished between 
Greeks on the islands and the mainland, and none of them stayed in Greece for too long. For 
example, Tertius Kendrick, a medical official who served under Maitland, wrote about the 
‘Septinsulars’ (Ionians): ‘The Septinsulars are implicated two ways: - the first, in committing 
piracies and robberies on the Albanian, Moreot [Morea, modern Peloponnese], and Turkish 
coasts; the second, in devising means to liberate themselves by treachery from the British 
government’.109 In theory, Maitland would have agreed with Kendrick on his characterization of 
Ionians as intriguers. Traveller’s accounts, however, were rarely adopting something more than 
general characteristics and there can be many objections here over the reception of such works 
by British officials: there have been no explicit mentions of these authors for example in official 
correspondence, or evidence that these works were considered as something more than 
‘bedtime stories’ by contemporaries. Kendrick’s work, for example, is very seldom referenced 
by other contemporary authors, yet he is referenced by modern works as an authoritative 
source in describing British representations of Ionians.  
Paschalidi, for example, includes Kendrick in other travel texts about the islands, written 
between 1822 and 1864: ‘the travellers were unable to reconstruct Ionian culture in its totality 
and, like travellers elsewhere, they selected details in Ionian culture and used them to 
represent the culture as a whole’.110 There was, therefore, a crucial difference between cultural 
representations and how representations directly affected British governance in the islands, 
                                                     
109 Tertius Kendrick, The Ionian Islands (London, 1822), p. ix. 
110 Apart from Kendrick, the authors Paschalidi mentions are: William Goodison, Frances Maclellan, Edward Lear, 
Thomas Ansted and Viscount Kirkwall (Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 44). 
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and these depictions should not be taken as self-evident or benchmarks of how British officials 
were thinking about the islanders.   
As previous sections have tried to show here, the bulk of the information that was kept 
in governmental records came from consular officials, agents, or other officials in the localities. 
British officials who served in the Ionian Islands were generally consulting these reports. The 
role of the governor, however, was decisive when organizing information, or the ways and 
extent that such representations would be integrated in official thinking. These were typical 
characteristics of colonial governance in the early-nineteenth century.  
C.A. Bayly's Imperial Meridian for example, constitutes one of the more characteristic 
analyses of colonial governance at the time, up to date. Imperial Meridian sought to revise 
Whig interpretations of imperial history. One aspect of his book, particularly useful in 
comparing British expansion in the Mediterranean with elsewhere in the empire, was his 
examination of 'proconsular despotisms'. By proconsular despotisms Bayly meant the 
'prevailing ethos of loyalism, royalism and aristocratic military virtue' cultivated by most 
colonial governors. This was widely compatible with 'the aims and attitudes of the regimes of 
the new conservatism in Great Britain’.111 Colonial governors had a free rein whilst the Colonial 
Office was politically weak. These 'revivified colonial regimes' were based on racial 
subordination and the fear of republicanism. This vice regal despotism, Bayly tells us, was not 
so successful in some areas such as Ireland, but was more successful in others such as in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.112 Similar characteristics of personal despotism of colonial governors 
were evident in Canada, Australia and India. Bayly's book is useful in making global comparisons 
of colonial state formation and will be useful in further comparing the case of the Ionian Islands 
with the development of the colonial state elsewhere. 
Jon E. Wilson's The Domination of Strangers (2008) examined the issue of colonial 
governance in India during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries. The book was 
influenced by debates on the emergence of political modernity in Europe and the rest of the 
                                                     
111 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 194-195. 
112 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, p. 199. 
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world, conducted by sociologists and philosophers such as Max Weber and Michel Foucault, as 
well as by historians such as Eric Stokes and Oliver MacDonagh. Wilson's input was different, as 
he claimed that such policies did not develop from a 'confident desire to transform South Asia' 
but by the 'anxious, insecure attitude to Indian society'.113 Wilson came to agree with C.A. Bayly 
on his argument regarding the crisis of the old aristocratic order.114 Transitions in colonial 
governance in India from early colonial rule onwards, were one of the main concerns of 
Wilson's work. He noted that one of the most crucial characteristics of British rule in India was 
the emergence of an 'abstract, objectivising style of thought' where British officials were ruled 
by the 'instinct to classify and generalise' Indian forms of life.115 This thesis poses similar 
questions on the ways that British administration in the Ionian Islands collected and particularly 
organized information on the islanders, and the extent that this process was similar as 
elsewhere in the empire at the time, i.e. India.   
 
Structure and Summary of Chapters 
Chapter one provides a historical overview of the period of Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars in the Mediterranean from 1797 until British troops landed on the islands in 
1809. Focusing on this period, the chapter examines the shift of British official attitudes 
towards the Mediterranean and particularly the importance that the islands started to play in 
British strategy. In terms of communications and ‘grand strategy’, it argues that the islands 
were not considered a passage to India by British officials, but rather as a strategic outpost in 
close proximity to the Ottoman Empire which gradually grew in importance in wartime. It 
argues that the turning points towards the occupation of the islands were the Treaty of Tilsit in 
1807 and the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809. The islands were ordered to be occupied by 
Lord Collingwood, a decision which did not come from metropolitan quarters, but from officers 
serving in the Mediterranean.  
                                                     
113 Wilson, The Domination of Strangers, p. 4. 
114 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, passim.  
115Wilson, The Domination, p. 12. 
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Utilizing the case of the British consul in the islands, Spiridion Foresti, chapter two 
examines the impact of information that British officials received on the islands through 
consular networks, and how this particular consul opened channels of communication with 
nearby areas for the British. Furthermore, Foresti was an important ‘go-between’ who took part 
in local power networks and played an active role in promoting Britain’s presence. Supporting 
British protection, he was convinced that British rule would improve the social and political 
conditions in the islands. However, under the new colonial administration he was removed 
from office on charges of corruption and was marginalized from administration. His case is 
indicative of the anxieties of Maitland’s administration about what he perceived to be the 
influence of the Ionian elites, and particularly regarding how the new administration was 
relying on patronage and direct control of information instead of devolution and the 
establishment of institutions and state mechanism.    
Chapter three looks at the period when a provisional government was established in the 
islands, from their occupation in 1809 until the islands passed under Britain’s protection in 
1815. During this time, three successive civil commissioners managed the administration of the 
Ionian Islands. While administration in the islands was put into an indeterminate state until the 
formal cession, this period was yet very formative in cementing British presence in the region. 
In order to show how imperial presence was solidified, the chapter discusses how British 
presence in the islands acted as a nodal point for information and intellectual networks, as well 
as economic integration in the region. As such, it explains how, contrary to the ambivalent 
status of the islands amongst European powers, the establishment of overlapping networks in 
the islands played also a crucial role in British considerations at the diplomatic table.   
Chapter four explores disease-control, statistics and official information-gathering more 
broadly, by a closer examination of the plague that broke out in Corfu between 1815 and 1816. 
The aim of chapter four is two-fold: on the one hand, it studies plague-control and similarities 
as well as differences between the British and the Venetian practices in controlling the disease 
in the islands. On the other hand, it examines how information accumulated from the plague in 
Corfu was synthesized and organized. More specifically, it observes how British and Ionian 
officials sought to control the disease, and how the accumulated medical data was organized. It 
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argues that the collection of medical knowledge and statistics was rarely part of a carefully 
thought-out official strategy, but rather the outcome of individual experience, military 
measures, and metropolitan debates on scientific knowledge. In all respects, the efforts of 
military and medical officials alike – both British and Ionian physicians – had substantially 
utilized previously held institutions and local networks, and were aiming more to the 
improvement of the Venetian institutions than their radical transformation. Overall, the 
relationship between gathering information and state measures was more related to disease-
control in the islands, or to medical debates in Britain, and more loosely related to the growth 
of the Anglo-Ionian state and institutions in the islands. In this way, the chapter finds common 
ground with relevant studies of Britain in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, than 
with works on the mid and late-nineteenth century empire.116   
The period after 1816 in the islands was marked by anticipation amongst the Ionians as 
for the new administration, which was identified with the character of its high commissioner, 
Sir Thomas Maitland. Ionian historiography has emphasized Maitland’s despotic style of rule 
and the definitive role he played for the future ambivalent status of the protectorate as a half-
way colony, whose ambivalence became indefinite under the Constitution of 1817. Chapter 
five, then, examines the formative period between 1816 and 1819, and specifically how 
dependent the political and constitutional character of the protectorate was on the experience, 
personality and ideology of its new high commissioner. The chapter also argues that the 
reasons for the ambivalence of the protectorate were not merely constitutional as is often 
assumed, but owed to broader – and certainly similar with other parts of the empire – 
characteristics of early-nineteenth century colonial governance, where the role of the British 
governor was central. Methodologically, at this deeply unsettling stage for the islands, this 
study takes issue with Foucauldian approaches that associate political control with a more 
‘scientific’ approach on governance for the period under study.117 While British officials indeed 
sought to record the population, and ‘scientific’ approaches to governance in the form of 
population registers etc., were increasingly becoming part of European state structures, 
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circumstances in the Ionian Islands allowed for mixed approaches to governance, and which 
were more dependent on the British governor.  
Chapter six discusses two developments that ended the origins of the protectorate 
which started in wartime and ended during early 1820s: the Greek Revolution that began in 
1821 and the increasing metropolitan pressures on colonial governors to systematize and to 
process statistical information from the colonies, which is known as the information revolution. 
In both of these developments, British governance of the islands was closely connected with 
Maitland’s administration. Starting from the peasant rebellion that broke out in the island of 
Santa Maura in 1819, one rebellion followed another culminating in the crisis that broke out in 
the 1820s. During that time, British officials proclaimed martial law for prolonged periods of 
time, in response to the possibility of the revolution which was threatening to spread to the 
islands. In the mainland, it would be the beginning of the creation of the Greek state, and the 
protectorate would thus enter into a new phase where Ionians could look to this entity, should 
they become disappointed by the Ionian State. British officials were successful in enforcing 
‘tranquility’ in the islands and in maintaining control over the protectorate, but this period 
marked another phase of Anglokratia, where this thesis ends.  
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Chapter 1: Prime movers and the wartime origins of Anglo-Ionian 
connection, 1797-1809 
 
‘Among the numerous essential benefits accruing to Great Britain from the 
possession of Corfu is to be reckoned the very important one of its being an 
observatory over the whole of European Turkey. By knowing the movements 
and occurrences that take place within and proper measures may be taken by 
Great Britain accordingly, either of preparation of counteract, of cooperation 
or of palliation’.118 
 
 
The above quote was made two years before the occupation of the islands by British troops in 
1809, by a British official and a long-term resident in the region. William Meyer, a consular 
official, was convinced the islands would lend Britain several advantages, unlike official circles in 
London who were more ambivalent about making British presence permanent in this part of the 
Mediterranean. The thesis argues that the quote above summarizes the place of the Ionian 
Islands in the empire, whose main strategic importance for Britain in the nineteenth century was 
information and geopolitical influence, rather than commercial profit. However, as existing 
historiography has already shown, the Anglo-Ionian connection marked the beginning of a longer 
period of ambivalence in London about their place in the empire. This chapter illuminates the 
origins of this connection.  
 
  
                                                     
118 The quote is part of one of Meyer’s long reports on the islands, titled ‘Some Political and Military Details of the 
Island of Corfu …’, kept today in TNA FO 42/9, Meyer to George Canning, Kew, Surr[e]y, 12 December 1807. 
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Protection, geopolitical imperatives and the establishment of the Anglo-Ionian 
connection, 1798-1801 
After an agreement between the victorious Quadruple Alliance (Britain, Austria, Prussia 
and Russia), the Ionian Islands passed under British protection with the Treaty of Paris 
(November 1815). The new protectorate was named The United States of the Ionian Islands. 
According to the treaty, the islands would form ‘a single, free, and independent State under the 
denomination of the United States of the Ionian Islands’, which, in turn would be placed ‘under 
the immediate and exclusive protection’ of the United Kingdom.119 British protection should 
‘…secure to the islanders the full exercise of their religion, a joint degree of civil liberty, and the 
freedom of commerce. … in conjunction with the principal inhabitants’.120 As Judith Blow 
Williams wrote, ‘disillusionment with the old type of colony and both the ever-present threat 
and the opportunities of war dictated a new type of holding: a small strategic spot, preferably 
an island, easily defensible, and at the same time capable of tapping a populous potential 
market’.121 These wartime acquisitions were overseen by several departments of the British 
government instead of by one.122 The Ionian Islands belonged to the same category of holding.  
As we will see in the next chapters, the Ionian protectorate was nominally an 
independent state, but in reality was governed as a colony. For good reason, historians prefer 
the terms semi-colony or half-colony to describe the protectorate.123 In fact, the official 
language of protection and the legal ambiguity that followed the Treaty of Paris has been 
emphasized as pointing to the peculiar and anomalous place of the islands within the empire.124 
While this thesis takes into account how this legal ambiguity played out in imperial thinking, it 
focuses more on studying how wartime origins and later security imperatives shaped 
constitutional development and imperial presence in general on the islands. Indeed, when 
                                                     
119 Articles I and II in Appendix F. The Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands. 1815 in Henry 
Jervis, White-Jervis, History of the Island of Corfu, and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands (London, 1852), pp. 201, 
292, 293. 
120 TNA CO 136/300, Bunbury to Maitland, London 16 August 1815. 
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122 Andrew Porter, ‘Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century’ in The Oxford History of the 
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considering these wartime origins and the decision to send British troops to occupy the islands 
in 1809, it is contingency that should be emphasized over any long-term official thinking. At the 
same time, while the political content of protection and its wartime origins is a recurring theme 
throughout the present study, it would be useful first to examine some typologies and 
misconceptions about the strategic place of the islands.   
In some ways, Charles James Napier’s typology of the islands might seem characteristic 
of the matter. Napier was a British officer who served as a Resident (governor) on the island of 
Cephalonia, and who later became known as the ‘terror of Sind’, serving as a governor in Sindh, 
modern-day Pakistan.125 In his book The Colonies (1833), he divided the ‘colonies of England’ 
into three categories: the first consisted of those which were important to Britain ‘from their 
extent of territory and rich productions’, like the East and West Indies; the second consisted of 
colonies with an importance in war and in commerce without producing much wealth, like 
Gibraltar, Malta and Bermuda; in the third category were the Ionian Islands, Canada and the 
Cape. These colonies, Napier wrote, had not contributed much to war or wealth, but had ‘an 
extent of territory and population united to a political and commercial importance, that, by 
good government, may become productive of wealth and power to Great Britain’.126 Although 
Napier’s observations were written in a later period, he emphasized the direct economic or 
political advantages that might accrue to Britain through its control of the islands, their as-yet 
unrealized potential to become a profitable entrepôt and a model-colony.     
                                                     
125 Sir Charles James Napier (1782-1853) served as the governor of Cephalonia between 1822 and 1830, and not 
between 1809 and 1816 as is mentioned before (Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 96). The years he was 
a governor in the island he later described as ‘the happiest in his life’. Born in London, he later established 
connections with Ireland when his family moved in Celbridge, Co. Kildare, in 1785. Because of Ireland, Napier became 
aware of bad government and the misery of the colonized. During the Greek revolution of 1821, he became a 
passionate supporter of Greek independence. After having served in the Peninsular and American wars (1808-1814) 
and the Ionian Islands, Napier was appointed in Bombay (1841) and then became a Governor of Sind, modern-day 
Pakistan (Ainslie T. Embree, ‘Sir Charles James Napier’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford, 2004), 
available online: 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.bris.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-19748 (December 2016)). 
126 Sir Charles James Napier, The Colonies: treating of their value generally-of the Ionian Islands in particular (London, 
1833), p. 1. 
   
52 
 
The Ionian Islands should be studied within the framework of wartime maritime 
acquisitions like the Cape (taken from the Dutch in 1806) or Mauritius – both formally ceded in 
1815 – as the product of conquest.127 Furthermore, the importance of the islands in maritime 
communications and commerce, as well as the strategic leverage that the islands would provide 
for Britain in her relations with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, makes the islands an 
interesting case of Britain’s acquisitions in wartime.  
Aside from trade, controlling sea lanes brought advantages in maritime communications 
and the collection of military and economic information. For example, the British consul in the 
Ionian Islands, Spiridion Foresti, in correspondence with foreign secretary William Grenville in 
1793, noted the lack of activity of an otherwise vibrant British commerce in western Greece and 
the Ionian Sea.128 Overall, after the declaration of war in February 1793, significant delays and 
unexpected losses arose in communication and processing information to London with the 
detainment of British merchant ships in the region.129 While in 1793 commercial traffic in the 
eastern Mediterranean had significantly declined, the state-controlled Levant Company had 
factories spread across the Ottoman Empire. Agents of the company were obtaining 
intelligence on trade fluctuations, but also valuable political information which was 
communicated to London. Intelligence from the Mediterranean, of course, was fragmented 
evidence, a result of commercial gossip, newspapers, and countless other sources of 
intelligence, often circulating in information markets such as Lloyd’s Coffee House.130 The war 
with France forced the British to speed up the race for information, and to systematize the 
collection of military intelligence.  
Contingency is a factor that is generally acknowledged in Ionian historiography but 
rarely taken into account: the literature instead focuses on interpretations related to economic 
imperialism, or as a step towards global hegemony and as a ‘stepping stone’ to India, instead of 
the fine and shifting diplomatic balances of wartime and the unpredictable parts played by 
                                                     
127 John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (London, 2013), p. 37. 
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individual military officers operating in the Mediterranean.131 Focusing on the latter, this 
chapter explains how the Ionian Islands entered British strategic planning, the place of the 
islands in imperial thinking, as well as the information milieu of British officials in regards to the 
islands. As some relevant studies have explained, the islands began to be included in British 
strategic thinking during Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt in 1798-1801.  
Ensuring the security of communications played a large role in the decision to send 
British troops to the islands. But again, historical interpretations of imperial thinking in the early 
nineteenth century, and regarding the Ionian Islands in particular, tend to cast the 
circumstances of the post-Napoleonic era — even the mid-nineteenth century — back in time 
in order to explain the cession of the islands. When accounting for the prime movers behind the 
cession of the islands in 1809, for example, one of the most characteristic misconceptions 
among historians is the supposed significance of the islands to global communications, and 
specifically as an outpost on the overland route to India.132 This assumption, that the cession of 
the islands was secured in order to enhance communications with India, is misleading. This 
assumption has gained remarkable traction among historians of the Ionian Islands, with very 
few exceptions.133 While the overland route to India through Egypt and the Suez isthmus would 
take less time to travel in theory, the passage was nevertheless much more unstable and 
hazardous, as Napoleon’s campaign to Egypt had shown. Furthermore, Britain had to rely on 
the Ottoman government for overland routes, in a period where Anglo-Ottoman relations were 
not stable.134 It would take until the building of the Suez Canal in 1869 for overland routes to 
India via the Mediterranean to become safer from banditry, war and political turbulence. 
Sea lanes past Africa and the Cape can be posited as a more realistic example of 
passages to India.135 Sailing times round the Cape would vary between four months to a year, 
                                                     
131 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, pp. 74-79; Tumelty’s work is an exception (‘The Ionian Islands’), 
passim. 
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with six months being a ‘rough average’.136 While travelling times were shorter, the route to 
India in the southern Atlantic and Indian oceans was safer and secured by troop movements 
and the establishment of a chain of coastal stations in St. Helena, the Cape and Mauritius.137 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, an attack on India through southern Africa and 
the Cape was more possible, but it was especially the importance of the Cape as a military 
entrepôt and its proximity to India which became apparent during the wars with France. As 
Wellesley told Dundas in 1800: ‘the importance of the Cape in its relation to India increases 
every hour; and the connection between the settlements becomes more intimate in every view 
of our military, political, and commercial interests’.138 In contrast with the Cape, there were no 
explicit mentions associating the Ionian Islands with routes to India during the wars with 
France.  
Misconceptions about the place of the islands in sea routes and maritime 
communications can be attributed to Russian plans to invade Britain’s territories in India in 
1801, which were quickly abandoned. Also, they derive from the confusion in official 
correspondence as to Napoleon’s strategy, where French attempts to conceal strategic targets 
by leaking false information were quite common. As Robert Holland wrote, ‘blurring places and 
military logic, underlines a persistent difficulty in explaining Great Britain’s role in the 
Mediterranean’.139 As we will see, the importance of the Ionian Islands lay on being an 
‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’, providing significant advantages in monitoring 
communication and traffic at the entrance to the Adriatic and the Balkans to any power that 
controlled them.   
As we will see later, the place of the islands in maritime communications indeed played 
a key role in imperial thinking, but more in regards to the ‘closed system’ of the eastern 
Mediterranean and the shifting realities of war. In terms of naval communications and 
                                                     
136 P. J. Marshall, ‘Introduction’ in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, volume II. The 
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138 Quote from McAleer, ‘The Key to India’, pp. 298, 314. 
139 Holland, Blue-Water Empire, p. 13. 
   
55 
 
information, what needs to be emphasized is that the islands entered British war plans because 
the Royal Navy was starved of information in the eastern Mediterranean. This chapter, 
therefore, examines the origins of the official Anglo-Ionian connection, as well as the wider 
unexpected complexities that British officials experienced with their involvement in the area. 
This revision makes a case for a British defensive strategy against potential French attacks to 
India, rather than a carefully thought-out plan to secure India via naval posts in the 
Mediterranean.140 Robert Holland, for example, mentioned the importance of Egypt for the 
British not as a stepping stone to India, but ‘in a mirror-image of Napoleon’s own fascination’, 
and a ‘useful element in the struggle to gain leverage over the future of the Ottoman 
Empire’.141  
In an eighteenth century military fashion, British military engagements in the 
Mediterranean (like in Malta) were primarily considered bargaining chips for later negotiations. 
British ships initiated a blockade of the island in 1798, which ended with the landing of British 
troops on the island under Captain Ball to fight alongside the Maltese, and the French 
surrendering the island in 1800. But the continued British presence on the island was far from 
settled.142 Under the Treaty of Amiens (1802) the British agreed to withdraw from the island; 
Nelson thought of Malta as ‘a useless and enormous expense’ and several naval officers agreed 
with him. Pitt the Younger also shared similar sentiments.143 On the other hand, debates 
regarding the fate of Malta were raging on in the British parliament. Considerations on 
abandoning Malta were also met with fierce reactions, mostly from Tory politicians.144 But the 
decisive strike against the French was the battle of Aboukir in 1798. French commercial traffic 
was diminished from Marseilles to Turkey and the French navy was temporarily expelled from 
                                                     
140 On French policies, see Vernon John Puryear, France and the Levant. From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace 
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the Mediterranean.145 As relevant works on the Mediterranean have shown, however, British 
naval victories did not lead to long-term naval hegemony.146  
 
Napoleon’s campaigns of 1796-1798 and the implications for the Ionian Islands 
 It was within this context of blurring strategic aims that Nelson’s incursion in the 
Mediterranean took place. Strategically, French campaigns in Italy (1796) and Egypt (1798-
1799) brought Napoleon’s army into the eastern Mediterranean. The entrance of French troops 
into Venice brought the end of the Venetian Republic with the Treaty of Campo Formio 
(October 1797). French troops occupied the Ionian Islands as a result, abolished aristocratic 
privileges and established a more egalitarian system in 1797, causing (as would be expected) 
intense social upheaval. Local councils were established and Trees of Liberty were planted. 
Jacobin clubs were created in Cephalonia and Zante.147 The story about the islands entering 
British military plans after 1798 is more or less told, but it will be repeated here, emphasizing 
the importance of the islands in communications and the collection of military information, 
rather than economic motivations.  
 As said before, Napoleon’s successes in Italy brought French armies into the eastern 
Mediterranean and threatened the allies’ military capabilities in the region. After all, for French 
strategy the islands became increasingly important as commercial and strategic keys to the 
Levant. Acknowledging the importance of the islands, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand (the 
French foreign secretary under the Directory) that, if the French had to choose between all Italy 
and Corfu, they should keep the latter.148 But to understand the importance of the islands for 
British strategy in 1798, one has to look at the broader changes that occurred in systematizing 
information-gathering in wartime. In previous wars during the eighteenth century, like the 
American War of 1776-1783, fleets – British and French alike – were often scattered in distant 
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waters, blundering ‘aimlessly’ around America.149 Problems of communications and military 
intelligence were addressed with greater care during the wars of 1793-1815. Overall, the turn 
of military officials to intelligence-collection matched a broader interest in knowledge 
accumulation, but for the purposes of war: the Hydrographic Department was created by the 
Admiralty in 1795, for example.150 The process of centralizing knowledge into an office was not 
without problems: to a great extent naval and military information depended on individual 
initiatives.151  In fact, a successful integration of military intelligence owed much to their 
organization by experienced officers, most characteristically in the case of Wellington’s 
information networks in the Peninsular Campaign, or Nelson’s networks in the 
Mediterranean.152 
Perhaps learning from previous mistakes in communications during the wars of the 
eighteenth century, Nelson in particular took great interest in obtaining accurate and, if 
possible, timely information. In the Mediterranean, he utilized in the best way possible any 
information networks available. Surprisingly, Nelson’s published correspondence has been 
barely utilized in Ionian historiography, although it is particularly illuminating in regards to early 
British entanglements in the Ionian Islands; even more usefully, to distinguish between any 
putative grand strategy for imperial expansion and the reality of the pursuit of short-term 
military objectives.153 Most important for maritime communications was the connection 
between William Hamilton, the British Ambassador to the Kingdom of Naples (1764-1800) and 
Spiridion Foresti, in the Ionian Islands. Foresti – who was under surveillance by French 
authorities in the islands as a British agent – constantly and promptly sent information to 
Hamilton on the movements of the French fleet, on assemblage and dispatch of naval stores 
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and on the number of ships available to the French.154 Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt is a 
characteristic example of how dependent the Royal Navy on information from the 
Mediterranean. The fact is often referred to, but is rarely taken into account by historians of 
the islands, that British naval intelligence was lacking, and that Nelson’s squadron was far from 
supplies in the Mediterranean.155 After the British victory against the French fleet in Aboukir 
bay (August 1798), Foresti was able to identify French ships that fled the battle of Aboukir, and 
briefly found refuge in the port of Corfu, being reported as English prizes when in reality they 
were French ships. The role of Foresti and consular networks will be discussed later, in greater 
detail.156 
Meanwhile, the British presence in the Mediterranean, particularly after the victory at 
Aboukir, raised questions for officials as to the form the British presence should take in the 
region. British governments from Pitt onwards increasingly saw a dilemma ‘as to whether the 
British aim in the Mediterranean was simply to restore the status quo ante bellum, as Pitt 
himself preferred, or whether a more lasting commitment was being hammered into place’.157 
This dilemma persisted throughout the war, and not only in regards to British possessions in the 
Mediterranean. Most British considerations were ‘fundamentally defensive, financial, and naval 
rather than aggressively Imperial and territorial’.158  
The presence of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean in 1798 might be viewed 
as another example of how the parameters of British foreign policy were changing in wartime. 
Firstly, there were immediate military and diplomatic objectives: orders that were sent to 
                                                     
154 C.I. Chessell, ‘Britain’s Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti and Intelligence Collection’, Journal of Mediterranean 
Studies, 16:1/2 (2006), p. 60. 
155 Michael Duffy, ‘British Naval Intelligence and Bonaparte’s Egyptian Expedition of 1798’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 
84:3 (August, 1998), p. 278. 
156 William Wyndham Grenville (1759-1834) was a foreign secretary between 1791 and 1801, a prime minister in the 
government that was sarcastically called ‘ministry of all talents’ between 1806 and 1807, and the leader of the Whig 
Party (1807-1817). Grenville, a personal friend to Pitt, was committed in economic reconstruction after the loss of 
the American colonies and was responsible for the Canada Act of 1791 which repealed certain parts of Quebec Act 
in 1774 (Information from P. J. Jupp, P. ‘Grenville, William Wyndham, Baron Grenville (1759–1834)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004), available online: . 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11501?docPos=19 (December, 2016).  
157 Holland, Blue-Water Empire, p. 12. 
158 Michael Duffy, ‘World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815’ in Marshall, OHBE, II, p. 184. 
   
59 
 
British officials serving in the Mediterranean emphasized the importance of maintaining 
collaboration with the allied powers of Austria and Russia. For example, the orders that Nelson 
received during the 1790s were to guard the coasts of Sicily and the Adriatic, and to assist 
Ottoman and Russian forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean, avoiding giving any cause 
for further suspicion to the Russians.159 Ensuring collaboration with its allies was the paramount 
aim of British foreign policy, especially in cases of continental military operations when 
accurate communication between officials was needed.160 Equally, however, the growth of 
Britain’s role in the region led to significant suspicions of other European powers present in the 
region, particularly regarding threats to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, a concern that 
played out in British foreign policy since the beginnings of the so-called ‘Eastern Question’. 
British officials like Nelson were frequently concerned with keeping Russian influence away 
from the eastern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire.161  
 
The Septinsular Republic 
Reflecting the political strife they were embroiled in due to class antagonisms, as well as 
the strategic significance the islands had for European powers, the islanders were divided into 
different political parties, each supporting France, Russia or Britain. Often, European agents 
operated in the islands either by promising foreign protection to the Ionians, or by fuelling 
social tensions. For example, in the case of the French consul in Zante, Constantin Guys: the 
consul set the building of the French consulate on fire in 1796, in order to place the blame on 
anti-French sentiments among the Ionians.162 For Russia, on the other hand, the islands would 
provide a gateway to the Mediterranean, especially after 1798.163 But at the same time, Ionian 
social groups and political factions saw the occupations of their islands by French, Russian and 
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later, British troops, as opportunities to forward their own claims, whether for social reform or 
personal ambitions. This became more evident when the islanders were given nominal 
independence in 1800. As Calligas characterized this period of turmoil and political 
‘experimentation’, it ‘unleashed powerful ideas that were not given time to work off their 
novelty into a sustainable compromise’, remaining as a source of inspiration for Ionians who 
genuinely wanted social and political change.164 
Responding to the threat of Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, the Russians allied with the 
Ottomans in 1799, an alliance which was perceived by a British observer as ‘an unnatural state 
of things between those two powers’.165 In March of the same year, Russian and Ottoman 
forces took control of the Ionian Islands from the French. After the occupation of the islands, 
the new authorities established the Septinsular Republic with the help of local collaborators: a 
nominally independent state under joint Russian and Ottoman protection, offering at the same 
time limited self-government to the Ionians. The new state had the ‘fundamental principles of a 
constitution analogous to those of the modern Republic of Italy’ whose ‘true effect’ to the 
islanders could not be determined yet, as Foresti wrote later to Nelson.166 Details of the new 
Republic became known to Ionians through public proclamations. Count Mocenigo, a powerful 
Corfiote aristocrat, characterized by Foresti as the ‘engine that runs the machine’, was the 
Russian plenipotentiary and became the president of the ‘infant’ state.167 In reality, Russian 
interventions were frequent, particularly in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Septinsular 
Republic.168 The new state consisted of the seven major islands and several important coastal 
towns in mainland Greece, which had previously belonged to the Venetian sphere of 
influence.169 The creation of the new Republic was welcomed by many on the islands who 
genuinely wanted deep political and social reforms, but it would nevertheless be but a passing 
phase in this politically chaotic period on the islands. 
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The Septinsular Republic was the first independent Greek state in modern history, and, 
despite foreign protection, created an important point of reference for Ionians. In terms of 
research, a fuller picture might be drawn by studying Russian and French archives, though not 
as part of the present thesis, but rather as a multilingual collaborative project. There is, for 
example, one work on the period of the Septinsular Republic with a particular emphasis on 
Russia, which could be used as a point for further study.170 The Republic – which would have a 
short life (1798-1807) - was a legal and political entity on its own with its own consulates in 
places like Malta and the Black Sea. Passports were issued under the supervision of the 
ministers of the Septinsular Republic, Capodistrias171 and Mocenigo and have been described 
by historiography as the first time when ‘the passport was invented as a crucial tool of public 
administration’.172 This is inaccurate, however, as passport controls are hardly an invention of 
the nineteenth century.173  
The creation of the Republic gave to many Ionians the prospect of creating a central 
authority that would keep the long-lasting social and political antagonisms – and particularly 
the power of the Ionian elites – in check. For others, it gave prospects of employment, 
patronage or climbing the social ladder. Successive administrations under foreign protection, 
and administrators constantly meddling with political and social hierarchies fed into centuries-
old antagonisms, throwing the islanders into political turmoil which often ended in armed 
clashes between different factions on the islands. From the so-called ‘Byzantine Constitution’ in 
1800, which was drafted under the close supervision of the Tsar, one constitution succeeded 
the other, finally resulting in the constitution which was drafted in St. Petersburg and delivered 
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to the Ionians (1803).174 These constitutions, especially the one of 1803, theoretically provided 
the basis for the constitution that was drafted during British rule in 1817.  
Constitutional experiments in the Mediterranean empire in the early nineteenth century 
were inseparably connected with concerns over military capabilities and expenditure, more 
than with exporting legal uniformity across the empire. As we will see later, this diversity of 
locally-implemented versions of the ‘rule of law’ by British officials owed much to wartime 
origins, regional concerns of imperial policy and the governors’ previous experiences and 
ideologies. It is a crucial characteristic of early nineteenth century colonial governance.175 The 
constitution of 1803 of the Septinsular Republic reflected similar imperatives and provided the 
theoretical basis for the later constitution under British rule. For contemporaries like Foresti, 
the defence of the new state was dependent on foreign troops, but was unable to sustain a 
military force with local revenues: ‘I do not see how it is possible for this Republic to maintain 
its independence, deprived as it is of force of its own; and without some foreign military it is 
impossible for it to maintain its own internal tranquility’, adding that the revenues of the 
islands, amounting to about 300,000 Spanish dollars, could support a garrison of up to 2,000 
men. Campbell confirmed Foresti’s observations that the islands had to rely on British revenues 
to maintain a garrison.176 
But the creation of the Septinsular Republic should not be studied only in isolation, like 
previous historical works on the islands have done, but also need to be viewed in its 
Mediterranean and global dimensions.177 In the period following Aboukir bay and the birth of 
the Republic, many saw the British presence in a favourable light across the Mediterranean.  
Even more, in the Ionian Islands this rising ‘Anglomania’ seemed to be enforced by British 
assurances in return. This enthusiasm also encompassed British literary traditions and culture, 
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perhaps most commonly associated with Ugo Foscolo’s work.178 Nelson’s victory, for example, 
was celebrated by gathering crowds across the Mediterranean, such as in Naples or Malta.179 
On the Ionian Islands, more islanders, disappointed with the French and Russian occupations, 
started to see the British as protectors of their independence and commercial security. British 
officials like Nelson utilized consular and diplomatic networks in order to collect information on 
enemy movements and politics, but also to disseminate information, particularly the 
assurances of the Royal Navy to protect Ionian commerce and the independence of the 
Republic. Consuls on the spot like Foresti, who came from the island of Zante and knew the 
language and politics, proved invaluable in this sense. In fact, it can be presumed that in the 
absence of any military presence, these brokers were personifying British assurances to the 
islanders.  
Addressed directly to the islanders, Nelson’s proclamation was circulated among the 
islands. The proclamation was written in Italian and Greek, and was circulated in Corfu, Cerigo, 
Cephalonia and Zante in October 1798. Nelson promised that if the ‘provisional government’ of 
the islands hoisted the British flag, the protection of the Royal Navy was assured, without any 
tax or ‘contribution’.180 He also added that, if the inhabitants expelled the remaining French 
troops, ‘all the Admiral’ wanted was ‘French shipping and property, both of war and 
merchandize’.181 ‘Upon the whole’, he declared, his only wish was to ‘deliver good men from 
tyranny and oppression’.182  Nelson’s promises regarding the protection of Ionian commerce 
were officially confirmed by a letter from Grenville to the British ambassador in Constantinople, 
Lord Elgin, in January 1801. Britain acknowledged the creation of the new state and declared 
that the security of its ships — under the flag of the new state or the British flag — would be 
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guaranteed by the Royal Navy.183 The defeat of the French fleet in Aboukir, then, seems to have 
been the catalyst for a widespread and rising tide of ‘Anglomania’.  
Predictably, the use of excessive language and hyperbole by Ionians writing to British 
officials was not only a product of aristocratic vanity, but was also a reflection of the intense 
political shifts and differences in the islands at the time. Nobles from Zante sent Nelson a sword 
and a cane as gifts, claiming that his victory had ‘liberated this part of Greece, which had fallen 
an involuntary victim to French rage’.184 The inhabitants of Zante greeted ‘the great nation of 
Britain’ who saved them from ‘the horrors of anarchy and destruction’. Now that the seas were 
‘free’, the ‘august voices of Religion, of Nature, of Justice, of Humanity were, without terror, 
heard among us’.185 Moreover, several members of the ‘Septinsular’ government were to be 
sent to London in order to ask for the continuance of British protection.186   
As we saw before, every foreign intervention or attempt to impose central 
administration stirred old social and political divisions on the islands. Currant traders in Zante or 
Cephalonian seamen were asking for British protection, while many Corfiote nobles preferred 
Russian protection as a means towards re-establishing their titles and lands. Foreign protection 
acquired a completely different meaning for many Ionians, depending on their social class or 
political affiliations.187 Similarly, differences among the islanders extended to local politics, or 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches which, crucially, 
involved rights over land. In fact, the mention of religious affiliation in official correspondence 
often blurred the lines between religious and ethnic identities: Greek culture was considered 
inseparable from Orthodox faith by many, including Greeks both on the islands and the 
mainland. For example, a report in 1815 mentioned: ‘with the exception of about sixty seven 
families, dispersed in the different islands who profess the Roman Catholic religion, the rest of 
the population is of the Greek faith’.188 
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To summarize the previous sections, one episode in 1801 was characteristic of the 
political turmoil and confusion that were prevalent at the time in the islands. On the night of 
the 19th of February, a group of inhabitants in Zante hoisted the British flag on the ramparts of 
the fortress, causing a reaction from the local garrison, whose attitude was quite lukewarm at 
the time, considering several of Foresti’s letters to foreign secretary Hawkesbury, the later Earl 
of Liverpool (1808) and prime minister between 1812 and 1827.189 In a state of utter confusion, 
the consul ‘could not be certain’ that ‘the affair had not been brought by the arts of the 
Russians’, but the British flag remained hoisted for months despite the islands being nominally 
under Russian protection. 
 
The threat of French invasion, 1803-1805 
 From 1807 onwards, sending British troops to the islands became increasingly 
inevitable, particularly when Tsar Alexander signed an alliance with Napoleon. The role of 
Anglo-Russian relations – and particularly how official anxieties and strategy affected the 
administration of a strategic outpost like the Ionian Islands – has  very often been neglected, or 
significantly downplayed in Ionian historiography as a trivial factor, which tends to view 
Britain’s ascendancy as a global power after 1815 as an almost natural phenomenon. 
Meanwhile, the first British attempts to integrate secret and open military intelligence in the 
‘Depot for Military Knowledge’ in 1803, which held maps and significant information on 
geography, lagged significantly behind its French counterpart (‘Bureau de Renseignments’). In 
fact, a successful integration of military intelligence was achieved only at a personal level, most 
characteristically in the case of Wellington’s information networks in the Peninsular Campaign 
later, or Nelson’s networks in the Mediterranean.190  
It was in the Treaty of Tilsit, historians argue, when the provinces in the Greek mainland 
were ‘brought within the active margins of European conflict’.191 However, this had taken place 
                                                     
189 TNA FO 42/4, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 22 September 1801. 
190 Knight, Britain Against Napoleon, p. 287. 
191 Holland, Blue-Water Empire, p. 19. 
   
66 
 
already three years before. In the period after 1803, which the rest of the chapter will focus on, 
Anglo-Russian relations were characterized by ambivalence, and so British efforts sought a 
balance between striking a permanent alliance with Russia against France, and containing 
French designs outside the Ottoman Empire.192 Being at the epicentre of British and Russian 
policies in the Mediterranean, it was on the Ionian Islands, in close proximity to the mainland, 
where British and Russian officials cooperated closely, in order to gather information about a 
suspected major French invasion in the region between 1804 and 1805.  
There were differences among British officials in regards to the islands, as previous 
historians have mentioned, particularly between ‘high politics’ and agents on the spot. For high-
ranking British officials, strengthening the presence of the Royal Navy in the eastern 
Mediterranean in order to support the islands was a controversial issue. George Elphinstone, 
Viscount Keith (1746-1823), for example, who was the Commander-In-Chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet at the time, was more concerned about other matters.193 Referring to him, 
Foresti mentioned to Grenville that Elphinstone ‘did not think that the inhabitants of them [the 
Ionian Islands were] sufficiently steady or united on their principles to warrant him to give any 
very decided support. His Lordship added, that other affairs of greater moment claimed his 
attention, and any step of this sort would certainly commit the British with the Russians and the 
Turks’.194  
Compared to parliamentary discussions on Malta or Sicily for example, there were no 
dilemmas over Britain’s lasting commitment to the Ionian Islands. But, as has already been 
mentioned above, British attitudes towards the islands changed after Aboukir and the 
Septinsular Republic, particularly as distrust of Russians by officials like Nelson grew, despite 
the alliance between Britain and Russia and the formation of the Third Coalition later on (April 
1805). British officials were oscillating between suspicion and alliance against the common 
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enemy, the French, until the emerging political equilibrium among European powers in 1815. 
Distrust nevertheless persisted after the war and, as this thesis will argue, affected crucial 
aspects of imperial thinking in the early years of the protectorate. The cession of the islands 
cannot be explained by judging its inherent qualities for British officials, but by its place in 
geopolitics and the balance of powers in Europe.  
 Since the creation of the nominally independent Septinsular Republic, the islands were 
perceived to be in the Russian sphere of influence. The British foreign secretary, Hawkesbury, 
was trying to get the court in Saint Petersburg to strike a defensive alliance against France. The 
British encouraged the Russians to bring more troops to the islands and the mainland in order 
to guard them from French attack, and the Russians asked for naval protection from the British. 
On the Ionian Islands, Russian troops were consistently strengthened, reaching 9,000 troops by 
March 1804. Through the Septinsular Republic, Russia had ensured her presence in the fortified 
harbour of Corfu and a chain of coastal towns in western Greece, controlling commerce and 
coastal navigation in the Adriatic.195 Supplementing the British consular presence, London sent 
agents to the Islands after 1804, principally to contain French designs, but at the same time 
creating friction with the Russians.  
Despite the Septinsular Republic declaring a brief neutrality in 1803, Britain’s presence 
was becoming more frequent in Ionian politics: the British consul, Foresti, was appointed by 
Downing Street as Resident in the Ionian islands, aiming to ‘cultivate the most unreserved 
intercourse and good understanding with the Russian Ministers at Corfu, and that you will 
cooperate with him in every measure which may tend to promote the independence and 
security of the Republic of the Seven Islands’.196 At the same time, the consul continued to pass 
information to London, covering political developments on the islands and enemy movements: 
in December 1803, he was the one who warned London about the possibility of a French attack 
on Corfu and the Morea in mainland Greece.197 Nelson ordered his captains to respect Ionian 
neutrality and to protect Ionian vessels in case of French attacks, as long as Ionian ports did not 
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shelter enemy privateers.198 The ability of Ionian ships to trade under the flag of the Septinsular 
Republic, which would be recognized by Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire, brought 
significant gains to Ionian shipping and commerce.199  
Foresti’s appointment as a Resident in the Septinsular government was clearly political. 
British agents along with Foresti were dispatched from London to the islands as well as western 
Greece, in order to gather information about a possible French invasion in the area.200 
Especially from 1803 onwards, the British penetrated local networks in the mainland, 
exchanging, for example, ammunition and promises of military aid to local pashas for 
information on enemy movements and politics in Constantinople. Strategically, the access of 
local pashas to information on enemy movements and the land would prove invaluable to the 
Royal Navy, and they would become central figures in Nelson’s information networks in the 
eastern Mediterranean. By maintaining agents on the spot like Foresti, London had acquired 
invaluable access to information from the mainland and the Ottoman Porte. It was at this stage 
that Anglo-Ottoman relations would crystallize into a fragile and fluctuating alliance, and at the 
same time, effectively stabilize Britain as an intermediary between the Ottoman government 
and other European powers.     
 
The ‘irretrievable step was taken’: the impact of the Treaty of Tilsit on Anglo-
Ionian relations, 1807-1809 
 Despite Nelson’s impressive, and final, victory at Trafalgar in 1805, the French armies 
were far from defeated. The Napoleonic victories against the Austrian and the Austro-Russian 
armies in Ulm and Austerlitz respectively in the same year are cases in point.201 Always fragile, 
Britain’s position in the Mediterranean became even more precarious in the absence of 
supporting Austrian and Russian land forces on the continent. Either way, the British 
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contribution to the coalition forces in Europe before 1808 was primarily naval. Disappointed 
with Britain’s lack of substantial contribution in war on the continent, and with a Russian army 
exhausted after a decisive French victory in Friedland (June 1807), Tsar Alexander signed the 
Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807.  
The signing of the treaty came as an absolute shock, particularly to British officials 
serving in the Mediterranean who became clear advocates of the idea that the Royal Navy 
should occupy the islands. Meyer wrote to Hammond that the treaty was an ‘irretrievable step’ 
and the ministers of Russia were ‘victims of disappointed ambition’, suggesting the occupation 
of Corfu by British troops202: 
The expulsion of the French from Corfu would disconcert the enemy; would 
deeply depress their influence in the Levant; would exile the Greeks, wary and 
bigoted, to seek the protection of the sovereigns of the Seas, whom they know 
to be Incorruptible protestant Christians; would deter the Enemy and his 
confederates from subverting so easily the Turkish Empire; perceiving the 
impassable barrier drawn across the Northern frontier of the Morea. Such an 
operation would convince the nations of the South and the western Asiatics, 
now the objects of Russian and French delusion, of the irresistible energy of 
British power, when unaided, would make it again respected where it is now 
the maxim to work at it, to execrate it!203 
 According to Tilsit, the Russians agreed to aid France against Britain, and France agreed 
to aid Russia against the Ottoman Empire in return. As a result, British policy became close to 
the Porte. As previous historians have mentioned, after the treaty the British embassy in 
Constantinople became the vantage point for the British in the eastern Mediterranean.204 
British officials now had to face multiple challenges: the threat of invasion by Napoleon – in 
both Britain and Britain’s possessions in India – as well as the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire, for which the French and Russian emperors were already making contingency plans.205 
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 Moreover, Russia agreed to join Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’ and as a consequence 
of the treaty declared war on Britain, isolating her. Russian trade with Britain, supplying naval 
stores and grain coming from the Black Sea, closed after 1807.206 Never integrating fully into 
Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’, Russia kept a rather neutral stance towards Britain and did 
not engage in full-scale military conflict. The fact that Russia relinquished her possessions in the 
Mediterranean was a new reality, which created the circumstances for Britain to send troops 
and to occupy the islands two years later. It was only after Napoleon’s invasion of Russia (1812) 
that trade relations between Russia and Britain were fully restored.207 The Treaty of Tilsit was 
also crucial for the Russian presence in the Adriatic and the Ionian Islands. The strategically 
important port of Cattaro (modern day Kotor, Montenegro) and as mentioned above, the 
Ionian Islands, were ceded to France under a secret article of the treaty.208  
By 1807, Corfu had become a major military depot in the eastern Mediterranean for all 
European powers involved. The French established a force of about 7,000 troops there, a 
garrison which was characterized as ‘enormous’.209 Spiridion Foresti wrote to Lord Collingwood, 
Commander-In-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, in August of the same year that the Treaty of 
Tilsit was so important that it ‘almost established the future destiny of Europe’.210  He perhaps 
wrote with some hyperbole in order to provoke a military reaction from London, but he 
nevertheless expressed a genuine concern for the British at the time: Tilsit indeed looked like it 
sealed Britain’s fate. The French occupying troops would be able to organize provisions and 
expeditions against British positions in Sicily or Egypt.211 In a state of panic, official anxieties 
about a potential attack on British possessions in India, accompanied by a renewal of fears of 
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the invasion of Britain itself, seemed to come roaring back.212 Robert Adair, a diplomat, for 
example, forwarded information to the new Secretary of War and the Colonies, George Canning 
(appointed March 1807) and the Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, about ‘a plan for such 
an attack’ (against India) through Persia which was ‘undoubtedly formed’.213  
 Aside from speculations about Napoleon’s perceived targets, French attitudes towards 
the Ottoman Empire played a great role in British strategic thinking. The Treaty has been 
referenced in passing in Ionian historiography often,214 yet it was an important milestone 
towards the final occupation of the islands by the British. Occupying the islands gave significant 
advantages to the French, particularly in regards to communication channels with the Ottoman 
government. From Corfu, the French could enter into a ‘constant intrigue with the Greek 
subjects of the Porte’ but also strengthen their presence in the Ottoman Porte.215 Meanwhile, 
under close surveillance by the French authorities in the islands, consuls who served in the 
islands were able to convey crucial information to London about Napoleon’s designs on the 
east.216 
 Then the ‘irretrievable step’ in Tilsit made British connections with the Greek mainland 
inseparable from their policies in the islands. As we saw before, and as we will also see in the 
next chapter in greater detail, British communications with local pashas were instrumental in 
collecting information in the period 1803–1805. Ongoing secret communications, for example 
with Ali Pasha of Ioannina, were established to predict French designs and became of crucial 
importance for the British, especially following Britain’s isolation after 1807. In a rather 
reciprocal relationship, British officials played upon the pasha’s personal ambitions and his 
quarrel with Russia, while Ali sought to consolidate his power in the Ottoman Empire with the 
help of the British.217 
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Withdrawing from the Mediterranean became the new reality for Russian foreign 
policy.218 This thesis argues that Russia’s withdrawal started the countdown for British troops to 
occupy the islands. Suspicion between Russia and the British was mutual and did not subside 
even after Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, when the latter and Britain became firm allies. 
Most characteristically, Anglo-Russian rivalry would reach a climax over the growth of Russian 
influence on the flourishing trade on the Lower Danube and in Greece during the revolution in 
1821-1822.219 At the beginning of negotiations in Vienna, Meyer summarized the complicated 
relationship between Russian government and the local population, and what Britain’s 
involvement should be in the area:  
… the moment Great Britain retires from the key islands Russia will immediately 
reappear on the stage of the Levant, so familiar, so partial to her … [and will 
claim the] the powerful unanimous support of an whole long oppressed 
enthusiastic people, (deserted) by other nations, professing the same religion 
and cherishing the same political views!220 
 
Meyer’s concerns were shared by other British officials later, and the same anxiety was 
evident at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, as seen in the case of Castlereagh on the eve of the 
Congress of Vienna. On the Ionian Islands, individuals and networks with connections to Russia 
were immediately suspected of Russian expansionism by British officials, particularly in the 
post-Napoleonic era. These claims of Russia’s supposed expansionism in the Mediterranean 
were exaggerated, but nevertheless affected (to an extent) British governance in the islands. 
We will see more of these wartime concerns that stemmed from Anglo-Russian relations, and 
how these were articulated in the diplomatic negotiations at the end of the war in the next 
chapters.  
The loss of the islands to the French after Tilsit also created a more immediate problem 
for the Royal Navy: a lack of depots for colonial goods and manufacturing, as well as for 
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shipbuilding and repairs, in the eastern Mediterranean. Napoleon’s continental blockade forced 
commerce to enter Europe via the central Mediterranean, particularly through smuggling. 
Nevertheless, the aim of the blockade — to strangle British exports and isolate the British — 
would soon become redundant and dissolve. Malta, for example became a major entrepôt. By 
1808 the island was already absorbing approximately 12.6% of British exports, mostly for 
onward transmission.221 As Alexander Ball – the British governor of Malta at the time - noted in 
1807, the only limit to the expansion of Maltese trade was the shortage of storage space.222 But 
British possessions in the Mediterranean were primarily temporary contingencies of strategic 
and military importance, and secondarily of long-term commercial value.  
 To sum up what may seem in retrospect an incredibly chaotic period: from Nelson in 
1798 to the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, for British officials the Ionian Islands belonged to the 
Russian sphere of influence. The treaty of 1807 shocked the British and was considered by 
many an irretrievable step of Russian policy. It is often mentioned in Ionian historiography, but 
its actual importance to the occupation of the islands by British troops is downplayed: it 
seemed to justify British distrust of Russia, and allowed for a greater accommodation between 
Ottoman and British interests, particularly those of Ali Pasha who saw the British as reliable 
allies to support his ambitions in the mainland. The withdrawal of Russia from the 
Mediterranean gave the British the opportunity to increase their influence over the Ionians and 
Greeks in general, and to look for a secure outlet for trade and shipbuilding.     
As for the ‘prime movers’ behind the occupation of the islands, there have been 
attempts in historiography to relate British expansion and particularly the occupation of the 
islands to the needs of the metropolitan economy. Panayiotis Kapetanakis, for example, argued 
that the establishment of colonial rule in the islands was meant to secure British commercial 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean, a development related to two parameters: the opening 
of the Black Sea and the desire to acquire more favourable terms in Ionian exports. According 
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to such interpretations, it was domestic demand as well as developments in the periphery that 
provoked the occupation of the islands:  
The interest of Britain over the Ionian Islands is dated much earlier than 1809 
and her decision for the gradual occupation of the islands and their inclusion 
into her colonial possessions. As research has shown, the most important 
reason which lead Britain to the islands, during the years before the 19th 
century, was trade and was related to the necessity of acquiring favourable 
terms in one of the main products of the islands, but also main ingredient in 
British dietary habits, which was currant. This commercial interest of British for 
the Ionian Islands will begin to acquire political characteristics with the 
Revolutionary wars (1792).223  
Kapetanakis’ interpretation sought to connect the history of the Ionian Islands with 
broader developments in the empire, what is known as the rise of the Second British Empire. 
But as this chapter shows so far, to privilege economic reasons such as the currant trade over 
diplomatic and military circumstances – particularly following Tilsit – would be misleading. 
 
British involvement in Ottoman politics and chimerical theories after Tilsit 
So far, this chapter has tried to explain that the decision to occupy the Ionian Islands 
was not due to a ‘prime mover’ like trade or the passage to India. If there was any grand 
strategy among British decision-makers, it can be outlined as primarily to contain France, to 
secure the Ottoman Empire and to ensure Britain’s home defence. At the same time, the exact 
nature of Britain’s involvement in the Mediterranean sparked much controversy in Britain, in 
Parliament as well as among the wider public.224 Although this is not the topic of this thesis, it is 
worth mentioning that a number of publications circulated in Britain, particularly travel 
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literature, and a broader intellectual and cultural interest in the ‘Orient’ grew.225 Such an 
example is John Usko’s Brief Narrative (1808).226 
In order to understand the change of mentalities in regards to Britain’s role in the 
eastern Mediterranean in this last section of the chapter, we will briefly examine new 
diplomatic developments and the parallel interest in the east that was sparked in Britain. Then, 
we will examine the ‘peripheral’ factors that played out in the decision to occupy the Ionian 
Islands by British troops. Essentially, this particular section, and the wider chapter as well, build 
upon Tumelty’s thesis concerning the importance of British officials on the spot, and of Ionian 
collaborators, in the final decision to establish the British Protectorate in 1815, which will be 
discussed in a later chapter.  
Although secondary compared to military and strategic considerations, there were also 
commercial considerations behind the occupation of the islands. A significant development in 
British commercial policy as well as diplomacy, for example, was the ‘opening up’ of the Black 
Sea grain market in 1809. In 1807, a few months before Tilsit, a British fleet under Admiral 
Duckworth tried to force the Ottoman government to join the Anglo-Russian alliance and to 
open the straits of Dardanelles and the Black Sea trade. Duckworth failed to force the straits 
and a combined British expedition to Alexandria also failed, resulting in a war which ended two 
years later with the Treaty of the Dardanelles in January 1809.227 The treaty fully restored older 
Anglo-Ottoman capitulatory treaties of 1675 and, more recently, 1802, and gave a boost to 
British trade in the Black Sea: a tariff of 3 per cent on British imports was charged, and the 
properties of British merchants were restored.228  
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The British mission, led by Robert Adair, managed a great diplomatic achievement by 
effectively securing British trade in the Black Sea and ending the French monopoly at the same 
time.229 Most importantly, a secret article ensured Britain was a principal ally of the Ottomans 
against the French, and potentially a mediator in the case of a Russo-Ottoman war. According 
to the article, the British paid £300,000 and offered assistance to the Ottomans ‘should France 
unjustly declare war against the Sublime Porte’.230 British assistance would come in the form of 
military protection of Ottoman harbours and islands in the Mediterranean, defending the 
Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Dalmatia, and supplying the Porte with guns and powder. 
Even Britain’s role as a mediator with Russia was explicitly mentioned. At the same time, she 
had to respect the integrity of Ottoman territories.231 Signing the treaty seemed to confirm to 
British officials the old notion among British officials about the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire which was believed to be underway. Britain became the most important European ally 
to Ottoman interests. Ruptures between French-Ottoman relations had also taken place a few 
years before, when Ottoman territories in the Balkans were threatened by French invasion in 
1804-1805, particularly in mainland Greece. These developments in the eastern Mediterranean 
had an impact on how many British officials viewed Britain’s political and military presence in 
the region.   
Notions of Ottoman decline caused a broader interest among the British public. In 
Britain, some intellectuals called for Britain to play a greater role in the Mediterranean. Works 
on Britain’s new role caused great controversy and were called ‘chimerical’ by many. These 
works encouraged Britain’s ‘blue-water’ policy, and saw Britain’s role in the Mediterranean in 
the light of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Gould Francis Leckie (1767-1850), for instance, 
was one such interesting case who advocated for a more lasting British presence in the region. 
Leckie was a British landowner living in Sicily from 1801 to 1807, and associated with the British 
who resided in the Mediterranean at the time, such as the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the 
Civil Commissioner of Malta Sir Alexander Ball, and Sir John Moore, the famous Scottish 
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commander of British forces in Spain.232 As mentioned before, Leckie’s Historical Survey was 
published in 1808. Leckie’s main argument was that Britain should focus on her naval dominion, 
as ‘the safest policy seems to be to look to ourselves for that security which we have hitherto 
founded on a precarious balance, and which has cost us so much treasure to maintain’.233 
Britain should play a major role in what was seen by Leckie and many of his contemporaries as 
the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire: the British should consider the creation of an 
independent Greece under British protection, as this would be ‘a necessary step’ as ‘a 
secondary maritime and military power between the two continents’.234 Respecting local 
customs and religion, he suggested Crete, Cyprus and the Ionian Islands as ideal outposts for 
British protection.  
To draw explicit connections between Leckie’s grand-strategic plan and British military 
operations in the Mediterranean would be an exaggeration. After all, Leckie’s views were 
considered ‘theoretical’ among decision-makers and he was characterized by several 
newspapers of the time as a ‘chimerical theorist’.235 His ideas on Britain becoming an ‘insular 
empire’ were more controversial when they became public in 1808 than they would become 
later in nineteenth century, and the lines between the ‘blue-water’ school and supporters of 
the balance of powers were not always clear. To a large degree, imperial thinking was still 
shaped by the notions of the eighteenth century and, in terms of policy, the issue of the level of 
Britain’s military commitment to the continent.236 Moreover, following the shock of Tilsit and 
the enforcement of Napoleon’s continental blockade, Britain’s isolation became a reality and 
would hardly be pursued further by policymakers. But coming from his recent experience in 
Sicily, Leckie’s work saw the acquisition of naval stations and outposts like Sicily, Malta or the 
Ionian Islands in their Mediterranean context. His ideas about an independent state under 
British protection, instead of the acquisition of territorial possessions as colonies, started to 
gain influence in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. And the nature of these regimes should 
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be constitutional, as the ‘tyranny of Asiatic despotism’ should be confronted by a British 
constitution.237 Nevertheless, it was a growing mentality among British officials, which quickly 
gained ground during the French Revolution and the wars of 1793-1815, that Britain would be 
secure only by controlling the seas, allowing for the expression of views of theorists like Leckie.  
  
The occupation of the islands, 1809 
To move back to the matter of the occupation of the islands, in terms of decision-
making, more pragmatic targets were pursued in 1809, defined by concerns about military 
capability, logistics and costs. In the Mediterranean, official thinking was clearly cantered on 
Sicily and Malta, and not on the Ionian Islands. For the Prime Minister, the Duke of Liverpool, a 
military expedition to Cephalonia and Zante made sense only in regards to strategic 
considerations on Sicily and ideally in the hopes of avoiding high costs: ‘if the permanent or 
temporary occupation of those or any others of the islands … would tend materially to the 
security of Sicily, without the necessity of [engaging] the British military force at this time in 
that sea, the expedition might upon that ground be judged expedient; But, when it is 
considered how large a part of the disposable force of the British army is already in the 
Mediterranean’, whereas out of 16,000 men, 10,000 were stationed in Sicily.238 In another 
letter to Stuart, Liverpool mentioned ‘the superior importance’ of Sicily, where in all of Stuart’s 
arrangements of troops he should ‘consider the security of Sicily and Malta as primary 
objects’.239  
To show such ambivalence towards the Ionian Islands compared to Sicily or Malta was 
common. Even as late as 1815, Castlereagh was considering delivering the islands to Austria 
during the Congress of Vienna. As was mentioned before, the decision to occupy the islands 
was not part of a grand strategy regarding the region. But as Ronald Hyam noted, ‘decisions are 
                                                     
237 Leckie, A Historical Survey, p. 8. 
238 TNA War Office (henceforth WO) 6/56, Liverpool to John Stuart, Downing Street, 29 November 1809, to pp. 88-
89. 
239 TNA WO 6/56, Liverpool to John Stuart, Downing Street, 30 December 1809, p. 92. 
   
79 
 
not taken by trends or abstract phenomena, but by individuals in very small inner groups’.240 In 
the case of the islands, this ‘inner group’ consisted of British military officials who had served 
on the spot and were convinced of the potential benefits that possession of the islands would 
bring to Britain. New circumstances, and particularly the loss of Sicily after 1806, seemed to 
encourage more military officials to turn to the eastern Mediterranean in search of secure naval 
depots. Moreover, information networks that operated in the Mediterranean obtained valuable 
local knowledge for British ministers, convincing them of the importance of the islands as a 
British possession after 1815. Decision-making over the occupation of the islands was thus 
shaped by the ‘dictates of strategy and war’.241 Tumelty’s thesis concerning the primacy of 
British officials on the spot in the decision to occupy the islands, although depressingly 
Anglocentric, is still valuable and often downplayed.242  
In 1809, the Austrian army was destroyed in the battle of Wagram and Napoleon’s army 
entered Vienna. Austria’s own ambitions in the Adriatic – including her claims on the Ionian 
Islands – were thwarted, and British troops in the Mediterranean were entirely exposed to a 
French attack.243 With the Austrian armies neutralized, and the Royal Navy unable to support 
any troops in the continent, military opportunities available to the British were mainly at sea. 
Responding to calls from Ionian captains in Malta for support, Lord Collingwood sent troops to 
occupy the islands in September of the same year. The decision to occupy the islands came 
rather spontaneously from Collingwood, who wrote later: ‘I hope that this last expedition will 
be approved in England by His Majesty; but I have undertaken it without instructions, and on 
my own responsibility. The General seemed rather averse to it, and doubtful whether he could 
safely spare the troops from Sicily’.244 British troops were meant to hoist the flag of the 
Septinsular Republic and not of Britain, which would show to ‘signify to the native inhabitants’ 
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that it was not a conquest, ‘but the expulsion of the French, to liberate them from bondage’.245 
Ionians ‘should not be given to understand, that the British forces are intended to garrison the 
islands, as it is expected their own troops will be able to maintain their independence, when 
the enemy is expelled’.246   
Eventually a British expeditionary force of about 1,900 troops attacked French forces in 
the Ionian Islands and captured the islands one by one.247 Foresti followed the British troops 
under General Oswald in Zante and then in Cephalonia. About 7,000 French troops and their 
auxiliary forces under General Donzelot delivered Corfu with her strong fortifications in 1814, 
after a blockade by the Royal Navy. Ionians were exhausted by war and intense political 
struggles in the islands, and British officials were careful to maintain the façade of Ionian 
independence until the formal cession of the islands in 1815. British intervention was sought by 
most, and in most British landings there was no resistance. Depending on the influence of the 
British party in the islands and old commercial connections, in islands like Zante or Cephalonia 
British troops were welcomed as liberators. Organized committees sent their acknowledgments 
to British officials from Ithaca, Cerigo and Zante.248 After the surrender of Corfu, other British 
officials who served on the islands echoed Meyer and Foresti’s observations on the importance 
of keeping the islands. James Campbell, for example, wrote to Colonial Secretary Bathurst in 
1814: ‘This very important subject [of keeping the islands] having naturally occupied my own 
mind and attention … as well as that of the other servants of His Majesty, to whom you now 
pleased to confide the interests of Great Britain in this quarter, in the accompanying address of 
Mr. Meyer, you will have before you the ideas which have presented themselves to us, and 
towards which, as they will spread … for themselves, I have only to solicit your Lordship’s 
indulgence and favourable consideration’.249 
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The chapter outlined the lineaments of British occupation of the islands. It mapped out 
the developments that turned the islands from one of England’s main trade partners in the 
Levant to an ‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’ within a couple of years. It showed how the 
Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was primarily the catalyst for the occupation of the islands and how the 
Treaty of the Dardanelles created prospects for future profits and the expansion of British 
trade. The signing of the treaty of 1807 between Russia and France, and the subsequent 
conquest of the islands by British troops gave significant leverage and advantage to British 
representatives in the negotiations that took place in the aftermath of war. Meanwhile, these 
developments took place at a time when many across Britain debated Britain’s global role, 
perhaps also because of the abolition of slave trade in 1807. In this sense, works like Leckie’s 
require further study. The aims of British policymakers in this part of the Mediterranean were 
clearly for strategic purposes and for reasons of communications and information. At the same 
time, the chapter examined the unprecedented developments in Ionian society and politics. 
Despite its brief existence, continuous foreign interventions and the close supervision of 
French, Russian and Ottoman rulers, the creation of the Septinsular Republic between 1799 and 
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Chapter 2: Consular networks and colonial bridgeheads. The case of 
Spiridion Foresti, 1797-1813 
 
The previous chapter explored the reasons for the occupation of the islands by British troops, 
and the place of the islands as an observatory over the Ottoman Empire. But British rule was 
not established purely in terms of strategy. In this chapter we will examine more closely the 
networks and individuals who obtained and communicated information on the islands to British 
policymakers in the period between 1797 and 1813. More specifically, the chapter focuses on 
consular networks and on the case of Spiridion Foresti during the early period of Anglo-Ionian 
connection. Foresti was a British consul from the Ionian island of Zante, and an important 
source of information for the British in wartime. The chapter examines the terms and 
circumstances that led to his employment as a British consul as well as the ways in which his 
personal and professional background affected the information he passed on to British officials. 
Building on the existing historiography on imperial careers, the chapter asks how Foresti and his 
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Information and consuls in the chain of command 
There are recurring methodological problems when dealing with consuls or lower 
diplomatic officials in imperial and global history, especially when historians gauge the 
significance of lengthy reports and the copious amounts of knowledge that was passed on to 
London on commercial statistics, local customs or local politics. It is difficult, for example, to 
assess how crucial the information that the consul processed to London was, and how relevant 
it was to British policymaking in the region at the time. Of equal importance was the extent that 
consuls, or any local information brokers, maintained their own network of contacts and how 
they participated in local power networks. First, this section will briefly examine the 
professional environment of the consul and his role in the chain of command. Then it will 
provide the background to the history of the British consul in the Ionian Islands.    
Nowadays, historians seem to be as condescending as higher-ranking officials – 
diplomats and military officials alike – were at the time towards consuls. Overall, the histories 
of consuls seem to be histories of neglect: on the one hand, viewed through the lens of 
traditional diplomatic history of ‘great men’, their presence in the empire is considered less 
than important, compared to the history of diplomats. On the other hand, viewed through the 
lens of cultural or social history, diplomats and consuls are neglected altogether. This has 
recently started to change, and historians who are drawn to examining the role of lower 
ranking officials, ‘peripheral’ figures and go-betweens, are also turning their attention towards 
consuls.251 By acknowledging the multiple interconnections between Britain and her overseas 
areas of influence, these studies choose to focus instead on the importance of British officials 
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‘on the spot’. In this sense, historiography on consuls also touches upon relevant debates in 
imperial and global history regarding colonial lives and imperial careers across the British 
world.252     
The British consul was a male, low-ranking official working in the service of the Foreign 
Office.  Depending on their region and the importance to British policy at the time of that 
region, consuls were not operating alone but were supported by a range of associates who 
answered directly to them. Hierarchically, the consuls were subordinates to diplomats, but they 
could also be promoted if their conduct was considered worthy. In the eighteenth-century 
eastern Mediterranean, the main centres of diplomatic activity were in Naples and 
Constantinople, particularly after Selim’s reforms (1789-1807) in the Ottoman Empire. Consular 
networks existed in the Ionian Islands, in Patras, in smaller ports in the Aegean, and in the 
States of Barbary in Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli.253  
Consuls, as mentioned above, are comparatively neglected in modern historiography. 
This neglect does not reflect only general methodological concerns of causality and historical 
significance, but its neglect seems similar to official mentalities and the chain of command in 
the Foreign Office during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consulship was perceived by 
many British officials largely as a private – and profitable – affair as opposed to the ‘selfless’ 
service of the diplomat. However, it seems that distinctions between the supposedly impartial 
diplomat and the supposedly opportunistic consul were largely rhetorical constructs of their 
time, reflecting divisions within the officialdom of British foreign policy and politics more 
generally, rather than a reality.254 Most of the time, the consul came from the merchant classes, 
whereas diplomats were drawn from the landed aristocracy. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that consuls were more driven by private interests than were diplomats. There are many 
examples of diplomats who accumulated massive economic and cultural capital from their 
service, several British ambassadors in the eastern Mediterranean among them; for example, 
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the famous Thomas Bruce, Earl of Elgin, who was ambassador to Constantinople between 1799 
and 1803. Despite such distinctions within British officialdom, in most cases pragmatism 
prevailed: the British government would consider using any available individual who knew the 
region.  
Consuls often encountered problems in communications and lack of instructions from 
London, which they solved by employing their own strategies and network of connections. Until 
Castlereagh’s and Canning’s reforms in 1815 and 1825 respectively, consuls – and occasionally 
diplomats - were poorly instructed by the foreign secretary regarding their actual 
responsibilities.255 We do need to state here that British consuls (or consul-generals by another 
title), like Alexander Cockburn in Saxony for example, complained in 1809 that consuls were 
‘like lost sheep in the Wilderness, without any sort of instructions or any information respecting 
their duty, in consequence of which they have been obliged to follow the steps of their 
Predecessors, and they are generally considered by Merchants as doing more injury than 
service to the Trade which they are intended to protect’.256 Supplemented by funds and port-
fees as means for their subsistence, consuls were above all necessary agents and information 
brokers of the empire in their area of operation. It was only in 1903 that the consular as well as 
the diplomatic service systematized ‘recruitment, control, transfer and promotion’.257 
Reflecting his role as an information broker, the consul often established contacts and 
struck agreements that neither ministers in London, nor military officials on the spot, could 
achieve. He would give assurances to local notables in the areas the consul was operating in. 
One example of an agreement like this took place in the Balkans in regard to the supply of 
timber:  after being contacted by the British consul, the British contracted the powerful Ali 
Pasha of Ioannina to secure the supply of timber, in return for territorial concessions or 
firearms. Ali was appointed by the Porte in 1787 as a governor and ruled the pashalik (province) 
of Ioannina, a territory which ended up consisting of much of today’s Greek mainland and part 
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of Albania.258 Such connections increased British influence over Ottoman politics and were 
established by small groups of individuals: the role of consular networks was paramount in this. 
Recent historiography has also explained amicable agreements between British consuls, Beys 
and various tribal leaders in Northern Africa, which benefitted both sides in different ways.259 
Acting as representatives of Britain in distant places, in most such agreements the consuls 
offered British protection and patronage.260  
 Methodologically, the role of consuls in the empire is better understood if one utilizes 
John Darwin’s use of ‘colonial bridgeheads’: ‘the bridgehead was the hinge or ‘interface’ 
between the metropole and a local periphery. It was the transmission shaft of imperialism and 
the recruiting sergeant of collaborators … whether British influence grew, or was transformed 
into formal and informal empire, largely depended upon the circumstances and performance of 
the bridgehead’.261 While British influence initially depended on the ‘colonial bridgehead’ that 
the British consul established, the first formal government under British protection did its 
utmost to replace wartime sources of information.  
 
Spiridion Foresti: consular networks and historical background 
When considering microhistory or any study at a small scale – whether places, 
individuals or objects – historians have cautioned that it is dangerous to ‘love too much’ their 
subject.  As Jill Lepore writes, ‘getting too close to your subject is a major danger, but not 
getting to know her well enough is just as likely’.262 Clearly the interesting stories of consuls as 
‘lost sheep in the Wilderness’ of imperial frontiers warrant such a temptation. Equally 
interesting was the case of the British consul in the Ionian Islands, whose family, just like his 
                                                     
258 Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte; Dennis N. Skiotis, ‘From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali 
of Tepelen, 1750-1784’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2:3 (Jul., 1971), pp. 219-244; John W. Baggally, 
Ali Pasha and Great Britain (Oxford, 1938). 
259 Sara ElGaddari, ‘His Majesty’s Agents’. 
260 F. Robert Hunter, ‘Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the 
Maghreb, 1660–1814’, The Journal of North African Studies, 4:4 (1999), p. 12. 
261 Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians’, p. 629. 
262 Jill Lepore, ‘Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography’, The Journal of American 
History, 88: 1 (June, 2001), pp. 129. 
   
87 
 
counterparts in the Levant Company, had established old connections between England and the 
eastern Mediterranean, being stationed in the island of Zante, a place whose commercial links 
with England stretched back to the sixteenth century. Diligently and steadily, the British consul 
who was appointed in Zante, Spiridion Foresti, sent lengthy reports to the Foreign Office on 
exchange rates, local customs, Ionian politics, or on enemy movements and manpower in 
wartime; pretty much any information on economic, diplomatic or political interest was 
routinely shared with the Treasury and the Board of Trade.263  
As microhistory examines the lives and careers of individuals, it also needs to examine 
their role in the broader environment. In the case of the Ionian Islands in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, in the midst of social and political change. Conceptually, when 
referring to the policymakers of the late Victorian period as well as the multiple ‘projects’ of 
colonialism, Darwin called for a ‘closer attention to the ethnographic, micro-economic and 
topographical characteristics of colonial and semi-colonial bridgeheads’ in order to understand 
the information milieu in which British policymakers lived.264 This study argues that such 
observations may be useful for the early nineteenth century as well. At the same time, it 
examines how – although inherently unequal – British and Ionian interests became compatible 
for brief moments, resulting in the consolidation of British rule in the islands. As we have 
already seen, various information networks operated in the eastern Mediterranean, which 
obtained and processed information for London using the Ionian Islands as vital links of 
communication with the mainland. For example, when a high-ranking official or agent was sent 
from London, he was passing through Corfu and was being informed by the local British consul 
about local politics, customs etc. 
Most of the consuls were drawn from the English or local mercantile communities 
abroad who had strong ties with England, for example the Levant Company or the consulate in 
the Ionian Islands (Zante). The consuls often served long enough to identify themselves with 
the places where their posts were. In the early nineteenth century, consuls were appointed, in 
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several cases due to previous consular service of other family members. That was the case with 
Spiridion Foresti (1752-1822), originating from a wealthy family of merchants from Zante, and 
who became a consul on the same island in 1783. Previous works on Ionian historiography, 
mostly by Ian Chessell and Panayiotis Kapetanakis, have already discussed Foresti’s role in 
British consular networks. This thesis builds upon these works.265 Another case on the Ionian 
Islands was Peter Sargint, the son of John Sargint, also consul in the islands and predecessor to 
Foresti.266 Similarly, the extended family of Pisani, from the island of Chios in Greece, of whom 
Bartholomew Pisani was the first dragoman (translator) for the British embassy in 
Constantinople.  
Foresti’s father had served as an officer with distinction in the East India Company.267 
Evidence about the life and service of his father in East India Company is scarce, except for a 
map of Calcutta drawn by someone called Foresti, and by Ollifres in 1742.268  
Discovering Spiridion Foresti’s story through these sources may seem like a made-up 
tale. Yet it can be illuminating as to the conditions in which British agents were recruited in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1789, Foresti was forced to leave his island, 
Zante, as he recovered stolen cargo from pirates from the island, and helped in the pirates’ 
execution afterwards. After three attempts by the pirates’ relatives on his life, Foresti asked for 
British protection, for the ‘speedy removal’ of him, his wife and children to a place of security, 
and a sum of money to ensure his removal and as a means of subsistence. British captains 
trading in Zante and two consuls from Leghorn – Sir Edward Astley and John Howard – 
supported his requests as ‘acts of justice due to his distinguished merit’.269 His requests were 
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accepted soon afterwards and Foresti relocated to Corfu.270 These would be the first of several 
distinctions Foresti would receive during his career. From that point afterwards, his career as a 
consul really took off. This became evident in the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars with 
France in 1793, when he began corresponding regularly with Nelson during Napoleon’s 
campaign in Egypt in 1798. In his long correspondence with British officials, Foresti was very 
often depicted by British officials as hard-working, and a staunch supporter of British protection 
on the islands.  
Considering the fact that consuls rarely received clear instructions from London, the 
content of shared information was largely dependent on the consul’s evaluation of 
circumstances and connections. Regardless of wide assumptions about the consul’s role in 
British foreign policy, since 1649 they were considered state officials. During the course of the 
eighteenth century, they became increasingly identified with British national interests and part 
of an increasingly well-organized diplomatic service.271 They usually received salaries on the 
king’s civil lists, and often collected various fees from British merchants in the ports in which 
they resided.272 Foresti, for example, received a salary of £200 per annum.273 Lacking clear 
instructions from London, the consul was largely left to his own devices. In the eastern 
Mediterranean for example, British consuls cooperated closely on a variety of issues with 
merchants and officials of the Levant Company, as well as with various officials of the Ottoman 
Empire, from Constantinople to Barbary. D. C. M. Platt, for example, calculated that thirty-two 
consular stations existed in 1790 in the Mediterranean, out of forty-six overall.274 The British 
consulate in Zante was a vital link in communications for the British with Constantinople, and 
Foresti corresponded frequently with the British ambassador in the Ottoman capital, passing 
intelligence to and from London, along with news of developments taking place on the islands.  
Apart from his consular duties to communicate local news to the Foreign Office and 
overseas embassies, Foresti had private contacts on the Ionian Islands, in mainland Greece, in 
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Italian cities and in London. His connections were among Venetian officials, Ionian elites and 
merchants. For example, he heard about Britain’s declaration of war on France (February 1793) 
from a Russian ship coming from Messina in March 1793.275 Among his contacts in London was, 
for example, Frederick North, a well-known classicist and Maitland’s predecessor as a colonial 
governor in Ceylon. Foresti was also in communication with the rapidly developing Greek and 
Ionian-Greek diaspora in the Black Sea and Constantinople. Since the mid-eighteenth century – 
and particularly after 1815 – Greek communities were spread across the Black Sea shores, 
engaging especially in shipping and the export of grain. For example, between 1785 and 1821, 
37% of Greek captains who carried exports from the Black Sea originated from the Ionian 
Islands.276 As a Greek, Foresti shared a common language, customs, and religion with Greeks on 
the mainland, allowing him access to information from local communities that very few British 
possessed. On the other hand, being ‘confined’ to an island, Foresti asked to be provided with 
the means to forward quicker correspondence to London via a boat express to Otranto.277   
Historically, Foresti certainly warrants characterization as a ‘go-between’: ‘someone 
who articulates relationships between disparate worlds or cultures by being able to translate 
between them’.278 Foresti was ethnically Greek and his faith was Greek Orthodox, but his 
political affiliations and income were linked with the British state and foreign policy. This 
chapter thus contributes to relevant literature on brokers and ‘go-betweens’.279 His case raises 
questions of space and agency which are also raised through relevant literature, such as: where 
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did his political sympathies lie? Were his activities related to the institutions they sought to 
produce?280 
 
Nelson’s intelligence and the origins of British protection, 1797-1798 
Consular service as well as his father’s connections gave Spiridion access to news about 
both Ionian and British politics. But his network was extensive in terms of individuals as well: 
for example, he used his own contacts to enable the provisional government of the islands to 
employ skilful civil officials from all over the Balkans; namely, professors from the vibrant Greek 
– and particularly, Ionian – mercantile community in Constantinople. He liaised with almost 
every individual he could for intelligence when they stayed in Corfu in transit to the continent 
or the Porte.281 In the previous chapter we saw how the islands entered British naval strategy 
and Nelson’s plans in the Mediterranean.  
This section examines Nelson’s networks of information from the perspective of Foresti, 
Nelson’s source of information in this part of the Mediterranean. The aim is to explain how the 
British gained greater access to Ionian society and how they acquired better knowledge of 
Ionian politics using Foresti’s network of contacts and information. Furthermore, in a broader 
context, the fortunes and political life of Foresti and his family were linked earlier than the 
Napoleonic Wars with the historical phase of ‘northern invasion’: the commercial penetration 
of western and northern European shipping and products in the Mediterranean, followed by 
British naval hegemony in the nineteenth century. In fact, the decline of Venetian political and 
economic influence, and the subsequent rise of English trade in the Mediterranean has been an 
ongoing debate in Anglophone and Francophone literature at least since the 1930s.282 Τhe 
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concept of ‘northern invaders’ became so deeply ingrained in historical consciousness that it 
may seem today inevitable by many historians.283 Therefore, studying such social and economic 
processes through the lens of small scale contexts – like Foresti’s networks – might provide 
another perspective.  
Foresti was very active in the early years of the wars with France. His correspondence 
with the Foreign Office is also useful in mapping out the network of connections he had access 
to. For example, in 1794 he sent information to Grenville – who was foreign secretary between 
1791 and 1801, and a governor of a declining Levant Company at the time (1799-1821) – 
regarding corn shipments to France: sixty ships from the Greek islands of Hydra and Spetzes 
were shipping corn to various French ports via Genoa or Leghorn. These Greek ships were 
contracted by French merchants in the Levant (i.e. Salonica), and corn was sold at prices more 
than double the original cost.284 But Foresti’s locally-obtained information was found necessary 
during Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt (1797-1798). As mentioned before, Foresti was the one 
that discovered the remaining two ships of war that escaped the destructive battle in Aboukir 
bay in 1798. The French ships had fled to Venice from Corfu and Foresti was able to identify the 
ships after comparing inquiries from locals and a report by Watson, the British consul in 
Naples.285 The British consul tried to include the Ionian Islands in the imperial agenda as he was 
a supporter of British occupation of the islands.286 But his role was not important just because 
of his tracking of enemy movements.  
Victualling for naval stores was one of the consul’s most crucial duties. Regarding raw 
materials and especially timber, Foresti was pointing to forests in mainland Greece as an 
excellent source of timber for ship-building and repairs since before the war broke out in 1793. 
The French had signed a contract with Ali Pasha of Ioannina between 1782 and 1791 to fell the 
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trees, and had established a commercial house in the nearby town of Preveza. The pasha 
provided the cutters in exchange for firearms.287 French merchants furnished timber for ship-
building to Toulon from nearby forests and imported colonial produce from Marseilles for 
several years. Since then, however, this traffic had ceased.288 It was a ‘fatal’ mistake, Foresti 
wrote to Grenville, that his predecessor had overlooked this and did not mention it to the 
British government.289 With minimal expense, these forests could quickly provide for the 
building of six ships of the line and to allow the careening290 of ten.291  
Timber was a rare commodity, particularly in times of war. The effectiveness of the navy 
relied on its logistics: foodstuffs and naval stores being the most important. As for the latter, 
the Admiralty gradually became well aware of the shortage of the product, as it was becoming 
a growing problem for the Royal Navy, particularly during Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt 
(1798).292 Moreover, low supplies of timber after the treaty of Amiens (1802) and the 
cancellation of contracts with timber-suppliers due to corruption in the Baltic further increased 
that need. After 1809, Napoleon’s continental blockade effectively brought an end to the Baltic 
timber trade, when the British government deliberately imposed high charges on the product in 
preference of Canadian timber.293 
Canadian and Mediterranean timber trades became available, and the role of the consul 
was key in pointing out any new sources of the product he could trace.294 Being on good terms 
with the contractor, forests in western Greece could become suitable for the construction of 
warships for the British at a low cost, and ‘sufficient to answer the demands of any of the most 
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extensive naval powers’.295 Agreement between the pasha and the British became easier after 
British plans for landing on the islands became more realistic. In 1809, Foresti sent a report to 
Canning titled ‘Concise statement of the number, extent, produce and present condition of the 
forests situated in the territories of a powerful Ottoman official, Ali Pasha of Ioannina’. The 
document consisted of a very detailed report on the exact location of these forests, the size and 
quality of timber, and information on the shipping ports nearby.296 Timber was finally secured 
in 1810, in return for territorial concessions to Ali.297 In 1812, Castlereagh wrote to Foresti to 
ask Ali Pasha for his protection, so that the British could acquire timber from the shores of the 
Adriatic for shipyards in Malta.298  
As the islands’ economy and society were directly dependent on maritime trade, the 
same was true of political stability. This social process was developed to the point of creation of 
a civil society and a commercial bourgeoisie on the islands under British rule during the 
nineteenth century. In many ways, Foresti’s case calls for further research into the origins of an 
English-affiliated political party, as well as into the extent that this group’s interests and 
aspirations were associated with an identifiable ‘commercial bourgeoisie’ on the islands.299 It 
seems that Foresti already considered British protection the better option for the islands by 
1798. Most crucially, the benefits of such ‘protection’ – in whatever form – lay in the opening of 
Ionian maritime trade and the abolition of Venetian monopolies. Since Venetian rule, Ionian 
merchants were repulsed by tight regulations enforced by the authorities, who increasingly 
used the agricultural production and exports of the islands as an attempt to balance the 
Republic’s losses in international markets. As mentioned before in this thesis, the Republic of 
Venice had enforced local monocultures (currants in Zante and Cephalonia, olives in Corfu) and 
the islands depended on imports of grain from the mainland or elsewhere (later the Black Sea). 
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As a result, the islands were dependent on nearby areas for importing foodstuffs and were 
often threatened by scarcity.300  
It was at this stage that Ionians began to seek foreign protection from strict Venetian 
laws, and British protection started to appeal to many Ionians in wartime. Foresti was among 
Ionian merchants whose profits were affected directly: he wrote to Grenville about the duty of 
Novissimo, where all exports – particularly currants and olive oil - had to pass through Venice 
and pay high duties.301 At this stage, however, Venice could not control the maritime traffic 
effectively, and Foresti might have exaggerated the strict enforcement of the measure. This 
strict economic control progressively made Ionian exports much less competitive; one example 
being currants from Zante compared to currants from the nearby Morea. A five-year trial 
abolition of this obligation by the Venetian Senate also proved to be very profitable for British-
Ionian trade, as they could trade directly with the islands. The exact impact of abolition on 
British commerce could be confirmed by information from British merchants trading in the 
region.302  
Economic imperatives also played a role in Foresti’s preference of British protection. 
Resorting to an old tactic among seamen in the Mediterranean to avoid strict regulations, 
Ionian merchants hoisted neutral flags - such as Ottoman, or those from Jerusalem and Raguza 
- or became occupied in clandestine trade. Such practices became increasingly common during 
the Napoleonic wars. According to Foresti, many Ionians associated foreign rulers with 
commercial regulations and control, while the British were linked with the development of free 
trade. Indeed, further research into Ionian conceptions of the English during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries is more than necessary in order to understand better the 
transformation of Anglo-Ionian relations as well as of Ionian society during that time. In any 
case, it was rather common during the earlier period for English merchants to circumvent 
Venetian commercial regulations no less than the Ionians.303 Since 1798, Foresti assured 
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Grenville that ‘if any English naval force, however small, should make its appearance in the 
neighbourhood of these Islands, the republicans [supporters of Revolutionary France] would 
immediately fall a sacrifice to their hatred. This is particularly applicable to Zante, where a 
constant and advantageous commercial connection with the English nation, has strengthened 
their natural sentiments’.304 These obstacles that Foresti mentioned to Grenville were well 
known to Ionians who were affected by Ionian maritime trade, particularly the islands of Zante 
and Cephalonia. His family – as well as his island, Zante - were economically connected to 
British interests through the important currant trade.305 Maria Fusaro had shown the 
importance of English commerce for the two islands, and the inability of Venice to incorporate 
the islands into her economic system: ‘Zante and Cephalonia’, Fusaro writes, ‘developed 
autonomously to fulfil the demands of the English market, setting in motion a profound 
transformation in their social fabric that made them substantially different even from the other 
Ionian islands such as Corfu’.306  
 
Foreign ‘protection’ and political information, 1798-1807 
During Nelson’s expedition to the Mediterranean, Foresti rose from the position of a 
consul and a broker to that of a political agent in the islands due to the invaluable information 
he obtained locally. This information helped the Royal Navy enormously during Napoleon’s 
campaign to Egypt. At the political sphere, Foresti quickly became after 1798 a leading member 
of the ‘English party’ in the islands, which became increasingly active particularly during the 
French administrations of the islands (1797-1798, 1807-1814).307 Ionians who supported British 
protection were a disenfranchised mix of aristocrats and merchants in the islands whose 
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interests had received serious blows due to war in the Mediterranean, and due to Venetian and 
later French restrictions on trade.  
During the French occupation of the islands in 1797 Foresti, being a British agent, was in 
a precarious position in Corfu. In the meantime, he managed to smuggle valuable political 
intelligence out of Corfu, referring to political developments in the islands: ‘Marks of 
discontent, by no means equivocal, have been shown by the inhabitants of Zante, and 
particularly those … under the direct government of the French’, Foresti wrote to Grenville.308 
While the ostensible cause was the attempt to levy more taxes, he observed, the real reason 
was ‘a rooted hatred to the French, and to the effects of the interruption of their commerce’ 
with Britain.309 Ionian men and women were giving frequent ‘proofs of the rooted and 
invincible hatred … for every individual of the French nation’.310 Indeed, the initial French 
occupation - which lasted only twenty months – brought mixed feelings to many Ionians. 
French authorities abolished Ionian aristocracy, proclaimed freedom of the press and planted 
the ‘liberty tree’ in Corfu. Amongst the least popular characteristics of French administration in 
1797 and 1798 was anticlericalism. Although Foresti admitted that political opinions were by no 
means homogenous amongst the Ionian social strata, he consistently emphasized political 
commentary in favour of British protection.   
Furthermore, individuals such as Foresti knew how Venetian information systems 
functioned at the local level, and especially how Ionian nobles utilized them. Examples like 
these were the channels of information that circulated from the towns to the countryside, and 
back: many Ionian aristocrats who lived in the towns were usually tightly connected with the 
peasants in the countryside through of tenancy or social relationships. Information was thus 
circulating between the towns and the countryside relatively quickly. Incendiary proclamations 
from the urban centres to rural areas could provoke rebellions, should they be combined with 
local grievances.  
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Harsh measures were taken by the French, in order to prevent the leaks of sensitive 
information from the town to the countryside, and in order to avoid agitated reactions from 
peasants who disliked French rule. Several aristocrats were imprisoned in Corfu in 1798. Foresti 
was well acquainted with these aristocrats, and could not suspect any other reason for their 
arrest other than ‘circulating intelligence to the peasantry’.311 Actions such as this increased a 
general state of dissatisfaction in the islands for the conquerors, allowing at the same time 
Foresti to play a greater role as a de facto representative of the British presence in Ionian 
politics. Information-gathering came at a personal cost for Foresti: shortly after the French 
occupation of the islands he was put under house arrest as an official of an enemy nation312, 
and the whole of his personal effects were confiscated, worth 7,000 pounds.313 He resumed 
communication with the Admiralty by using his contacts and by smuggling information to 
Nelson.  
For the first time after years, change was in the air. In the period after the French 
occupation of the islands, Foresti’s role as a political agent of Britain developed and 
subsequently came to play a greater role in Ionian power networks. The creation of the 
‘Septinsular Republic’ in 1800 and the constitutions of 1800, 1803, 1806 gave an impression of 
political independence to many Ionians, even under the supervision of Russia. A class of Ionian 
reformers and intellectuals came to the fore during the new Republic, genuinely wanting the 
new government to implement deep changes to institutions traditionally controlled by the local 
aristocracy. Furthermore, literary societies were founded in the islands.   
  Some genuine efforts took place by the new Ionian government to restrain the power 
of the elites, reform local administration, education and commerce. The Septinsular 
government even appointed a historian to write the history of the new republic, Andrea 
Mustoxidi (1806).314 Despite the strong presence of Russia and foreign protection, social and 
political changes were significant. Yet, old rivalries persisted and factions clashed like the Annini 
                                                     
311 TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Venice, 28 September 1798, pp. 90a-b. 
312 He was put under house arrest in 31 July 1797. I owe this information to Ian Chessell.  
313 TNA FO 42/17, [signed] Foresti, St. James’s Place, 21 October 1816, p. 63. 
314 Karapidakis, ‘The Heptanese’, p. 173; Mavrogiannis, History of the Ionian Isles, II, pp. 27-30, pp. 68-110. 
   
99 
 
and Metaxa families in Cephalonia.315 Clamour for deep reform in all aspects of Ionian society 
multiplied. Islands like Zante and Cephalonia had been explicit in preferring British protection 
over that of other powers, while Corfu was less dependent on British trade and politically more 
divided. Meanwhile, social and economic differences between the islands persisted. Partly due 
to their older commercial connections with Britain, there were no feudal structures and 
jurisdiction in Zante and Cephalonia, unlike in Corfu.316 These differences were known to 
London due to the information that British agents such as William Martin Leake, obtained on 
the ground when they were sent to Greece.317 Meanwhile, in July 1803 Foresti was appointed 
by Grenville’s successor as foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury (1801-1804), as ‘his Majesty’s 
Resident to the Republic of the Seven Islands’, a position which superseded his place as a 
consul. He was urged to ‘cultivate the most unreserved intercourse and good understanding 
with the Russian minister at Corfu … to promote the independence and security of the Republic 
of the Seven Islands’.318   
Throughout the period of the Septinsular Republic, Foresti depicted the supporters of 
French influence on the islands in very dark colours. For example, he wrote to Hawkesbury 
about ‘illegal proceedings’ taking place in Corfu in 1803: these inhabitants ‘were particularly 
warm in the French interests during the last wars’, and their ‘misconduct has been notorious … 
yet policy at present prevents both the [Ionian] government and Count Mocenigo [the Russian 
plenipotentiary] from using the severe animadversion those persons merit’.319 According to 
him, Ionians who were attached to French interests were ‘notorious’ and belonged to ‘that 
class who was the cause of all the disturbances … have affected these islands; Notwithstanding 
which many of them now occupy the most lucrative and important offices under this 
government, to the quiet astonishment and surprise of the lovers of order and moderation’.320 
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Foresti thought that British protection would bring an end in these differences, and would 
ensure the political stability and economic prosperity on the islands. 
But Foresti’s observations to British ministers on the strategic significance of the islands, 
were backed up by other officials who served in the islands, such as the new consul who was 
appointed to the theoretically independent Septinsular Republic, Walter Rodwell Wright 
(1774/5 – 1826). He wrote the poem Horae Ionicae: a poem descriptive of the Ionian Islands 
and part of the adjacent coast of Greece (1809). Wright succeeded Spiridion Foresti as a consul 
in the Ionian Islands between 1803 and 1805, as ‘Consul for the Republic of the Seven Islands’. 
He was also a scholar and had accumulated material about the islands. His library and archive 
were looted by the French authorities, destroying a work he was preparing on the history of the 
islands.321 
We saw before how Ionian merchants had earlier tried to avoid Venetian regulations. 
Indeed, to an extent Venetian and French regulations on Ionian maritime trade made it less 
competitive, and war did not improve the situation. Traditional Ionian exports like currants 
were harmed, particularly compared to those of the Morea in the mainland. Yet, it seems that it 
was very widely assumed that, should the British seize control of the islands, they would abolish 
strict measures over commerce. Wright, for example, was convinced that British protection 
would make Ionian exports more competitive and would ensure the prosperity of their 
inhabitants. Writing to Mulgrave he warned about the influence of Russia in the islands, where 
the majority of their inhabitants shared common religious dispositions with the country of the 
Tsar:  
The commercial security and personal liberty resulting from the naval 
superiority and liberal policy of the British government, combined with the 
probable influx of British capital, would, I conceive, operate as an effectual 
counterbalance against the superior fertility and extent of the opposite 
peninsula (Morea). And these neglected Islands would be such protection be 
enabled to rival the produce and possibly the manufactures of the Morea. 
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While the comparative effects of the different systems of policy, which would 
most probably be adopted by the two protecting nations, would sufficiently 
prevent the extension of that Russian influence which must ultimately prove 
detrimental to the interests of Great Britain.322 
Wright thought that the possession of the Ionian Islands would give Britain considerable 
advantages, particularly in regards to the main aims of British foreign policy in the region. He 
was concerned that, although the Septinsular Republic, being occupied by Russian troops, 
would present a ‘strong frontier’ against the ‘attempts of a French armament’, the greatest 
threat for British interests came from the growth of Russian influence in the area. Against the 
policy of Russia, he suggested ‘immediate precautions’ were necessary: for Britain to come to 
an agreement with Russia - to acquire either the Ionian Islands or the Morea. But because 
Britain was a maritime power, he suggested that the former would be a better outcome.323  
Similarly, he sent information on the revenues and produce of the islands. Apart from an 
effective and strategic ‘counterbalance’ to the concerns mentioned above, the islands would 
prove to be an economic benefit as well: Corfu could provide an ‘excellent’ naval station and 
could be furnished with quantities of timber and hemp cordage from nearby areas. Its soil was 
fertile but ‘extremely ill cultivated affording scarcely any other produce than a considerable 
quantity of oil’, which was exported to Venice.324 Santa Maura could also provide timber 
according to Wright, Paxo and Ithaca offered their convenient ports, Cephalonia its capable 
seamen and currants, Zante its currants which could generate revenues for the government 
worth £100,000 (Ithaca and Cephalonia currants worth £50,000), and Cerigo its wine, which 
‘might afford a considerable supply for British consumption’. The ‘principal disadvantage’ was 
for Wright the fact that the islands were dependent on mainland Greece for their supply of 
provisions, but the fertility of Corfu would offer a solution if policies of agricultural 
improvement were promoted.325  
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Like Foresti and other officials who served in the Mediterranean, Wright promoted the 
idea to ministers in London that the Ionian Islands could turn into an important entrepôt in the 
Mediterranean. But Wright did not stay for a long time in the islands, having a very brief 
consulship. In fact, only after a year of his appointment to Zante he expressed his wish to leave, 
seeking to acquire a position of ‘superior value and consideration’ in the recently established 
consulate of Alexandria (1803) or Raguza, should a consulate be created there.326 He soon left 
the Ionian Islands and returned to England as his health had deteriorated ‘from the heats of the 
past summer’.327 It is difficult to assess whether Wright left the islands because he indeed 
suffered from illness, or because of lack of opportunities, or because he simply found the 
Greeks unbearable. But if there was another thing his brief presence in the islands had shown, 
that was Foresti’s role as a guest for high-ranking newcomers from England, and therefore their 
first source of information.328   
Foresti’s role as a vital source of information was recognized by Nelson, who had 
established an extended network of information gathering in the Mediterranean, particularly 
during Napoleon’s campaign in 1797-1798.329 Writing to Evan Nepean in 1799, he 
acknowledged Foresti and the British consul at Tunis, Major Magra, as the ‘only ones … who 
really and truly do their duty, and merit every encouragement and protection’.330 Foresti’s ‘zeal, 
spirit and assiduity’ was commended also by Lord Grenville, and a couple of years later Foresti 
was promoted, something that did not occur very often in consular service. In fact, two years 
after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he was recommended for knighthood. ‘No native servant 
of His Majesty could have displayed a greater degree of zeal and fidelity, in promoting the 
interests of this country’, the Earl of Vincent wrote much later to Foresti.331 But as we will see 
later, despite his being apprised by other British officials all of his contacts could not protect 
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Foresti’s reputation when the first High Commissioner in the islands excluded him from office 
and destroyed his reputation.  
 
The threat of French invasion, 1804-1813 
Ministers in London and officers in the Mediterranean were becoming more familiar 
with potential allies in the area through the information provided by Foresti. As a main 
informant, Foresti felt the need to provide London with all the information he considered 
necessary, as well as to establish links with important local contacts. The British authorities who 
were established later in the islands would substantially utilize communication channels that 
were opened by Foresti, for various reasons: naval stores, information on French and Russian 
movements; or, after the cession of the islands to Britain in 1815, political developments in the 
mainland. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one significant event that enhanced the 
British penetration of local information networks through Foresti was the threat of French 
invasion between 1803 and 1805. The next two sections explain particularly the importance of 
Foresti in two ways: first, in processing accurate military information to London, and second in 
establishing links between Ali Pasha and the British. In the long term, this connection would 
provide to the British a direct connection to the Porte, allowing them to play a vital part in the 
interplay between the ambitious pasha and the attempts by the Ottoman central government 
to control him. This alleviated, at the same time, the major anxiety Britain had over a potential 
war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. During this period, the consul reached the peak 
of his career.    
Being an ‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’, Foresti was able from Corfu to obtain 
timely information on French plans, either from his contacts or from officers of the Royal Navy. 
He passed the news on to London. In December 1803, for example, his was perhaps the earliest 
report to Hawkesbury about the French expedition against Corfu and the Morea which 
threatened the Ottoman Empire.332 The role of the British consul in establishing links with the 
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nearby Ali Pasha was paramount, as British policymakers often used the pasha’s separatist 
tendencies as leverage over the Ottoman government. By 1810, Ali Pasha was more able to 
declare his alliance to Britain, as this would fall in line with the official policy of the Ottoman 
government, and would help Ali to prove his loyalty to the Porte. But at the same time, as will 
see, Foresti’s role as an informant and a political agent changed dramatically after the landing 
of British troops in 1809 and particularly after 1813, when Foresti was released from his service 
as a consul and as an agent for the British government.  
The anticipation of a large scale French invasion of the region kept the British in a state 
of alert, as they were convinced that the Ottoman government would not be able to contain 
the French. On the islands, distrust of the French became more evident in the following years, 
allowing the English party to solidify its presence as a major player in Ionian politics. This 
became increasingly evident in the years after 1804 with the threat of the French invasion. 
Subsequently, French agents were sent to gather intelligence in the Ionian Islands and mainland 
Greece. The neutrality of the ‘Septinsular Republic’ was threatened. Meanwhile, ships of the 
Septinsular Republic were detained by the French and the property of their subjects was 
sequestered. More attacks on Ionian ships had interrupted their commerce, forcing the Ionian 
government to communicate with Britain.333 Closely monitoring French schemes in the islands, 
Foresti mentioned to Hawkesbury an incident which, according to him, was proof of Ionian 
distrust of the French. This event took place when the French emissary Romieux arrived on 
Zante: on the surface, the emissary went to the islands for diplomatic reasons, but in reality he 
went to gather information from supporters of France on the islands, and it was possible that 
he went there to incite revolt on the islands and the Morea.334 In regards to revolt in mainland 
Greece, after unsuccessful rebellions over the past 40 years, Foresti speculated that it would be 
‘very difficult to excite the inhabitants of the Morea to revolt except they see a very powerful 
and sufficient force to support them’.335 The government of the Septinsular Republic instructed 
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two Ionian noblemen to accompany him, as was the custom in Venetian times for men of 
distinction. In secrecy, however, they were instructed by the Ionian government to track his 
movements.336  
The second major area of intervention by the energetic consul was the establishment of 
communication channels between Ali Pasha of Ioannina and the British: he had been 
mentioning the pasha to the Foreign Office since at least 1798. Foresti sent lengthy reports to 
London about the pasha’s character, the ways he governed and his relations with the Ottoman 
government and other European powers.337 Ali, an ambitious man, was a capable Ottoman 
official (the rank is also mentioned in official correspondence as bashaw) who sought to expand 
his pashalik to Albania and the Ionian Islands if he could, almost independently from the 
Porte.338 During the wars of 1793 and 1815, he established multiple connections with France, 
Britain and Russia, constantly shifting his allegiances with characteristic ease to whichever 
power he thought a better fit with ‘his ever more frantic bid to gain control of the territories’. 
Ali Pasha was an acute tactician who was secretly communicating with rival powers like France 
and Britain.339 But in the course of war he slowly but steadily saw Britain as the ideal power to 
help him solidify his conquests and power in the Ottoman government. In 1803, the pasha 
confided to the Earl of Aberdeen, who travelled to Greece, possibly looking for classical 
antiquities, that ‘he much wished the English to be his mediators with the Sublime Porte’.340 
After 1803, several British emissaries visited Ali Pasha, some of them also acting as spies on the 
pasha’s conduct. Official correspondence between them and London testify to the importance 
the pasha put in British policy above every European power in the region. Among them was 
William Hamilton, the future British ambassador of Naples. Recruited from the Levant 
Company, John Phillips Morier was drawn from service in the company in order to serve as a 
consul-general in Albania for £3 per day in 1804.341  
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London sent instructions to Morier to resist French designs in the Ottoman provinces, 
and to urge Ottoman pashas, ‘in the most forcible manner never to lose sight of this most 
important object, nor suffer themselves to be deceived by any assurances of the French 
government denying the existence of any such projects as are … to them. You will also inform 
the pachas that the King has not been inattentive to the dangers with which they are menaced 
nor to the means of averting them … You will also recommend to the pachas to be upon their 
guard against the designs of the numerous French emissaries who, as this government have … 
to believe, are most actively employed in the different European provinces of the Ottoman 
empire for the purpose of exciting disaffection and revolt’.342 In the same document, the 
government instructed Morier to employ clerks, dragomans (interpreters) and janissaries from 
Ottoman service. The British ambassador in Constantinople would also furnish him the 
appropriate passes and letters of credit for pashas of western Greece.343  
Foresti’s local knowledge was again invaluable, as he would prove significant help even 
to a long-time resident in the Levant like Morier, particularly in terms of penetrating through 
barriers of language and culture when Greeks in the mainland would refuse to disclose 
information to the former. In 1804, for example, in one of his surveys to the mainland to gather 
information about the invasion, Morier wrote to London referring to his efforts to interview 
locals: ‘they are so much upon their guard that I have not been able to persuade any of them to 
declare their sentiment to me’.344 At this point, Foresti tried to establish communication to the 
nearby pashas in Greece, and to receive intelligence from outside the Ionian Islands. In 1809 he 
sent his son, George Foresti, to act as a British consul in Ali Pasha’s court. 
After the occupation of the islands by British troops in 1809, Britain’s relations with Ali 
Pasha entered another phase: without any instructions from London, Ali insisted on meeting 
with British officials in private. In April 1810, he met a mission consisting of Foresti and Oswald, 
where he disclosed his wishes in regard to the instability and the ambivalent stance of the 
Ottoman government towards the French. Foresti informed Wellesley about the meeting and 
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Ali’s wishes to abandon the central government: ‘If the government of Constantinople departs 
from its present engagements His Highness declared His Readiness to separate His Interests 
from the general government and make common cause with Great Britain and give all the 
assistance that his country affords’.345 
Foresti’s own involvement in Britain’s relations with the pasha and subsequently, his 
worth as an intermediary and a ‘native informant’ changed after British troops landed on the 
islands. If, for British officials, the pasha was an ally who was never to be fully trusted, Foresti 
claimed otherwise. After having established his own network of informants in the pasha’s 
territory, he emphasized the pasha’s honest intentions early on.346 Gradually, more British 
officials started to associate Foresti with ‘Greek politics and the character of the country’, 
sometimes questioning his utility directly or indirectly. Such an example were the comments of 
George Charles D’Aguilar – appointed later as a lieutenant-general in Hong Kong (1843-1848) – 
after being sent by Bentinck on a military mission to the pasha’s court. For example, in 1812 
D’Aguilar shared his concerns over Foresti in confidential correspondence with Bentinck: 
Mr. Spiridion Foresti is an old man, … himself on the long services he has 
rendered to the government. He rates these services very highly, and is 
disappointed if they are not appreciated in the same manner by others. He 
seems to think himself neglected and complains of receiving no [answers?] 
from your Lordship to his office at communications. From what I can gather he 
expected to have been fully instructed with the subjects of my mission. Even 
before I arrived here. He is jealous to a ridiculous excess of his own son – and 
even at open variance with him in consequence of his having accepted on the 
appointment of British agent at the court of Ali Pasha contrary to his express 
advice and recommendation. He is jealous indeed of anyone’s interference 
there, and thinks no one calculated to manage the pasha – but himself.347 
After many conversations with him D’Aguilar mentioned how Foresti seemed insistent 
on knowing all the information relating to the intentions of the British government towards the 
pasha. This persistence, as well as Foresti’s own daily correspondence with the pasha through 
his son, placed D’ Aguilar ‘on guard’, not willing to share any information. D’Aguilar based his 
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observations about Foresti on the fact that ‘public characters are as justifiable and necessary, as 
they would be … and indecorous if they only concerned individuals’.348 Surely, there was an 
emphasis on the fact that Foresti was a Greek and involved with Greek ‘party politics’. Similarly, 
in another confidential letter, Oswald wrote to Bunbury that the ‘great fault’ of George Airey – 
the British official in charge of the islands at the time – had been that he had ‘manifestly 
become the tool of Foresti and Siguro … instead of making them what they are calculated for 
useful instruments’. Foresti, Oswald continued, ‘is a well-intentioned, intelligent man, but to a 
degree vain and full of party spirit … he is a Greek and therefore ought not to direct amongst 
the Greeks’.349 Foresti’s personal and professional downfall had begun.  
D’ Aguilar’s comments about Foresti concealed ‘information panics’ that came out of 
British entanglements in local politics, revealing at the same time crucial weaknesses of the 
British position in the region; in the case of Foresti, particularly the lack of regular and different 
channels of information. It would become part of the British way of approaching the islands to 
question the reliability of ‘native informants’ or to abandon them altogether. Making a clean 
break with the previous informational and political order, the British governor — after the 
cession of the islands to Britain — centralized all powers and information-gathering in his 
hands. As we will see later, the colonial governor became the sole source of information 
communicated to London. 
This thesis argues that Foresti’s role as a ‘go-between’ who crossed cultural, linguistic 
and political boundaries makes for an interesting case to examine issues that are raised in 
relevant literature.350 As we will see later in a greater detail, after the occupation of the islands 
by the British, Foresti tried to use his experience and connections in Britain to promote other 
projects, for example educational institutions on the islands. But it would be in the period after 
the cession of the islands that the previous information networks would be replaced by a new 
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order, dominated by the governor’s centralization of powers. During this period, Foresti and 
other Ionian collaborators would be marginalized and excluded from office. 
 
French imperial administration and the occupation of the islands 
Foresti wrote to Canning that Ionian commerce during the French occupation of the 
islands was totally interrupted due to heavy taxation. While a ‘system of terror’ silenced ‘all 
remonstrance’, Foresti wrote to Canning that the ‘islanders still support themselves with the 
consolation of receiving British succour’.351 Ionian merchants were forced to hoist the French 
flag, which was at war, instead of the Septinsular or the previous neutral flags they carried for 
their commerce before.352 British properties on the islands, including Foresti’s, were 
confiscated. The French authorities circulated a proclamation, according to which the islands 
were considered a conquered country and French territory. From this point onwards, British 
occupation of the islands would have been much desired. Ironically though, it was the British 
blockade from 1809 onwards that completely ruined Ionian commerce and pushed them 
further into scarcity. 
By 1809, Foresti’s views on British protection were already crystallized. Then, on the eve 
of British troops landing on the Ionian Islands, he privately shared his ideas with a confidant in 
Zante, also a member of the English party of great influence on the islands, Antonio 
Martinengo. As a concluding remark, it shows how convinced he was of the fact that British and 
Ionian interests coincided:   
Actuated by those sentiments which attach me to my country, and by the 
esteem which I entertain for your person, I have to acquaint you that this is the 
most likely moment to regain our political independence. … Be certain that the 
Protection of Great Britain is ready for the first summons, and that the British 
fleet will give you every assistance. If on the contrary this propitious 
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opportunity is allowed to escape, our islands must fear, on the first appearance 
of war between the Turks and France, an invasion from the former.353 
Foresti’s views about the advantages for the islands under British protection had not 
changed. Despite any potential personal or professional benefits he might have expected, he 
seemed genuine in his political views about the prospect of the British ensuring Ionian political 
independence and a government similar to the Septinsular Republic. When the occupation of 
the islands was decided upon in 1809, Foresti was in the leading team of the expedition, 
providing information on the land, including plans of Corfu, to Oswald.354 The help he offered in 
organizing a provisional government under the British was acknowledged by British officials, 
including the commander of British troops at the time.355 Other Ionian politicians also referred 
to Foresti’s ‘incomparable merit’ in assisting in the British occupation of the islands. For 
example, Ionian politicians from Ithaca sent a letter to Canning to thank him for the ‘recovery of 
the freedom’ of their island from the French. According to them, Foresti’s role was 
‘instrumental’ for ‘the prosperity and relief of the Ionian people’.356 
Foresti’s sympathies did not lie only with the political independence of Ionians and the 
restoration of the republic, but also with his countrymen in the mainland. In a rare 
disagreement with the pasha, when the latter asked for some ‘Albanian outlaws, or Robbers’ 
who fled to the islands to be delivered to him, the consul decided ‘against giving these people 
up to him’, as the British commander at the islands at the time, George Airey wrote to 
Bentinck.357 
In 1813, however, the islands were considered de facto a British territory by London as 
well as officials on the spot, and thus all diplomatic functions – including consulship – ceased. 
Despite his release from British service, Foresti kept sending information to British officials and 
provided advice on Ionian politics and society. Following his release as a consul, Foresti had 
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bitter disputes with the first High Commissioner of the islands, Thomas Maitland, after a civil 
suit declared by his predecessor, James Campbell.358  
It appears in Maitland’s dispatches, however, that the civil suit might have been the 
pretext to get rid of the old consul. The commissioner wrote to Bathurst about this in 1816: ‘it 
appears from everything I can learn … both from General Campbell, and Mr. Meyer, the Chief 
Secretary to the government that old Foresti has been playing a part hostile to our interests for 
a length of time; on the principle that if he got a Republic re-established he would get himself, 
made minister to it – and he has been considerably I apprehend an active organ against us’, 
having an insider in the Ionian government who was communicating any information to Foresti 
was counteracting British views.359 The case is indicative of Maitland’s frequent interventions in 
confining the secretary’s office ‘to those whom I either knew personally, or who employed the 
perfect confidence’ of Campbell.360 
Personal antipathies certainly played a role in the dispute between Foresti and 
Maitland.361 Foresti went to England in 1817 and came into contact with several of his old 
acquaintances – including the Earl of St. Vincent for example – but did not succeed in alleviating 
the accusations that were levelled against him. Foresti, as well as his whole family, was locked 
in a legal dispute that continued for years. Up until 1821, his son George Foresti continued to 
write to Bathurst about Foresti’s family, seeking to reclaim Spiridion’s deposit of 1,274 dollars 
that was confiscated by French authorities a couple of years before. This was in addition to the 
multiple memorials the father submitted for restitution of the confiscated amount to the Ionian 
government. After many rejections by the central administration on the islands, the son asked 
the British government to intervene, to no avail.362 After many years of inactivity Spiridion 
Foresti’s health deteriorated and he finally died in March 1822. Immediately following his 
death, Foresti’s wife, Angiola, and children were unable to cover long accumulated debts and 
the family’s debtors confiscated ‘all movable and immovable property’. The correspondence 
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that his wife kept with what seemed to be the only remaining friend of Foresti’s family in 
Britain, Frederick North, is kept in the British Library and is filled with desperation about the 
fate of the family. It is a valuable source for further research into Foresti’s case.363     
Spiridion Foresti’s reputation was finally cleared after his death. As Chessell has noticed, 
these disputes with Maitland and his indifference in providing actual independence to the 
Ionians meant Foresti was gradually alienated from British interests. Foresti’s reputation and 
property were quickly restored after Maitland’s death in 1824. The summary of findings of the 
judge in the Admiralty High Court were the following: 
… that Sir Spiridion Foresti performed his duty to the captors with great fidelity, 
in circumstances of a very trying and difficult nature. It is clear that he did 
everything that was proper and just for the benefit of the parties as far as he 
could, in the hazardous state of public events. I am therefore anxious to give 
protection to this gentleman, who appears to have acted with perfect propriety 
as a prize agent, - with due attention to the interest of his principals, and with 
unimpeachable honesty.364 
 Foresti’s lengthy reports to the Foreign Office ceased in 1813, when the islands fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. After this point, any mention of his name in either 
Bathurst or Maitland’s dispatches are scant and few. Suddenly, the main source of information 
for the British during the wars with France occupied no further place whatsoever in the new 
regime after the creation of the protectorate. But Foresti’s exclusion from office was not only a 
product of personal antipathy, as Chessell mentioned. Rather, it was connected to a much 
broader change in the administration of the protectorate when Maitland became a governor. 
As we will see later, Maitland represented a radically different logic than his predecessors, 
where older sources of information were replaced by the centralizing tendencies of the new 
governor. In order to create a new ‘rule of law’, the previous class of informers and disaffected 
(from Venetian and French administrations) Ionians who placed great hopes in the British 
administration – the so called English-party – were accused of being ‘intriguers’, and were 
effectively removed from power.    
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Scholars of microhistory have been cautioned not to ‘love [their subject] too much’. This 
has often been the case with places, individuals, and objects. Perspective, then, is needed when 
focusing on the microscale. Furthermore, while many studies are concerned with the 
importance of local actors, fewer consider absences and why, specifically, previously important 
actors lost their credibility as information agents. This chapter has looked an example of the 
latter case. Despite his importance as a primary informant and agent of Britain in the islands 
until 1815, Foresti’s case may say less about the occupation and the subsequent governance of 
the islands by Britain. His locally-obtained intelligence, drawing on his access to local networks 
– both on the islands and the mainland – were crucial in providing the British with broad access 
to the region, often at some cost to Foresti.  Foresti’s importance was demonstrated in various 
cases, such as his contribution to Nelson’s intelligence networks, helping to anticipate an 
invasion in 1804-1805, and acting as a broker between the British and Ali Pasha. But this 
changed once British troops landed on the islands, when Foresti lost his privileged position as a 
major source of information. Cases such as Foresti’s can be very illuminating as to how 
transitions took place during and after the establishment of ‘colonial bridgeheads’. 
Furthermore, consideration of the role of local consuls, disenfranchised elites and supporters of 
British rule on the islands calls for a broader definition of the term bridgehead; one that 
acknowledges the brief coexistence – though inherently unequal – of imperial and local 
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Figure I. Sir Thomas Maitland (1759-1824). High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and Malta between 
1813 and 1814. Unknown artist, Thirlestane Castle Trust.365 
 
                                                     
365 https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/lieutenant-general-sir-thomas-maitland-17591824-governor-of-malta-
18131824-211089 (accessed online: 25/04/2018). 
   
115 
 
Chapter 3: Provisional government in the islands and the aftermath of 
the Napoleonic Wars, 1809-1815 
 
When referring to the period 1809-1815, most studies in Ionian historiography have focused on 
the political and constitutional bases of the British protectorate as they were established in the 
Treaty of Paris (November 1815), approaching the case of the islands as a political and 
constitutional ‘experiment’ in the British Mediterranean. However, the establishment of links 
between British and local information networks on both the islands and the mainland were 
crucial precursors of the diplomatic negotiations which led to the creation of the Protectorate. 
Such links involved British officials balancing the demands of the nearby Ali Pasha, the Porte 
and Greeks. In this new scheme, British officials came into direct contact with local officials and 
networks, becoming thus more involved in local politics. During the early phases of the 
provisional government, British officials tried in various ways to connect the islands up with 
wider imperial networks and communication channels across port-cities and islands in the 
Mediterranean, in order to integrate regional economies and reinforce British political influence 
in strategic outposts. But as we will see later, this process brought significant challenges and 
anxieties for British officials. In some ways, this chapter is divided into two parts: first, it studies 
closely the changes and continuities in local networks that took place in the period after the 
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Human intelligence and local alliances: Ali Pasha, 1809-1813 
Being an ‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’, the islands were at the centre of the 
information exchange between the mainland and British outposts in the Mediterranean. When 
British troops landed on the islands, they were in the middle of overlapping networks of 
exchange. The consular connections of information that were established in wartime were 
maintained in the post-Napoleonic era. It is not true that, after the occupation of the islands in 
1809, the British turned their attention ‘to the possible economic advantages’ and that 
relations with the pasha became primarily economic.366 After establishing an effective ‘colonial 
bridgehead’ in the mainland, the pasha became a source of information on Ottoman politics 
that the British presence in the islands often consulted, even after the wars with France. 
Early on, local information networks had informed London about the regional 
economies and networks of which the Ionian Islands were part: as we saw in a previous 
chapter, Foresti was writing to Foreign Office before the declaration of war with France in 1793, 
about woods suitable for timber in mainland Greece. Wright, Foresti’s successor as a consul 
during the years of the Septinsular Republic, wrote in detail in 1805 about the trade of each 
island, as well as of the ‘principal disadvantage’ of islands like Zante that had to ‘depend on the 
opposite continent for a supply of provisions’, if Corfu could not provide.367 Links with the 
mainland could simply cease to exist. British commanders who landed on the islands in 1809 
were at the centre of such overlapping networks between the islands and the mainland. One 
very characteristic example, though different in many ways to the Ionian Islands, was the British 
presence in India; for example, when Cornwallis’ government tried to make the Mughal 
emperor dependent on the British for information. As elsewhere in the empire, British political 
influence – meaning, the protectorate – was established after penetration of local information 
and commercial networks, and local rulers.368 British connections with the mainland, and Ali 
pasha in particular, after 1809 were similar.  
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But who was Ali Pasha, and why he was so important to the British presence in the 
region? Some explanation of the historiography and legacy of Ali Pasha needs to be provided 
here. In terms of historiography and public memory, even today’s picture of Ali Pasha in Greece 
is painted with dark colours; always extreme, sometimes considered a cunning pasha and a 
mixture of every Orientalist stereotype possible, sometimes a ruthless governor, more often 
both. As Katherine Fleming noted, ‘along with such other governors as Mehmet Ali of Egypt, Ali 
represented not traditional Ottoman despotism but rather a new breed of Ottoman governor 
who looked to the West rather than to the Ottoman bureaucracy for aggrandizement and 
political gain’.369 Regarding the neglect of historiography – both Greek and English-speaking – 
on Ali’s time, recent historiography on the pasha has been influenced by relevant debates on 
travel literature, colonialism, and particularly the debates on Orientalism, thus relying heavily 
on travellers’ accounts. Fleming’s work, for instance, also explained the importance of cultural 
stereotyping for both sides in the interactions between Ali Pasha and the British.370 Although 
acknowledging the connection of many travellers to British policymakers, this study focuses on 
official correspondence instead, and the close ties that British officials forged with the pasha. 
Most crucially, Britain’s policy in regards to the pasha, as well as the islands, largely depended 
on individuals. 
Strategically, Ali was a dominant factor in the region, mainly as a barrier to a potential 
French invasion of Greece.371 William Leake, an accredited agent of the British government, 
expressed his observations on Ali’s role in the wider region to Wellesley in 1810, which were 
quite indicative of the dominant imperial thinking at the time:  
Conscious of the advantages he derives from the countenance of the Porte, he 
not only sedulously avoids showing any open contempt for the supreme 
government, but by a contrary conduct, has had the art to establish an 
influence with the ruling persons at Constantinople and in other parts of 
European Turkey, which, in some important instances, has determined the 
event of the revolutions at the capital, and has directed the decisions of the 
Porte in regard to its foreign relations with the powers of Europe. … it is with 
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great satisfaction, therefore, I declare my persuasion, that he will continue to 
be, to the utmost of his strength, a barrier upon this side of the continent, 
against the ambition of France, and may possibly save the Ottoman Empire 
from that destruction, which, without his assistance, seems almost 
inevitable.372 
Britain’s relations with the pasha were also essential in terms of exchanging intelligence. 
In wartime, regular information channels were established between the islands and mainland 
Greece through the pasha’s court in Ioannina, northern Greece. George Foresti – Spiridion 
Foresti’s son – who was a British consul in Ali Pasha’s court at the time, was constantly passing 
intelligence on various matters onto British officials – ammunitions, the pasha or enemy 
movements, negotiations that the Porte was involved in – that circulated in the domains of the 
pasha. After the occupation of the islands by British troops in 1809, Britain’s relations with Ali 
Pasha reached a new level: without any instructions from London, Ali insisted on meeting with 
British officials in private. In April 1810, he met a mission consisting of Foresti and Oswald, 
where he disclosed his wishes in regards to the instability and ambivalent stance of the 
Ottoman government towards the French. Foresti informed Wellesley about the meeting and 
Ali’s wishes to abandon the central government: ‘If the government of Constantinople departs 
from its present engagements His Highness declared His Readiness to separate His Interests 
from the general government and make common cause with Great Britain and give all the 
assistance that his country affords’.373 For example, a courier ‘from the Grand Vezier’s 
headquarters’ reached the pasha’s court in November 1811, bringing news of the peace 
negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish war. Foresti sent 
intelligence to Colonel Sidney Smith confirming Russia’s continuing interest in the islands, 
unsuccessfully pressing Ottoman ministers to support Russia’s claims.374 
Geographical proximity added to the complexity of the situation. Other British officials on 
the spot, who were closer to the social milieu of the area, entertained more complex opinions on 
the character of such migration. They seemed to be well aware of local allegiances once British 
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troops landed on the islands. George Airey, for example, wrote to Maitland and explained to him 
that,  
Those people who do take shelter in these islands from the resentment of the 
Pacha; and whom he styled robbers, are not so in the sense that we should … 
them in our own country. They are individuals of certain tribes of people, who 
from some cause or other and indeed from the [nature?] of the government, 
are almost always at variance with the Vizir. They possibly in their sort of 
predatory wars have had their villages burnt are living in the woods; and some 
of few when had proceed to take refuge in the neighbouring islands. Possibly 
one of the strongest arguments for the policy of not delivering up these people 
may be that it might materially hurt our interest with the Greeks, to see that 
we deliver up to the vengeance of the Vizir, those of their unhappy 
countrymen, who have taken refuge amongst us.375 
Two of these ‘robbers’ were, for example, Ali Farmachi and the later commander-in-
chief of the Greeks during the revolution of 1821, Theodoros Colocotronis, who had escaped 
the pasha by fleeing to the islands. Falling for the pasha’s demands, as he was ‘most anxious to 
get these men out of our hands’, Airey wrote about the incident to William Bentinck. Airey was 
concerned that, due to their popularity among the Greeks, should British authorities deliver 
these men to the pasha, this would ‘stain our national character’, and cause the British ‘to lose 
the confidence and affection of the people of these islands’.376 To ‘give up these men’, Airey 
continued ‘would possibly be, not only to ourselves in our own eyes, but in the eyes of the 
neighbouring nations, and indeed in the eyes of the pasha himself; he would probably laugh at 
our [measures?] at the same time that he gained his ends’.377 But Airey did not stay long in the 
islands.  
Although Bathurst was also aware of the distinction between refugees and bandits, on 
his dismissal Airey was probably considered too sentimental by many officials for differentiating 
between ‘unhappy countrymen’ and robbers. We saw previously how Airey’s relationship with 
Ionians like Foresti, and the latter’s political and ethnic sentiments were criticized by other 
officials. But as we will see later, the revolution of 1820 in the mainland dramatically increased 
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the influx of refugees and politicized many armed ‘bandits’, pressing the Anglo-Ionian 
authorities for more radical measures. This study argues that the origins of this relationship 
began during the period under study of the chapter. Such micromanagement, balancing 
between conflicting demands, with Britain becoming the intermediaries, were common for 
officials on the spot.  
In regards to the pasha, apart from his influence in the wider region and the empire at 
large, historians of modern Greece very rarely acknowledge that the pasha was also in control 
of an extensive network of information. For example, Ali Pasha was able to communicate 
directly with Castlereagh ‘through Your Excellency’s channel from Vienna’, as the pasha wrote 
to Campbell in 1814, asking for an introduction to the minister.378 Being aware of the islands’ 
dependency on the mainland for foodstuff and information, Bathurst was more concerned with 
maintaining good relations with Ali Pasha than with the Ottoman Empire at large. It was 
precisely the interconnection between local networks and British officials on the islands that 
allowed the British to penetrate local information networks.  
 
Official priorities before Vienna 
Settling crucial issues of foreign or colonial policy among heads of interested 
governmental departments in closed sessions with relative independence from the British 
parliament was common during the early nineteenth century.379  In Britain, Henry Bathurst 
(1762-1834) was appointed Secretary of State for War and the Colonies under Lord Liverpool’s 
government in 1812. Bathurst, a High Tory, was Colonial Secretary longer than any other 
minister. Bathurst’s role in the decision-making of Britain’s colonial policy was crucial: for the 
next ten years, he, Liverpool and Castlereagh effectively formed an inner cabinet. Like many 
other ministers of his time, the sheer workload Bathurst had to face as minister in the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars was unthinkable by today’s standards. As an example, 
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Neville Thompson mentioned that between 1812 and 1814 Bathurst exchanged over 500 letters 
with Lord Wellington.380 Charles Greville, a family friend, described Bathurst as a ‘very amiable 
man with a good understanding, though his talents were far from brilliant, a High Churchman 
and a High Tory, but a cool politician, a bad speaker, a good writer, greatly averse to changes, 
but acquiescing in many’.381 Overall, Bathurst’s public correspondence with other British 
officials on the topic of the Ionian Islands, preserved in the Colonial and Foreign Office papers, 
illuminate a rather careful approach towards local customs, although one that still considered 
British legal traditions and culture superior. In this sense, Bathurst suggested to Maitland that 
he collaborate with Spiridion Foresti.  
More than diplomatic relations, Anglo-Ionian authorities and British civil commissioners 
had to negotiate matters such as fleeing convicts or refugees with Ali Pasha regularly. Ali 
Pasha’s collaboration with British officials in the area on information and supplies became more 
frequent, particularly in 1811. Sir James Campbell succeeded Airey and was appointed by 
Bathurst as colonial governor on the islands in 1813 (King’s Civil Commissioner), along with 
Meyer as Campbell’s public secretary on the islands subordinate to Bentinck.382 Including 
experience in the last two campaigns of the American War of Independence in 1781, he had 
pursued a military career in India, Ireland and in the Mediterranean from 1805.383 His salary 
was paid by the islands’ revenues and amounted to £2,000 per annum, along with a secretary 
(£800) and a treasurer (£600).384 Campbell’s administration is often neglected in the history of 
the islands, in favour of his much more decorated (and better connected in London) successor, 
Thomas Maitland. Appointing Campbell, Bathurst instructed him to ‘cultivate the most friendly 
understanding’ with the Greeks in general, probably referring to the wealthy Greek mercantile 
and shipping networks in the Aegean Sea. Historians have written at length about Greek 
                                                     
380 Neville Thompson, ‘Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834)’ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1696?docPos=9 (February, 2016).  
381 Quote in Neville Thompson, ‘Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834)’ in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1696?docPos=9 (February, 2016). 
382 TNA CO 136/300, no. 2, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street 27 February 1813. 
383 H.M. Stephens revised by Stewart M. Fraser, ’Sir James Campbell (1763-1819)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-4506?rskey=n1sUS7&result=3 (March, 2016). 
384 TNA CO 136/300, no. 2, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street, 27 February 1813. 
   
122 
 
shipping, diaspora and trade networks in the British Mediterranean, but much less about 
imperial thinking.385 Bathurst advised Campbell to form no ‘public connections’, being 
specifically aware of negative complications in Anglo-Turkish relations. By ‘public connections’, 
Bathurst meant to avoid any potential source of discontent for the Ottomans, such as friendlier 
relations with the Greeks, especially ones fleeing Ottoman authorities.  
Bathurst was not vaguely concerned with Ottoman politics, but specifically with the 
relationship of the islands with the ‘neighbouring provinces of Turkey’, with a ‘particular 
attention to the proceedings and disposition of the pacha of Ioannina’. Bathurst added, that ‘it 
is certainly desirable that we should remain upon amicable terms with that powerful chief, and 
care should be taken not to give him any just grounds of complaint or hostility, by opening the 
Ionian Islands as places of sanctuary for the banditti who may fly from his territory. The 
Protection which the Albanian robbers find in St Maura and other islands, appears to be a 
principal cause of misunderstanding with the Turkish pachas, and you will endeavour to close 
this source of … and mistrust’.386 
The next two sections explain how closely involved the first British administrators 
became with Ionian society during the period of the provisional government (1809-1815). While 
Ionian historiography is focused on the career and administration of the first High 
Commissioner, Thomas Maitland, the earlier period is not taken into account. Despite the 
constitutional and political ‘limbo’ that followed, these commanders followed a very different 
approach to governance than Maitland would. For example, Campbell seemed to be more 
conciliatory towards the interests of the elites, and more interested in turning the islands into 
‘a cultural magnet’, drawing experts from across the Greek diaspora.    
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From Foreign to the Colonial Office: the provisional government 
 Islands have been described in literature as sites ‘where new forms of freedom (and 
control) can be imagined and implemented’.387 There was definitely a prospect of implementing 
new forms of control among British officials who occupied the Ionian Islands. In fact, as we will 
see later in this chapter, Meyer represented the opinions of several British officials on the spot 
when he wrote to Campbell about the islands as a ‘possession … [and a] solid and legitimate 
ground of war’.388 
In 1813, the islands passed from the jurisdiction of the Foreign to Colonial Office. As has 
been emphasized, historians have been generally less willing to theorize the colonial state than 
to provide various functional descriptions.389 As we have already established, the Ionian State 
which was created under the Treaty of Paris in 1815 was a rather peculiar case of a colonial 
state in the broader historical context of the British Empire: in theory an independent state, in 
reality a colony. Its constitutional and political origins have been amply documented, and more 
recent works have explained how the protectorate state regulated the daily lives of Ionians.390 
Confusion among historians about how to categorize the Ionian State, however, rarely 
reflect similar confusion amongst British officials at the time. During the period of the 
provisional government until 1815, no major changes would take place, and particularly no 
‘material improvements into the practice of the courts of justice’.391 During Campbell’s 
administration, British officials took steps to consolidate their rule in the area, to integrate 
commercial activity, to encourage changes in the legislature and to promote projects for the 
‘moral improvement’ of the Greeks. In all of these aspects of state formation, significant 
autonomy was left to the colonial governor and thus these initiatives largely depended on his 
efforts.  
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While the previous section explained British ties with the mainland through maintained 
contact with Ali Pasha, this section examines how a provisional government was formed in the 
islands and how British officials conceived of Britain’s presence in the region. Then, it examines 
the movement of knowledge, products and people within a broader geographical scope across 
the Mediterranean.  
 From 1809 to 1815, the provisional government that was established by the British and 
their Ionian collaborators was not permitted by London to apply any major changes in the 
legislature or to Ionian society in general. The constitutional and political status of the islands 
would remain unresolved until the Treaty of Paris, and as it seemed later, for the whole period 
under study. Even the organization of the British archives concerning the Ionian Islands today is 
a testimony to the confusion that dominated diplomatic debates on the islands, as well as 
governmental jurisdiction in Britain: in the archives today, for example, there is a clean break 
from 1813 onwards, when the islands were perceived to be a ‘colonial issue’; even though they 
were under temporary occupation under international law. Publicly, British officials had given 
every sign to the islanders that the new government would restore the old Septinsular 
Republic, an unfulfilled dream for many on the Ionian Islands.  Brigadier General Oswald (1777-
1840) for example, who was in charge of civil and military affairs in the provisional government 
between 1809 and 1812, circulated a proclamation which acknowledged the liberation of the 
Ionians from tyranny, the restoration of the ‘Ionian Republic’ and confirmed Britain’s political 
and economic protection to the Ionians.392 
Generally, despite assumptions about the Ionian character, there was a stark difference 
between how the urban and rural areas in the islands were viewed among British officials (the 
cittadini and contadini respectively). A British agent in official capacity wrote for instance to 
Canning a few of months before the occupation of the islands: ‘You are undoubtedly well 
informed that in all the islands, and particularly in Corfu, the inhabitants of the cities have for a 
long time formed a class very distinct from those of the rest of the country: the former from 
long habits under the government of Venice having assumed the manners of that part of Italy, 
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while the others retain the clandestine features of the Greek nation’.393 As mentioned before, 
Leake had served a successful military career abroad and was considered a reliable source of 
information because of his topographic surveys in the region. 
 Politically, British officials took steps to present the British presence to the Ionians as 
offering liberation from past tyrannies. As has been argued by historians of other parts of the 
British Empire, imperial rule was indeed ‘built on the experience of rule and the construction of 
cultural difference of the old empires’.394 In the Ionian Islands, for example, the British were 
consistently drawing comparisons with Venetian administration and legal traditions. As Fusaro 
noted, in the Ionian Islands there existed ‘continuities in the cultural practices and modalities of 
governance’.395 For example, continuity in terms of symbolism in the Protectorate was 
communicated to Ionians by adopting the Venetian Lion of St. Mark as an official symbol of the 
Ionian State. But the British also encouraged the use of Greek, which was not broadly used 
during Venetian times except by notaries.396 Proclamations that were circulated in the 
countryside and towns were written in Italian and Greek and bore the Venetian lion of Saint 
Mark. References to Britain liberating the Ionians from tyranny were common from the very 
beginning of the presence of British troops in the islands. Essentially, the main assumption was 
that British rule was an improvement on the regime of earlier Venetian, as well as French and 
Russian, rulers. Stemming from a familiar line of critique in Britain since the sixteenth century – 
but perhaps also from contemporary debates on ‘Old Corruption’ at the time – the ‘myth of 
Venice’ gradually shifted, referring to the economic and social crisis of the Venetian Republic 
due to corruption, and thus feeding into an ‘anti-myth of Venice’, particularly during the 
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eighteenth century.397 Being part of literary and political cultures of England, later Britain, since 
then, the subject has been debated much in historiography.398 
As Bayly has mentioned in Imperial Meridian, controlling news and political commentary 
indeed reflected some of the Colonial Office’s willingness to encourage ‘subordinate forms of 
nationalism’.399 Fostering such local ‘reinvented traditions’, Bayly wrote, was another strategy 
of promoting English institutions abroad, but also on the islands. Similar processes were also 
taking place within Britain. This policy of ‘reinventing’ attempts by indigenous people to 
rediscover their language, culture etc. had worked successfully in Scotland ‘with the invention 
by Walter Scott and his generation of a Scottish mythology of national identity under the 
Crown’.400 Although proclamations and news, in the form of rumours, were circulating the 
islands since Venetian times, it seems that diffusion of printed information originated in the 
Napoleonic Wars. A printing press was established by French authorities in Corfu in 1798.401 A 
weekly gazette circulated later in Zante, mainly containing information on military 
developments, proclamations of the general government, exchange rates etc. Foresti 
acknowledged the importance of this ‘war of words’ when he wrote to Bentinck in 1812 – when 
Corfu was still under French occupation – referring to two papers that were published: one in 
Corfu and one in Zante.402 
Both of the gazettes mostly contained information on military matters, thus allowing the 
dissemination of false or disorienting information on enemy movements. Foresti did not 
differentiate between French or Corfiote publishers in the publication of these papers. 
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Competition around winning over the ‘average’ Ionian became stronger as British occupation 
became more stable in the balance of powers. British economic and political interests aside, 
most British officials on the islands were confident that they could bring ‘moral improvement’ 
and prosperity to the islanders. Rhetorically, the ‘anti-myth of Venice’ was feeding into British 
claims of ‘moral improvement’. For British officials, however, cultivating friendly relations with 
the Greeks, as well as their ‘moral improvement’, were more programmatic than genuine.  
Overall, championing the interests of the ‘inferior classes of the community’ by the 
abolition of titular offices and the elite’s interests was a standard line in British discourse. 
Responding to London’s requests for information on Ionian society, Campbell set up the British 
headquarters in Zante, liaised with Ionian aristocrats and the heads of the leading ecclesiastical 
establishments on the islands, the Greek Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Campbell collected 
information on revenues, customs, the judicial and educational establishment etc. from various 
appendages he received from his predecessor Airey, as well as from interviews with local 
collaborators.403 These reports are kept today in the Colonial Office records and have been 
transcribed and published in Greece since the 1980s, but without any substantial historical 
analysis since.404 
During Campbell’s administration, Ionians were consulted on various matters, 
particularly in regards to the legislature. To a large extent, British initiatives were seen in a 
positive light during the period 1809-1815 by many Ionians who advocated reforms, particularly 
in the judicial and educational establishments. As elsewhere in the empire, models of 
governance were not simply implemented but also adapted to local contexts. Changing 
Venetian laws and constructing an efficient bureaucracy were indeed crucial in state formation 
on the islands.405 In theory, the critique of Venetian ‘corrupting influence’ shaped British 
declarations about the implementation of new forms of control. Campbell’s calls for regulation 
of the legislature were in agreement with many Ionians who advocated deep reforms in the 
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judicial establishment of the islands: one of Campbell’s early initiatives, for instance, was to 
gather a committee consisting of knowledgeable Ionian judges and politicians in order to 
provide more accurate information for the legislature. According to them, the problems of the 
judicial establishment—and particularly of the criminal code—on the islands were, that the 
principle of legislation being still in force,  
…completed of a period in which the luminous principle of legislation 
philosophy were not yet displayed, drawn up in a language which is not 
understood at all by the lower classes and very imperfectly by lawyers and 
founded on the maxims of a government which is no more, it is not surprising 
if private individuals ignorant of the dictates of their own conduct are in the 
course of their actions and if the judges listening to their feelings, avoid to 
execute laws sometime contradictory, often …, and always very extravagant.406 
These reforms were related to the Venetian criminal code on maiming and murder in 
the islands, as well as on the incomprehensible language of the legal system to the ‘lower 
classes’, ‘excited by the pressing want of a salutary reform in their own legislature has been 
already manifested in past times by efforts which reflect the greatest honour on those who 
were the first promoters of this beneficial change’.407 While Campbell found the institutions of 
the islands ‘irreconcilable to English ideas, English usage and English principles generally’, he 
wrote about the lower classes who had ‘been made the instruments of a few ambitious and 
designing individuals among the higher orders, upon the basis of ancient vassalage or the 
feudal system’.408 Moreover, for Campbell it was essential to abolish a ‘number of superfluous 
offices’ and ‘honorary employments’ left over from the Septinsular Republic, in order to contain 
the power of the ‘passions and interests of the opulent patrician families’.409 Issues of law 
reform and state-formation in the islands under British rule have been discussed elsewhere, in 
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both Greek and English-speaking historiography.410 As Maria Fusaro has already suggested, 
more comparative studies between British and Venetian legal traditions may prove to be 
particularly fruitful.411 
 
‘Moral improvement’ and surveys – the hand of the state?  
 As has been mentioned, the period from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth 
centuries saw an unprecedented change in the islands. A new class of people across Ionian 
society had been advocating the ‘modernization’ of the islands, with the establishment of 
education or the implementation of deep changes in the legislature. As with the networks of 
military and economic information, the development of educational institutions on the islands 
overlapped with a rapidly growing ‘commercial bourgeoisie’ elsewhere in the Greek-speaking 
world. Ionian historiography has discussed at some length this Ionian bourgeoisie, which 
became increasingly vocal in public opinion on the islands, especially after the 1840s.412 This 
thesis is more concerned with an earlier period, and examines the extent to which the first 
surveys were ‘improvised’.  
Studies in imperial history have been debating the impact of colonialism on local 
institutions and networks for some time now, with an overwhelming focus on India.413 Equally, 
historians have also been aware of the strengths and limitations of ‘modernist master 
narratives’.414 Historical writing on Anglokratia on the Ionian Islands in particular, seems 
preoccupied with the impact of British institutions and discourse on Ionians, on whether the 
Protectorate was a successful ‘laboratory’ of modernity or not: whether seen in a positive or a 
negative light, the British presence in the islands as well as the Mediterranean more generally is 
presented almost as an unstoppable force for progress or cultural imperialism. For example, 
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there seems to be very similar concerns in relevant debates on British infrastructures, 
communications or large scheme projects for the ‘moral improvement’ of Ionians.  
But such large schemes were severely limited by a lack of funds or the significant 
amount of initiatives that colonial governors had to undertake on the spot. But there has been 
little discussion overall about the limits of such impact. An important point of departure is 
Greek knowledge networks which pre-existed the British, between the islands and mainland 
Greece, as well as the islands and the rest of Europe. Knowledge, political opinion and 
economic information were transmitted through these networks. Viewed from the British 
perspective, this section will illuminate how British officials sought to penetrate these networks 
and how compatible such imperatives were with locals. 
Overall, a hands-off approach prevailed in educational institutions in the earlier period 
of British administration. Education would become the work of individuals – British and Ionian 
alike – on the islands, and often obstructed by the fiscal problems of the government: such was 
the case of Frederick North, Maitland’s predecessor in Ceylon and future founder of the first 
Greek university during Anglokratia: the Ionian Academy in 1824. Before that, the first time 
that funds were secured in a Greek state – even under foreign protection – for educational 
purposes were during the Septinsular Republic in 1805.415 A university was founded during the 
French administration in 1808, but was abolished by Campbell, along with the press and an 
academy.416  
 Linguistically similar but politically diverse, Greek intellectual networks and communities 
in Europe of course pre-existed the nineteenth century. As Greek historians have mentioned, 
local identities and cultural backgrounds often mattered more than notions relating to a unique 
Greek national bourgeoisie, even less to a unique national consciousness in the Greek-speaking 
world.417 Building on previous works, this study argues that the ‘commercial bourgeoisie’ of the 
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Ionian Islands are a case in point.418 Wealthy Ionian families sent their male youth to study law 
and medicine at European universities such as Paris, Padua and Venice. Greek communities 
abroad formed channels of communication and knowledge transfers between Europe and 
Greece, perhaps most famously Greek mercantile and shipping interests in the Black Sea. These 
changes also left their mark on the islands as well as the Greek mainland at large, both in terms 
of knowledge production as well as daily life. The rapid growth in literary production in late 
eighteenth century for example, called the Heptanese School (Eptanesiaki Scholi in Greek), is a 
classic example of the connections formed with western European countries.419 At the same 
time, these changes widened the gaps between a literate middle and upper urban classes on 
the islands and the illiterate rural areas: according to one memoir of the time, for example, 
three-quarters of Ionians did not know how to read or write.420  
In theory, it was among Bathurst’s broader aims to establish strong links with Greek 
trade networks as well as to infuse ‘moral improvement’ in the Ionians. Though not explicitly 
articulated, this notion of moral improvement was mentioned frequently in Bathurst’s 
instructions to Campbell when the latter landed on the islands. To explain these cultural 
strategies in early-nineteenth century empire in a comparative perspective, Bayly mentioned 
the example of Ireland and ‘the revamping of the rituals of the Order of St. Patrick’.421 Indeed, 
the British tried to promote ‘subordinate forms of nationalism’ in the Ionian Islands as well, 
mainly through education and trying to turn the islands into a cultural magnet for the Greek-
speaking world. Bathurst informed Campbell of the prospect of establishing a Greek school or 
college, and a printing press with Greek types was shipped from Zante to Corfu, as a means of 
articulating information ‘and to diffuse knowledge through the countries where the Greek 
language is spoken’.422 Bathurst’s orders to Campbell to aid the diffusion of knowledge to areas 
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beyond the islands show that this initiative was not just about state-formation but also about 
establishing broader links with Greeks elsewhere. But in the end, it was due to individuals that 
an educational system was established. Foresti acted as an intermediary and used his own 
network of contacts across the Greek-speaking world. Not long after British troops landed on 
the islands, the consul received news from two famous Greek scholars at the time – Gregorius 
Constantas and Stephan Dukas - proposing to establish at their own expense, an Academy ‘for 
educating the youth of their nation’.423 Foresti’s suggestions to Castlereagh in 1813 on Ionian 
education, for example, had many characteristics of the ‘subordinate forms of nationalism’ that 
Bayly described in Imperial Meridian:  
Many Greeks, on that account repair to Vienna and other parts of Germany as 
well as to Russia, at great expense and with great inconvenience, … would come 
with much satisfaction to these islands could they receive here the same 
advantages. And the idea that our government extends its protection to the 
revival of literature in Greece would attach the whole nation to our interests 
more than any exertion however great of beneficence or of power.424  
Studying cases of ‘go-betweens’ – individuals who operated between British and Greek 
worlds – may help map out local intellectual networks but mostly how British officials tried to 
employ and penetrate such networks. At the same time, it might show the agency of such 
individuals and how they helped in associating western practices such as meritocracy with 
British rule.      
 
Public instruction and local initiatives: the case of Plato Petrides  
 During the period under study, ‘moral improvement’ and public instruction was not part 
of a London-planned model of transforming the Ionian society, but came from the initiatives of 
interested individuals from both the islands and Britain.  
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Plato Petrides (1790-1852) was such an example of a ‘go-between’. He came from the 
rich Greek community of Constantinople and was born in Argirokastro (modern day Albania), 
studied in London at the recommendation of Lord Elgin, and lived on the islands for most of his 
life (1813-1852).425 Campbell employed him in December 1813 as ‘Inspector of institutions of 
education’ in the provisional government, and then of the United States of the Ionian Islands in 
1819. 426 Petrides, who was also secretary to the Ionian legislative assembly, was later 
nominated a cavaliere of the Knight Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1833, and promoted 
to a knight commander in 1844.427 Later he came to play an important role in the organization 
of education on the islands, and in the period under study he acted as a key intermediary 
between British officials and the Greeks. As Campbell wrote to Bathurst, the main reason for 
Petrides’ appointment was the ‘particular advantages of information he possess by his 
knowledge of the language and the numberless local peculiarities of the country’. His 
knowledge of Greece gave him the facility to penetrate ‘into the real views and sentiments of 
the great mass of people in a manner not to be accomplished by any but one of their own body 
and religious persuasion’.428 Individuals like Petrides, were appointed to key positions in terms 
of information-gathering or social policy, often extending the sphere of education or the 
diffusion of knowledge more broadly. Apart from gathering knowledge regarding pupil 
numbers, social status or the conduct of teachers, individuals like Petrides played an active role 
in effectively promoting British protection, often receiving a good salary in return.429 His efforts, 
however, were directed more by his own personal experience in education.  
Petrides had conducted perhaps the first survey in Ionian schools during British rule, but 
with measures he thought himself ‘entitled to adopt’.430 This report on the state of education 
took place almost thirty years before the first ‘official printed Colonial Office report on the 
                                                     
425 I took details about Petrides’ life is in: H Meleti – Erga. Mastrodimitris, ‘O Ioannis Vilaras opos ton eide o protos 
viografos tou Platon Petrides’ [Ioannis Vilaras as was seen by his first biographer, Plato Petrides], NEA ESTIA, vol. 
1115. 
426 TNA CO 136/1, no. 29 [enclosed], Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 17 December 1813. 
427 Charles R. Dodd, The Peerage, Baronetage and Knightage of Great Britain and Ireland, including All the Titled 
Classes. Sixth Year (London, 1846), p. 318. 
428 TNA FO 42/15, no. 45, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 1 August 1814, p. 15. 
429 For instance, Petrides was paid £400 per annum (TNA CO 136/14 [Hankey?] to Goulburn, 28 July 1820, p. 152a) 
430 TNA CO 136/3, Plato Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, p. 38a. 
   
134 
 
schools’ (1843).431 After a tour of the islands in 1815, Petrides outlined to Campbell his 
observations on the situation of the schools. In Zante, for example, he sought to reorganize a 
school into a model institution. Petrides wrote to Campbell about his efforts to reorganize the 
schools that had so far led ‘a nominal existence’. The task proved to be challenging due to 
political events, but Petrides was encouraged by Campbell’s ‘indefatigable vigilance and 
attention for the promotion of the public good’.432 After his departure from the island on June 
28th 1814, he had left the school 4 professors and 135 students. As another observation, 
Petrides seemed content that a professor from Constantinople (Dr. Theodosius) replaced the 
local Mr. N. Mercati. By the 1st of January 1815, the particular school in Zante had 235 
students.433 Petrides’ object was two-fold: first, to ensure that the system of schools was well 
regulated and organized, and ‘to display to the inhabitants of Zante the great and real benefits 
expected to result to the country from the generous care of the British government’. Drawing 
from his academic background in Britain, or perhaps knowing exactly which words he ought to 
use, Petrides wrote to Campbell that ‘good order, discipline and decency continued to prevail in 
the management’ of the institution, even when he was absent.434  
In order to conduct the survey, he organized a public examination in the presence of 
Colonel Moors, the chief of the local government and the head of the Church (Protopapas), 
‘part of the civil authorities, most of the nobility, with a great number of the public, concerned 
to fill up the hall and the rooms of the house’. The successful examinations on various taught 
topics were met with ‘the unanimous applause of the audience’. Even those who were present 
and who used to encourage for a number of years ‘the policy of ignorance and wretchedness’, 
found themselves among ‘the first who gave … the compliments of congratulation’. The next 
day, more parents applied for the acceptance of their children at the public schools.435 Local 
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incidents like this became displays of British protection of education.436 But at the same time, 
public examinations were not conducted only for reasons of propaganda, nor merely for 
gathering administrative information for the needs of schools. Meritocracy – even in theory – 
and the establishment of a system of mass education was an integral part of local reforming 
initiatives and of the Ionian State, having recently conveyed the patronage and infrastructure of 
British rule. Moreover, social and political tensions were at the heart of such projects. In these 
cases, British officials had a laissez-faire approach, and these projects depended more on 
private funds. Individuals like Petrides were pioneers in collecting information about 
institutions in the islands, not only in the Ionian Islands, but also across the empire.437 Petrides 
was finally removed from office because of his clash with Theotoky. Writing to the Senator, 
Maitland acknowledged his support for Theotoky.438 
 
The islands in an imperial system 
We saw how British officials interpreted instructions from London in establishing 
connections with local intellectual networks. But during Campbell’s administration, the islands 
were connected with other British possessions in the Mediterranean as well. Port-cities and 
strategic outposts were gradually integrated into an imperial system of communications, 
commerce and shipping and, to an extent, integrated into the Atlantic economy. The regulation 
of movement, information and capital took the form of documentation and passes; a practice, 
although not new, that nevertheless sought to integrate regional economies into a broader 
imperial network.439 However, the creation of a system where products and capital, which had 
its origins in wartime period, would be little regulated but conducted under British protection, 
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would also bring different challenges to British officials: along with its expeditions in checking 
transatlantic slave trade, the Royal Navy was policing the Mediterranean. British maritime 
rights – Ionians and Maltese included after 1815 – involved a series of difficulties which no high-
ranking official would expect in the period before the war.    
Comparative studies between the Mediterranean and other oceans are few.440 
Historically, there have been few studies that consider the islands within a wider imperial 
system, whether in the context of communications, trade or diplomacy.441 Even less so, studies 
that consider the impact of the Royal Navy, and British presence more generally, on people and 
places in the Mediterranean ‘beyond the poop deck’. Moreover, focusing more on terms of 
communication and knowledge, this thesis argues that pre-existing maritime networks and 
forms of social communication were transformed during the same period of the provisional 
government in the islands.  
In many ways, war gave the incentive for the British to improve communications and 
the movement of knowledge. Despite Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805, maritime 
communications and commerce were suffering, particularly because the Mediterranean was 
still packed with French – and until 1808, Spanish – privateers. The British were struggling to 
keep military or diplomatic communications with their allies open.442 In Malta, a regular packet 
service was established in 1806, yet caused many complaints from the Post Office 
arrangements.443 Referring to delays in the mails, for example, Foresti mentioned in 1810 that 
his letters were delayed for three months, due to the absence of ‘public conveyance’ between 
Malta and Sicily.444 Measures were also taken to improve the postal service and 
communications. British packet losses occurred frequently and French privateer row boats 
were still operating in the Adriatic in 1813. In the same year, Campbell gave orders to establish 
an armed vessel, or packet, in order to maintain ‘constant’ communication between the Ionian 
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Islands, Sicily and Malta. He also complied with Bathurst’s suggestion to establish a post office 
in Zante. Apart from the main ports of the Adriatic, Malta and of mainland Greece, the postal 
service would have smaller branches in the rest of the islands, and would take letters from, and 
to, Malta, Sicily, Gibraltar, Tagus, Cadiz and other ports of Spain, as well as England. The service 
would also transmit letters to ports of the Ottoman Empire, such as Constantinople and 
Smyrna. There would be also an increase in customs charges on the islands, to cover these 
expenses.445 Through Campbell’s letters, there seems to be no mention of further connecting 
the islands with India, but with other ports throughout the Mediterranean.  
Ports of the islands were linked with other ports in the Mediterranean via the postal 
service, like Gibraltar and Malta, developing into entrepôts and pushing forward British 
commercial penetration into Turkey and Northern Africa.446 These ports were declared free; 
open sites for British and British-allied vessels that proceeded to another destination without 
being subjected to duties, except from a moderate 2% on the estimated value of the cargo.447 
Malta, for example, had already been declared a free port as early as 1801, while the ports of 
Zante and Argostoli in Cephalonia were declared free ports in 1813. News of the ports being 
declared free and ‘heads of particulars’ were circulated under official proclamations on the 
islands, communicated to British naval commanders in the Mediterranean, and were notified 
by the agent of the islands in Britain, Colonel Bunbury, at Lloyds Coffee House in London.448  
But the islands were integrated into the British Mediterranean under an imperial system 
of documentation. Documents of identification across the Mediterranean gradually 
transformed into ‘instruments of imperial protection’.449 One of the ways of integrating the 
British Mediterranean was through the so-called Mediterranean passes. The result of bilateral 
treaties between England and the Barbary States, these were documents of identification which 
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during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries became ‘instruments of protection’.450 
These licenses ensured that English vessels would not be attacked by Barbary ships. English 
merchant ships would continue trading unmolested and prisoners were released.451 In fact, 
vessels had to be built in Britain, and crews were to consist of at least three fourths British 
subjects.452 The issuance of these passes provided to the captain of the vessel – and therefore 
the vessel itself – freedom of movement and trade, as the owners of such passes would not be 
attacked by corsair or pirate ships belonging to the Barbary States. These agreements—which 
gave considerable advantage to British trade over other Christian or Muslim powers – were 
generally respected by pirates from the Barbary.453 In the case of Ionian vessels, passes were 
requested from the British government through the colonial governor. Passes were often 
temporary and were issued during Airey’s command, for example in 1812.454 
British policy in the region aimed at ‘facilitating’ the commerce of Greek merchant fleets 
of islands in the Aegean, like Hydra and Spezies, so that ‘most of the traders’ of these islands 
‘would willingly avail themselves of the British protection in receiving their trade with those 
ports’.455 British maritime protection competed with Austrian and Russian interests, who 
sought to establish their commercial connections in the Levant and the Mediterranean, 
warranting the belief at the same time ‘that the greatest Mediterranean facilities will be 
afforded by the Russian government to cover the Greek ships with the Russian flag’.456 
 The pass system would ensure that the British government integrated foreign and 
neutral shipping.457 It also became an effective way of gathering information on merchant 
fleets, tonnage and crews. Demand for passes grew in British possessions in the Mediterranean 
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like Gibraltar and Malta, including the Ionian Islands. Campbell, for example, who was the 
intermediary between the islanders and the British government, informed Bathurst in 1814 that 
the sixty Mediterranean passes that he received from the Admiralty were not sufficient for 
more than one fourth of the Ionian merchant fleet of 300 ‘square rigged vessels’. At the same 
time, 116 Ionian vessels, with only 66 of them belonging to Cephalonia, navigated already 
under the British flag.458 There was a danger, as Campbell informed Bathurst, that these Ionian 
traders would finally acquire protection from the Russians or the Austrians.459 Thus the mere 
practice of issuing passes had become a powerful instrument of imperial protection. 
Campbell warned Bathurst in 1815 that British commerce, ‘being connected more 
immediately with the Adriatic and Archipelago’, should be ‘opposed to the most ruinous 
depredations and losses by the enemy’s privateers’. As a countermeasure, the Ionian 
government should issue letters of marque and reprisal, in order to allow Ionian cruisers to 
attack Britain’s enemies. Under French rule, Corfu had become the ‘general rendezvous’ of the 
privateering system, which was composed of Corsicans, Genoese and Sclavonians.460 Free 
marine transport from Cephalonia to the other islands was also established on the 10th 
October 1816, after an application by the Regent of the island, Rivarola. But due to the 
existence of the plague, Santa Maura and Parga were exempted from communications.461 
British protection of Ionian maritime trade was utilized to further legitimize British 
presence on the islands. Britain had become the only naval power that could provide naval 
protection to all ‘weaker powers’; risking a permanent expenditure. Castlereagh wrote to 
Bathurst in 1815, for example: ‘I am afraid, as soon as we embark in the task of protecting the 
weaker powers, that every other power, even the Americans, will rely upon us for destroying, 
or keeping in port, the Barbary corsairs, and that the whole charge of the police of the 
Mediterranean will fall upon us’.462 The issue of the islands was closely interlinked: ‘… nothing 
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should be done or said upon the subject, till the point of the Ionian Islands is finally settled. The 
great motive the Ionians have to become our subjects is that our flag being now the only one 
respected’.463 In fact, as historians have discovered since, the area between the Ionian Islands 
and Calabria in Italy was one of the most preferred areas of Barbary corsairs during the early 
nineteenth century.464 Shortly after the Congress of Vienna, assurances were given by the 
regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to the British that Ionian ships under British jurisdiction 
would be respected.465 
British maritime rights cemented its imperial authority and the role of the Royal Navy as 
a guarantor of the maritime trade. In the end, however, this brought more challenges than the 
British could counter, most notably the extraordinary costs of policing the seas, particularly 
after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. We will see later how issues of maritime security 
were closely related to the creation of the protectorate in the Ionian Islands. The next sections 
discuss how the changes mentioned above were played out at the diplomatic table, and how 
diplomatic negotiations in the aftermath of war decided British presence in the region.   
 
Vienna politics and the creation of the protectorate   
When representatives from the victorious coalition forces commenced negotiations in 
Vienna, a similar ambivalence over maintaining control of the islands was articulated in official 
correspondence. British statesmen were slowly withdrawing from continental politics in 1815, 
with Bathurst and the Earl of Liverpool the main proponents of this policy.466 In Vienna, 
Castlereagh negotiated with Ioannis Capodistrias, a man who ‘professed a Liberalism which, 
though mainly inspired by a wish to help his own Greek countrymen, yet was undoubtedly 
sincere and intelligent enough’.467 Meanwhile, and particularly after the Treaty of Tilsit, the 
Ionian Islands had completely justified their place as an ‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’, a 
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prediction made by Meyer seven years before the Congress of Vienna: using Corfu as a base 
between 1799 and 1807, as well as after 1809, British military officials and consuls surveyed the 
islands as well as the mainland, collecting valuable military and political information. In the next 
two remaining sections of this chapter, the negotiations about the islands in the aftermath of 
the Napoleonic Wars are examined, and Castlereagh’s sources of information on the spot are 
discussed.  
Perhaps due to the complexity of the issue, the cession of the islands to Britain was one 
of the last issues to be resolved in the diplomatic negotiations that followed Napoleon’s defeat 
at Waterloo. Following the Congress of Vienna, it would take another year until the cession was 
signed on the 5th of November 1815 by Capodistrias, Castlereagh, Wellington and 
Rasoumouffsky.468 Indeed, debates about the islands could form a history of their own and 
negotiations over the islands have already been analysed in detail.469 We only need to pinpoint 
two major points which British negotiations were aiming at in regards to the islands: to keep 
Russia out of the Mediterranean, and to ensure Britain’s maritime rights in the region.  
Various European rulers lay claim to the islands, including almost every member of the 
coalition: Britain, Russia, and Austria, and even smaller sovereignties like the Kingdom of Two 
Sicilies, whose claim was based on the islands’ Venetian past. Such an example of the multiple 
alternatives for the islands was Castlereagh’s proposal for the islands to pass to Austria in 
March 1815.470 As Austria had no maritime interests, the move to cede the islands was less 
realistic and more a way to contain Russian influence in Eastern Europe: as Webster wrote, 
‘British statesmen … saw her as an obvious ally, and were prepared to try and make her as 
strong as possible in Europe … they looked to her to keep the centre of the Mediterranean free 
from both French and Russian influence’.471 It has been argued that the ‘political fate of the 
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islands was determined in the circles of European diplomacy’, but it was British troops who had 
already occupied the islands. Similarly, after Russia’s withdrawal from the Mediterranean in 
1807 and the victory at Waterloo British diplomats had acquired a much better negotiating 
position.472 
The ‘balance of power’ was a crucial determinant of British foreign policy in the 
aftermath of war. Among British statesmen, perhaps few have been more closely associated 
with the idea of the ‘balance of power’ in Europe as Castlereagh.473 British maritime rights and 
home defence were linked to continental politics and Britain’s foreign policy was generally 
aimed at ensuring the ‘balance of powers’ in Europe, the same as Britain’s maritime rights. In 
an interesting parallel with the Ionian Islands for example, Bayly mentioned that Castlereagh 
negotiated fiercely ‘to hold onto the Cape colony, St. Helena, and Mauritius not 'for their 
commercial value' but 'because they affect essentially the engagement and security of [British] 
dominion'.474 As has been mentioned before in Ionian historiography, the British government 
was divided over which policy to pursue on the Ionian Islands: for Bathurst, Bunbury and 
Campbell, the islands ‘ought to be annexed to the British Empire’, while for Richard Church, a 
British officer with experience of Mediterranean service and a good local knowledge of the 
region, the Ionian Islands should form a ‘shadowy’ Republic under British protection.475 With 
historians debating the exact definition of the ‘balance of power’, Anglo-Russian relations have 
been described more accurately as intertwined in a ‘great-power rivalry’ and cooperation at the 
same time, as ‘rivals and joint hegemons’.476 This ambivalence would affect greatly the 
existence of the protectorate as a half-colony. 
Permanent peace was far from settled, however. The Vienna settlement had indeed 
established an unusual ‘balance of power’ in Europe, a system ‘rested not on balance of power 
but on hegemony’. And the relations between two major European powers Britain and Russia 
                                                     
472 Wrigley, Ionian Neutrality, p. 65. 
473 C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822. Britain and the European Alliance (London, 1925), 
esp. pp. 63-74. 
474 C.A. Bayly, ‘The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
26:2 (1998), p. 35. 
475 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 80. 
476 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 572. 
   
143 
 
were nevertheless characterized by insecurity.477 Castlereagh, as other British officials at the 
time, was nevertheless concerned over what was perceived as the growth of Russian influence 
in the region, and particularly over Russia’s long-lasting influence over the Greeks, including of 
course the flourishing Greek shipping in wartime and Black Sea trade. During the diplomatic 
negotiations over the islands, there was much opposition by Emperor Alexander, ‘pleading the 
engagements he had formerly entered into for their independence’, meaning the years of the 
Septinsular government under Russia’s protection.478 Moreover, describing the situation in the 
Balkans, Vick wrote ‘low- level conflict remained ever- present and ready to ignite’.479 
For Castlereagh, who wrote to the British prime minister, the Earl of Liverpool, at the 
time, two primary objectives should be Britain’s policy aims on the Ionian Islands, even in the 
case that Britain did not occupy the islands:  
The one to provide adequately for the protection of the people who have so 
long confided themselves to our care; the other, not to suffer Russia to acquire 
any establishment in those islands, to the hazard of the internal tranquility both 
of Greece and Hungary, which latter kingdom is full of Greeks. With respect to 
the first of these objects, it might be secured by some arrangement like that 
lately framed for Genoa; but, in order to steer clear of the old republican form 
of government [the Septinsular Republic], which might afford a pretext for the 
renewal of Russian protection, it appears to me desirable to give a direct 
sovereignty over these islands, under whatever conditions may be thought 
right, to some acknowledged European Power, and if this power cannot be 
Great Britain, in order to exclude Russia, we may insist that the sovereign 
authority shall belong to a local power, that is, to the King of Sicily, or to the 
Emperor of Austria.480 
According to the foreign secretary, Britain should at least ensure the neutralization of 
the islands, by demolishing the fortifications at Corfu and by rendering the islands’ ports free, 
with a ‘system guaranteed by all great powers’.481 These observations were, of course, written 
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at an earlier stage of negotiations, but Castlereagh’s concern over Russia was evident from the 
beginning. While the Ionian Islands were considered too significant for British policymakers to 
abolish all control, by allowing the resurrection of Ionian independence under the Septinsular 
Republic, offering protection to the Ionians did not merely come from humanitarian interest; 
protecting the Ionians would involve integrating flourishing Ionian shipping and trade into the 
imperial network of the Mediterranean.  
Formally, Castlereagh consulted the opinion of two knowledgeable observers of the 
Ionian Islands and the Mediterranean in general. The first was Sir Richard Church, who was put 
in charge of a Greek light infantry unit which was assembled to fight against French troops in 
the islands.482 Church was asked specifically by Castlereagh to submit a memorandum to the 
Congress in Vienna regarding the importance of the islands.483 Although it was not clear 
whether the foreign secretary managed to study Church’s memorandum in detail due to the 
extraordinary paperwork during the Congress, Church’s ideas were indicative of the importance 
that British officials who served in the Mediterranean placed on the islands. 
Church mentioned the proofs of support for Britain that principal Ionian nobles had 
given, often ‘at the risk of their own lives’. For example, making explicit mention of the family 
of Martinengo from Zante, individuals who had prepared the inhabitants to actively join British 
troops, in the hopes of the restoration of the Septinsular Republic.484 Church made explicit 
mentions of the potential benefits of a British presence in the region, and particularly 
mentioned the fleets of the small islands of Hydra, Spetzes and Psara in the Aegean Sea, which 
possessed fleets of 500 large ships in total and major carriers in the Levant.485 At the same time, 
Church emphasized the importance of maintaining nearby areas in the continent, for example 
the town of Parga, for health policy reasons. These stations would ‘ensure the supply of 
provisions to the islands’ by forming ‘a barrier to prevent the possibility of the plague being 
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introduced from the neighbouring Turkish governments’, Church wrote to Castlereagh.486 The 
increasingly interconnected ports of the British Mediterranean played a crucial role in the 
spread of disease.487 The other source of information for Castlereagh was Capodistrias’ 
memorandum, and it seems Castlereagh was cooperating because he was hoping for a peaceful 
resolution with Russia in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.  
Indeed, Capodistrias was a Corfiote working for the Russian government, and due to his 
place of origin, a de facto representative of Ionian affairs in European courts; ‘the affair of my 
heart and of my mind – the affair of the Ionian Isles’, as Capodistrias himself confided to his 
friend and Russian official, Pozzo di Borgo.488 The Corfiote politician was mostly involved with 
Ionian affairs in diplomatic negotiations, and later became the main suspect of British officials 
in potential Russian intrigues and rebellions on the islands. The Ionian cooperated with 
Castlereagh nevertheless, submitting to him a memorandum on the history, customs and 
economy of the islands after the islands passed into British protection in November 1815. In 
this memorandum, it was evident how much weight Capodistrias put on education towards the 
‘moral improvement’ of Ionians. It was also evident that the ideal political system he proposed 
for the islands was characteristically conservative: ‘firstly, the state should be federal or united 
… secondly, active politics and political rights of individuals should come out from their right to 
land ownership … thirdly, judicial authorities should be independent and elected by landowners 
etc’.489 Hardly a revolutionary, then, Capodistrias actively worked towards Ionian independence 
in the long term and saw the cession of the islands into British ‘protection’ as the most viable 
option, and a better solution compared to the option of ceding to the Austrians.490 
Despite Castlereagh’s personal ideas about the promotion of British interests by ceding 
the islands to another power, among British officials – particularly on the spot – the general 
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consensus was shifting towards maintaining control of the islands. Bathurst, who also briefly 
became foreign secretary, replacing Castlereagh who was in Vienna until November 1815, 
prioritized British involvement in the area rather than the ‘balance of power’. Consolidating 
British presence in the Mediterranean was his main concern, encouraging at the same time a 
‘friendly connection’ with ‘all seafaring and commercial people’ in the region. Following the 
instructions he gave to Campbell regarding the Greeks in 1813, Bunbury also emphasized in a 
private letter to the future High Commissioner of the islands, Thomas Maitland (1760-1824), 
the importance of establishing ‘some degree of influence’ over the islands of Hydra and Spetzes 
in the Aegean Sea.491 Despite their size, these ‘little nations’ possessed large fleets and expert 
sailors, and were quickly becoming ‘the general carriers for the Levant’.492 The fleets of the 
small islands were disproportionally active during the war with France given the size of their 
islands of origin. Foresti, for example, had mentioned in 1805 to foreign secretary Mulgrave 
that about 200 ships from Hydra and Spetzes had broken through the blockade of Toulon in 
order to contribute supplies for the garrison.493 Responding to increasing criticism of the British 
government in Parliament, particularly in the post-Napoleonic era, Bathurst advocated 
respecting local customs and norms, as long as local populations did not jeopardize British 
rule.494 In the same sense, he suggested that Maitland should work with Spiridion Foresti. 
Ambivalence about the islands as a British possession was recurring during the period of 
the protectorate, but Castlereagh’s willingness to hand the islands over to Austria met with 
disagreement from several British officials, particularly the ones serving on the spot who were 
convinced of the value of the islands for Britain. After all, divided opinion over policy was 
feeding back into more pervasive debates in Parliament about Britain’s ‘blue-water’ policy: 
although also an advocate of the ‘balance of powers’, Bathurst was nevertheless a stronger 
supporter of relying on the Royal Navy and Britain’s maritime rights in the Mediterranean – 
including of course the integration of Greek mercantile interests – than relying on continental 
alliances. As has been mentioned before, such debates reflected the political and intellectual 
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climate in Britain. Bathurst’s view seemed strikingly similar to the view expressed in Leckie’s 
Historical Survey (1808). Leckie, probably exaggerating, mentioned that 50,000 seamen could 
be employed in various parts of Greece.495 
Ambivalence over the islands resurfaced in different forms in the later years of the 
Protectorate. But, above all, the newly acquired island outposts were seen as having the 
potential for future utility and profit, as a model-colony. Unlike other British insular possessions 
which had already acquired a great importance in war and commerce – such as Malta or 
Gibraltar – the Ionian Islands, ‘if properly governed’ could ‘produce riches and strength to 
England’.496  Sir Charles James Napier, whose statue is in Trafalgar Square today and who later 
came to be a local governor in Cephalonia (1822-1830), was certainly echoing the concerns of 
many British officials and particularly of the Treasury: the unstable social situation in the islands 
concerned many officials, as it meant that the government had to maintain a large, and thus 
expensive, military force on the islands.497  
 
Meyer and Campbell’s reports from the islands 
By the time the wars with France were coming to an end, the islands had already 
become part of an imperial network in the Mediterranean, which was rapidly integrating 
maritime communications via the postal service and regional economies. Military and consular 
officials who served in the Mediterranean, before or during the recent wars, were putting 
pressure on the British government to maintain control and formally cede the islands in the 
negotiations following the end of the war.498 This seems to be the point when rumours of the 
suggested proposal to cede the islands to Austria reached the islands. Campbell then tried to 
press the British government to maintain control over the islands in the post-Napoleonic era. 
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Referring to the prospect of the surrender of Corfu, for example, Campbell wrote to Bathurst in 
1814:  
But your Lordship is already aware of how small the means are at my disposal 
for cooperating in that enterprise, which on the other hand daily experience 
convinces me is the only one by which the British interests can be permanently 
secured and established throughout the Mediterranean. The Greeks are a 
people rapidly rising into power and consequence. And the commanding 
influence and rich resources which we cannot fail to derive from the 
continuance of our immediate connection so happily commenced with them, 
will be lost, perhaps irrevocably by suffering Corfu alone in the present state of 
Europe to remain in the possession of any foreign power.499  
Campbell also considered the wider implications of British involvement in the region, 
and a small British detachment stationing in the town of Parga in the mainland (western 
Greece), particularly in British relations with Greeks. He acknowledged that the presence of a 
British detachment in Parga would not excite any particular interest. However, British troops 
stationing there would save the ‘small Greek community’ from the ‘impending ferocity of its 
powerful and relentless neighbour’, Ali Pasha. The inhabitants of the small town had escaped 
Ali’s wrath long enough, but should he manage to occupy the town he would exterminate the 
inhabitants ‘regardless of age or sex’.  
The civil commissioner argued that Britain should maintain control over this town in the 
mainland. By maintaining troops, Campbell thought, Britain would strengthen the ‘weak and 
fluctuating’ Anglo-Hellenic connection, which was constantly disrupted by the ‘intrigues’ of 
parties affiliated to France or Russia in Greece: ‘a foundation has now been laid for a far more 
intimate political connection and union with the Greek nation by our occupation of Parga’.500 
Campbell’s comments on British presence in the region also show how blurred the borders 
between the islands and the mainland were.  
But Campbell was also reflecting the views of William Meyer, who had acquired during 
his years in the islands a good local knowledge of local customs and politics. Since the Treaty of 
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Tilsit in 1807 and Meyer’s comments about the ‘irretrievable step’ at the time, the official had 
shown a broader interest in geopolitical complications apart from the war with France. Meyer, 
who was also expressing his shared ideas with Spiridion Foresti, did want not explain the 
inherent importance of the islands but to answer the ‘sophisms and projects’ which were 
‘advanced by the ruling powers of the continent, ‘to induce the British cabinet to act upon that 
principle, and to urge her to relinquish under plausible and illusory arrangements’ the Ionian 
Islands:  
My present object is not to enter into any detailed exposition of the intrinsic 
value or internal resources of this highly gifted island, but briefly to trace the 
outline of its vast relative political importance under the present aspect and 
tendency of affair in Europe. … the necessity of the case, however, and not a 
spirit of aggrandizement or ambition led to the conquest of the greater part of 
them by the British arms. The Cession of such islands as these, which are the 
military and commercial keys of the Levant, ought not to be regulated by the 
same principles as the cession of colonies in general.501 
 Above all, Meyer was concerned about the expansion of Russia’s influence in the 
Mediterranean. According to the consul, Russia sought to secure an outlet for her trade, to 
strengthen her bonds with the Greeks – particularly through common religion – as well as to 
ensure demand for her exports in the Levant, in order to realize ‘her original commercial 
schemes in the Mediterranean’ as he outlined it. Meyer was convinced that ‘on the first 
renewal of war with Turkey, Russia will devise stratagems for hoisting her flag in the 
Mediterranean’.502 Perhaps it is worth mentioning Meyer’s broader strategic and geographic 
considerations that the islands belonged to:   
The channel of the Bosphorus may be forced. Turkey from her necessities, may 
be constrained to accord Russia the free passage of those straights. But should 
these events even not occur, and Corfu be relinquished by Britain I … … that no 
other power can prevent the Greek partisans of Russia (in a state of war with 
Turkey) from fettering out squadrons and to … up stations in the archipelago. 
And the talents and resources of her partisans are unquestionable. Such an 
event alone, while the name and influence of England is … and …, by the 
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dissolution of her connections with the Greek people by the abandonment of 
the Ionian Islands; such an event would be of itself sufficient to excite the 
greatest reaction (thereof) at the Levant. Piracies, rebellions and war in its 
worst forms would spread instantaneously over these regions; and the British 
interests would, on every account, be exposed to ruinous counteractions and 
mischances. Such is the buoyancy of Russian influence, from the … policy of 
Russia towards Turkey.503 
 His observations were not without foundation: Russia certainly had interests in the 
eastern Mediterranean, including common religious ties with the Greeks and political views 
shared by many in the islands, particularly amongst the Corfiote aristocracy. Time and again, 
such anxieties over perceived Russian influence, even though greatly exaggerated, would 
nevertheless greatly affect how British officials saw Ionian connections with Russia in the post-
Napoleonic era. The threat of Russian intervention affected imperial thinking on the islands, but 
more crucially was used as a justification for the British governor to maintain political control.   
As mentioned above, when the Vienna delegates commenced discussions again in Paris, 
the Ionian Islands became a British Protectorate, with the agreement of all European powers, 
under the Treaty of Paris in November 1815. Among the islanders, the decision on the islands 
passing into British protection was known by early December 1815.504 The nature of the 
protectorate as half-colony (or semi-colony), but nominally an independent state, has been 
discussed recently in Ionian historiography, but with an overwhelming focus on Maitland and 
Bathurst’s schemes, and with much less reference to Britain’s diplomatic obligations; not so 
much to the islanders but regarding her standing in international relations. Britain’s negotiating 
position had indeed improved much since Waterloo, and Russia was satisfied after British 
concessions on the Polish question. But as Bathurst wrote to Maitland shortly after the cession 
was signed, ‘it was at the same time intimated that we were not free from all engagements to 
the Ionian Islands … and the declarations we published on taking possession of some of them 
certainly on reference to them placed us under some obligations’.505 Therefore, the 
constitutional and political liberties of the Septinsular Republic were in theory maintained, but 
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at the same time created a constant source of tension with the possibility of Russian 
interference, should the protectorate’s international status be perceived to be abused by 
Russian officials.506 This tension surrounding Russian agents operating in the islands worsened 
when the possibility of Russian interference in Ionian affairs became more real after 1819, 
threatening the existence of the protectorate.  
During, and in the aftermath of the Vienna settlement, the British sought to ensure 
maritime rights, and to secure the hegemony of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. The case 
of Lord Exmouth’s expedition against the Barbary Regencies in 1816 is a case in point, seeking 
as it did to garner pan-European support to enforce the abolition of the slave trade in the 
Mediterranean. Exmouth’s expedition entered into a long period between accommodation and 
contestation with the Barbary States by attacking Algiers, and by freeing from captivity 
Europeans who were slaves in Maghreb. The Royal Navy effectively established naval dominion 
in the region, consolidating British power on the European coasts of the Mediterranean.507 
Recent literature has questioned the eradication of piracy and has challenged previous notions 
about the devastating impact of European military interventions on the Barbary States.508 The 
role of Britain in the area was nevertheless promoted as that of protector of stability and 
guarantor of the security of the seas, especially for the benefit of small states, including the 
Italian states, Malta and the Ionian Islands.509 What Exmouth’s expedition had shown in regards 
to the islands, is that British protection was not only about acquiring political power but also 
involved certain ‘obligations’, as Bathurst mentioned after the cession of the islands in 1815, 
extending diplomatic agreements. Part of Britain’s maritime ‘obligations’ was protection against 
piratical attacks. After the cession of the islands was secured, the Ionians – now British subjects 
– were included in the treaties with the Barbary regencies. Similarly, Ionians who lived under 
Ottoman dominions were considered British subjects, ‘exactly on the same scale and footing’ 
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that the Maltese were, as Maitland wrote to Bartholomew Frere, the British minister 
plenipotentiary in Constantinople in 1816.510 
 
Conclusion 
 Ionian historiography treats the period of the provisional government (1809-1815) as a 
political and constitutional ‘limbo’, where no major changes took place due to the temporary 
character of government and the legal ambiguity of the protectorate before its formal cession 
was decided under the Treaty of Paris. Yet despite its temporary character, it was during this 
period when the British presence became cemented, mainly for three reasons: first, the British 
found a stable ally in the mainland, Ali Pasha, whose role was crucial in terms of information 
and supplies. Second, the Ionian Islands had the chance to become a cultural magnet to the 
mainland as well as the Adriatic shores, attracting knowledgeable individuals across the Greek-
speaking world, although still relying to a great extent on the hands-off approach of the British 
administration. Third, the islands were integrated into an imperial network in the 
Mediterranean which took shape in wartime.   
Moreover, under the Vienna settlement and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, 
British maritime rights were secured, creating at the same time new challenges for the British 
government. As for the negotiations in the aftermath of war, many British officials – particularly 
the ones serving in the Mediterranean – considered the occupation of the islands as a product 
of British conquest, a ‘solid and legitimate ground of war’. Despite objections stated by Russian 
officials, especially in the earlier diplomatic discussions in 1815, the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 and 
the presence of British troops on the islands already gave Castlereagh an important advantage. 
However, British officials became convinced in the period after 1815 of the ‘reappearance’ of 
Russia in the Mediterranean, and the possibility of Russian interference in the islands on 
diplomatic grounds. To an extent, this anxiety shaped the ways that British officials perceived 
politics in the islands.  
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what this chapter wants to show, is that the 
diplomatic settlement on the islands did not come solely after Castlereagh’s negotiations. We 
saw how Castlereagh was more concerned with other issues, like ensuring that there would be 
no renewal of war with France, or giving concessions to Russia on Poland for instance. In the 
Ionian Islands, the British had penetrated through local networks and already cemented their 
imperial presence in various ways. These economic, cultural and political connections had 
already taken shape by 1814: the powerful Ali Pasha was a stable ally with Britain since 1811 – 
having secured naval stores for the Royal Navy – Foresti’s connections had already opened 
avenues for the islands to become a cultural magnet in the region. At the same time, the islands 
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Figure II: View of the harbour in Corfu 
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Chapter 4: Medical knowledge, statistics and plague control in the 
Ionian Islands, 1815-1819 
 
Science, imperial expansion, and whether they were related have been key topics for historians 
in recent decades.512 Medical knowledge and what is defined as ‘colonial medicine’ have also 
been recurring subjects in historical writing, where the overwhelming focus has been on South 
Asia and Africa.513 British medical officials who served on the islands based on their experience 
and local knowledge provided by Ionian physicians, used the accumulated information on 
plagues to compile statistical tables. This chapter contributes to the broader discussion on 
statistical information, disease-control and medical knowledge through the case of the plague 
that broke out in Corfu (1815). Furthermore, by looking at the particular plague outbreak, this 
chapter examines how the collection of statistical information, disease-control and medical 
knowledge were connected to imperial governance, and how knowledge was configured more 
broadly in both metropolitan and colonial contexts. Methodologically, studying both official 
correspondence and medical accounts illuminates a different picture of British governance on 
the islands than what is often assumed by Ionian historiography, in which Foucauldian 
approaches to ‘governmentality’ have perhaps misleadingly been applied to early nineteenth-
century colonial governance.514 
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Institutions, medical knowledge, and the background of plague control on the 
islands 
The present chapter is written based on two premises: first, disease-control during the 
period under study was based on Venetian institutions and practices. Despite British officials’ 
critique of the corruptive influence of Venice on the Ionians, the British essentially saw their 
presence in the islands as an improvement to the islanders’ prosperity and welfare, rather than 
a radical transformation of Ionian society. Second, collection of information – though utilizing 
local networks and institutions – was based on personal observation and ‘affective’ knowledge, 
an aspect which was even more evident in regards to metropolitan debates on scientific 
knowledge, and the need to acquire experience in the field.     
This section examines the institutions and background of disease-control before British 
occupation. It shows the extent of the relationship between medical knowledge, administration 
and statistics on the islands during foreign occupations, and especially during the centuries of 
Venetian rule. Venice also had one of the earlier systems of hospitals and medical institutions in 
Europe. Quarantine islands and stations called Lazaretto existed years before the British 
arrived, in order to isolate those suspected of infection in times of plague. While quarantine, for 
example, was new in England in the seventeenth century, authorities in many Italian cities 
(including Venice) were using quarantine policies as early as 1348.515 Collecting information in 
times of sickness through local authorities and households was also a common governing 
strategy. During plague outbreaks in Venice, for instance, heads of households were instructed 
to report to the parish priest, who was in turn expected to send daily collated reports to the 
government regarding the numbers of sick and houses which were shut up, also noting the 
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gender of those affected.516 Not unlike England and France at the time, it was individuals that 
did the counting more than institutions of government.517  
Central administration relied on the skills and reliability of these information-gatherers. 
The role of priests as information-gatherers and intermediaries between local communities and 
central administration was also crucial on the Ionian Islands, especially during plague outbreaks 
where significant concerns about public health were raised. When British troops landed on the 
islands, they found a system of infrastructures similar to the lazaretti.518 These buildings are 
even visible today if one travels to the Ionian Islands, Crete or any other place that was under 
Venetian rule in Greece: for example, a lazaretto was kept a stone’s throw away from Corfu 
town, in the small island of Vidos.519 This section briefly examines not only the institutions on 
the islands meant to combat plagues, but also how the accumulated medical data was 
considered usable by British officials. As we will see later, a recurring characteristic of many 
medical and military officials who collected data on the islands was to refer to the ‘corrupting 
influence’ of Venice, and especially to the quarantine system; this was most evident in times of 
disease.  
In terms of institutional plague control, a system of hospitals and charitable institutions 
was established on the islands during the seventeenth century.520 Policies of isolation were 
pursued by the Venetian authorities in the Ionian Islands during times of plague. Quarantine 
stations were supervised by a chief medical official (Proto medico), who had multiple 
supervisory duties. Hennen wrote that there were three or four such officers in the countryside, 
paid 25 dollars per month by the government.521 A structured system of public health 
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institutions and sanitary officers was also established, with a strict chain of command.522 
Physicians under the Venetian administration did not know the scientific basis of the plague, 
although authorities recognized infection and often took effective measures of prevention. 
Despite plague outbreaks waning during the 18th century in the islands, epidemics occurred due 
to ‘incorrect diagnoses or delayed notification of the authorities’.523 Also, in terms of the 
geographical position of the Ionian Islands, and especially Corfu, previous works have referred 
to the importance of island outposts to Venetian policies in forming an ‘invisible barrier’ against 
the spread of disease.524  
Throughout years of dealing with plague outbreaks, Ionian physicians had acquired 
significant medical knowledge and practical experience. British officials who served in the 
Mediterranean, like the Irish military surgeon John Hennen for example, mentioned local 
remedies – for example a vermifuge called Corallina – that were recommended by native 
physicians and were used by many military surgeons to ‘good effect’.525 But a significant 
medical literature also existed on the islands, which was mentioned by Hennen. The medical 
topographer published his Sketches of the Medical Topography of the Mediterranean in 1830. 
He described these works as ‘connected with the medical topography of Corfu’, and mentioned 
local authors such as Carlo Botta’s, Storia Naturale e Medico dell’ Isola di Corfu, which described 
diseases which occurred in Corfu in 1797; Nozioni Miscellane intorno a Corcira by Lazzaro 
Mordo (1808), or Baron Theotoky’s Des Illes Ioniennes (1815), as well as a number of 
translations.526 
In many ways, Venetian and British health institutions are worthy of comparison, and 
hopefully further study will illuminate aspects of Venetian and British administrations in the 
islands in this respect. The present study builds upon relevant works that emphasize the need 
for further comparison between British and Venetian administrations, especially regarding 
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information systems or health policies.527 Here, the interplay between the Ionians and the 
British in the formation of knowledge, institutions and power in the Ionian Islands was 
particularly important, as elsewhere in the empire.528 A good point of comparison between 
Venetian and British health policies, for example, would be to study the role of geography in 
dealing with disease. We saw for example that Corfu was important in forming an ‘invisible 
barrier’ against contagion, while officers serving in the Mediterranean, like Richard Church, saw 
towns on the mainland such as Parga as barriers against contagious diseases. 
In terms of the effectiveness of Venetian measures against plagues, researchers have 
suggested comparisons ‘with those in the neighbouring coastal region of the Greek peninsula’ 
under Ottoman rule.529 Comparisons between territories under Venetian and Ottoman rule, 
however, are difficult to make, mostly because of the lack of Ottoman measures in 
enumerating the mortality and morbidity of plagues in continental Greece. Estimates were 
highly speculative and depended on personal observation. For example, Spiridion Foresti wrote 
to Bentinck from Zante in 1812, about a plague outbreak that hit Constantinople – only three 
years before the Corfu plague – and that he was informed by consul-general Morier that ‘the 
plague was very severe and that the daily deaths were then reckoned at about 1,500’.530  
This section demonstrates that there was an institutional background and local 
knowledge in terms of disease-control, when the British landed on the islands. At the same 
time, the British faced similar problems to the Venetians: when sickness struck, for example, 
delays in disseminating news from local networks to the central government caused sickness to 
spread faster. But dealing with sickness also required the close monitoring of sanitary measures 
from administrators and medical officials. At the same time, medical interest in plagues and 
disease in general was parallel to a new scientific reasoning, and the increasing use of medical 
statistics and colonial experience in scientific debates. The rest of this chapter examines how 
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British and Ionian officials dealt with the plague that broke out in Corfu between 1815 and 
1816, and then discusses the implications on scientific debates in Britain and the use of 
statistics.   
 
Imperial careers and experience in disease-control  
Plague had a devastating impact in the nineteenth century, wrecking lives and 
economies, in circumstances unthinkable today, with 3,248 reported cases and 584 deaths 
between 2010 and 2015 worldwide.531 Particularly high troop mortality in British expeditions, 
such as in the West Indies in 1793-1798, sparked medical debates on the impact and 
particularly the environmental causes of disease.532 Considering the devastating impact of 
plague on economies and societies, one might have expected that medical theories on the 
nature of plagues would have caused intense political controversies in the British press and 
Parliament, specifically in regards to Britain’s imperial presence overseas. An eye-witness to an 
epidemic in Malta in 1813 described it as ‘the most afflicting of all human calamities; striking at 
the very root of our best affections, and severing the dearest and most sacred of our social ties; 
paralyzing every public measure, impeding every branch of commerce, and at once wounding, 
in the most deadly manner, our best, our dearest interests’.533 The consequences for trade and 
communications were also catastrophic. For example, individuals who were suspected or 
confirmed of being infected could be quarantined for up to 40 days. If these were crews of 
incoming ships, they were confined until the vessel received a clean ‘bill of health’. 
Aside from genuine concerns and humanitarian interest, disease was also a way for 
career advancement for both military and medical officials. Disease-control also gave ample 
opportunities for profit and reputation for many involved. In the early nineteenth century, 
professional and personal experience was crucial, especially when dealing with infectious 
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disease. There has been some debate in imperial historiography about whether colonial 
governors enjoyed free rein from London at the time; studying careers of colonial governors 
like Campbell or Maitland can be illuminating on this matter, and especially their connections in 
London and the army. Most commonly, it was in cases like plague outbreaks where the careers 
of governors – and of other officials – really took off, or ended abruptly. At the same time, the 
collection of medical data was severely limited by knowledge gaps between local communities 
and central administration, which manifested in different ways.  
Campbell’s appointment was one such example of disease affecting imperial careers: his 
conduct had been questionable since 1814, when he was accused repeatedly of ‘adopted 
measures … which tend to alienate the inhabitants from the British government’. Rumours 
circulated in the Congress of Vienna about harsh measures that his administration took in 
erecting gallows on the public walk in Corfu, and that British administration was treating the 
Ionians like ‘Indians’, as Capodistrias wrote to Castlereagh.534 Practices like capital punishment 
were unknown amongst the Ionians, and according to these reports, the British administration 
had established a ‘system of terror’, alienating a large part of Ionian society from the British. 
Campbell rejected the rumours outright, claiming that these were ‘misstatements and 
misrepresentations’, characteristic of these islands, coming from ‘a particular faction’.535  
Such accusations of deliberate misrepresentations of the Ionian situation were to be 
repeated often by British officials in the future. In the context of the ongoing negotiations in 
Vienna, allegations of abuse of power could provoke reactions from the Russians and 
potentially threaten the diplomatic position of the British in the islands. Despite the real 
possibility that Capodistrias could indeed be involved, Campbell was released from service 
when orders were sent to him on 23 December 1815 – less than ten days after news of a 
‘malignant fever’ reached Corfu – wherein he was instructed to ‘make over to Sir Th. Maitland 
… the whole of the command both civil and military, throughout the Ionian Islands’, furnishing 
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him also ‘with every information’ on the islands.536 Campbell nevertheless kept his place as a 
governor until February 1816, when he was formally replaced by Maitland.  
 
The plague in Corfu, 1815-1816 
 Disease struck in Corfu in 1815, because, as was later discovered, of smuggled goods 
that were brought from the continent. It was a box containing contaminated objects which 
threatened devastation across the island, in a similar way that disease struck elsewhere, i.e. in 
Malta two years before. The exact circumstances of Campbell’s release from service are not 
examined in historiography, but this chapter will show that the plague played a major role. His 
own words in his letter to Bathurst defending his conduct are, perhaps, illuminating: Campbell 
referred to ‘groundless but alarming reports, industriously circulated abroad … calculated 
beyond any other [reason] to rouse the greatest alarm and inquietude, and to give rise to the 
most exaggerated misstatements, these being in this instance unhappily a real foundation for 
spreading such alarming intelligence: I allude to the breaking out of a malignant fever in the 
southern district of this island, called Lefchimo’.537  
Indeed, the disease that broke out in Corfu would soon prove to be one of the earliest 
and most significant challenges for the British protectorate, threatening men and women and 
causing moral panic. So far, the importance of the plague in consolidating British rule – and 
particularly Maitland’s administration – has seen very little mention in Ionian historiography.538 
Doctors and physicians who were eyewitnesses, and who worked with colonial administrators 
like Campbell or Maitland, would later publish their memoirs. One of the surgeons who became 
the head of the committee to contain the spread of the plague in the islands, J.D. Tully, had 
already served for several years in the Mediterranean, and had helped deal with a plague 
outbreak in Malta under Maitland’s administration in 1813. Campbell appointed Tully as deputy 
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inspector of hospitals to ‘investigate and report upon the nature of the disease’.539 Tully gave a 
detailed, and depressing, account of the disease in his book The History of Plague as it has 
lately appeared in the islands of Malta, Gozo, Corfu, Cephalonia (1821), not ‘with the ordinary 
feelings of a medical writer, who merely examines … but he speaks from his own actual and 
positive experience’.540 The disease broke out ‘on the evening of the 18th December 1815’ in 
the small village of Marathia, in the district of Lefthimo (Lefkimmi in Greek) in southern Corfu; a 
district of 7,000 inhabitants according to Campbell’s estimates.541 Accompanied by two 
principal physicians of the island, the surgeon reached the small village where disease first 
struck, and after ‘an anxious investigation’ discovered that fever had broken out one month 
before: 13 out of a population of 50 had already died.542 The surgeon realized that the disease 
‘was then raging with considerable virulence’.543  
Campbell emphasized to Bathurst the importance of environmental conditions for the 
causes and spread of the plague. Despite the ‘misstatements’ which circulated in London, the 
governor dutifully treated the malady ‘with precisely the same precautions and measures as are 
adopted in cases of confirmed plague’.544 On the surrender of Corfu to the British, Campbell 
was informed by Donzelot, the commander of the French garrison on the island, about 
casualties the latter had suffered during military works on the islands due to ‘noxious 
exhalations’ on some parts of the island where ‘an unhealthy atmosphere prevailed at certain 
periods of the year’. According to Donzelot’s information, the ‘waste uncultivated state of the 
soil’ was to blame for the exhalations, precisely where the area of Lefkimmi was.545  ‘The 
movements of this garrison, and the measures of the civil government’, Campbell defended his 
administration by saying, ‘since I had the honour of being invested with the command, have 
been altogether of a nature to preclude any exposure to such risks’.546 In any case, Campbell 
ordered the establishment of cordons with sentries across the southern part of the island and 
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the village where the fever started was burnt after the removal of its inhabitants to a lazaretto, 
following Venetian procedures. Tully collected enough information to draw a map of the region 
where the plague started with the cordon lines, the exact names of the villages and the villages 
that were destroyed.547 He circulated, through the Gazette, instructions to the public to prevent 
social interactions, as these would spread the disease. Breaches of the quarantine often 
occurred; frequently when Ionian men and women escaped the confines of the quarantine to 
travel to the mainland. These individuals were condemned to death according to Venetian and 
French legislation on the breach of quarantine. 
Bridging the knowledge gaps between central administration and local communities 
often caused anxieties and provoked local resistance. Above all, panic such as that caused by 
infectious diseases called for ‘tested’ and local strategies which had endured for centuries: 
Ionians from the infected areas turned first to religion and to local priests, to the detriment of 
information reaching the central administration in Corfu town on time. The priests withheld the 
information for a month when sickness hit the village of Marathia, and delayed asking for help 
from the central government. Withholding information of the disease occurred perhaps 
because Ionians were afraid of being seized and segregated by quarantine. It was ‘the great 
ignorance and superstition of the peasantry of Lefchimo, having led them in the first instance to 
consult … the village priests’, Campbell explained to Bathurst, whose treatment ‘has proved in 
this case most fatal … and that the fever quickly assumed a very suspicious appearance … of an 
highly contagious nature’.548 Tully’s writings a couple of years after the plague repeated the 
concerns he shared with Campbell back then. Close investigation did not bear much fruit for 
Tully, who interviewed men and women on the spot, as ‘ignorance and superstition seemed to 
reign with unbounded sway’: the villagers attributed the disease to the ‘agency of a spirit’, 
someone who has murdered in the village a couple of months before. The villagers sought to 
placate the ‘spirit’, Tully added, by referring to the priests, by church offerings, processions and 
prayers.549  
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In practice, medical officials like Tully and Ionian physicians penetrated local information 
and religious networks. Tully, who worked along priests during the plague, often used them as a 
means to collect essential information on symptoms or methods of transmission of the plague, 
by threatening men and women who withheld information, ‘so anxiously required’, with 
excommunication.550 Medical officials, again like Tully, who inquired of locals in order to 
identify and isolate the sources of disease, met with significant resistance. The reactions of 
British medical officials to local superstitions and cultural differences varied.   
Tully did not conceal his contempt for individuals who hid information on the plague 
‘under the shadow of religion’ and the devastating impact that this had on the spread of 
disease.551 But his contempt was for religion in general, not Greeks at large. We should mention 
here that the term ‘Greek’ was generally applied by the British in order to describe the Greek 
Orthodox religion or the mainland, but more rarely to describe Greeks in both islands and the 
mainland as members of the same national group. For Tully, very pragmatic in his search for the 
source of disease, the concealment of information and superstition were not attributed to any 
inherent ethnic characteristics. Hennen, on the other hand, when describing the morals and the 
‘national character’ of Ionians, found it ‘the very lowest in Europe’. He saw amongst the Ionians 
a propensity to ‘revenge, litigation and political intrigue’. Hennen was even more critical with 
the clergy, whom he considered as ‘tyrannical’, ‘ignorant’ and ‘superstitious’; ‘taken from the 
very scum of the population’.552 He claimed that the ‘Greek character’ was ‘debased by their 
long endurance of Turkish tyranny and Venetian prostitution, as exerted on the Continent and 
in the Islands’ and ‘one of the principal causes is to be found in the depravity and ignorance of 
their clergy’. Hennen continued, ‘many of these persons can barely read their breviary: few, if 
any acts of private atrocity, or rebellion, have occurred in the Islands, which have not been 
planned and in part executed by the priests’.553 But, in both cases, Tully and Hennen, the 
insecurity to delve more into local communities whose ‘key’ seemed to hold priests and local 
                                                     
550 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 123. 
551 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 127. 
552 Hennen, Sketches, p. 184. 
553 Hennen, Sketches, p. 184. 
   
166 
 
‘superstitions’ was evident. These insecurities were prominent among medical topographers 
and British officials across the empire, particularly during crises like plague outbreaks.554  
Tully studied any potential environmental circumstance for the spread of infection, 
mentioning the ‘natural unhealthiness of the whole district during the autumn’.555 
Acknowledging at the same time, however, that medical officials were ‘unschooled … in the 
management of this disease’, and ‘we had yet to learn those grand principles which were to 
place us upon a firm and solid footing, and give security to all’.556 But delays in notifying the 
authorities of the disease was owed to the ‘clergy, primates, and some gentlemen of the island’ 
who consistently denied the existence of sickness by sending daily official reports about ‘the 
most perfect health’ throughout the southern part of the island.557 In fact, the ‘existence of 
disease’, Tully wrote in his book, ‘was discovered in a manner purely accidental’.558 After 
establishing hospitals and camps in three places across the southern part of the island, every 
effort was directed to maintain isolation of individuals and communities, and to impose the 
rules of the quarantine, but with little effect.  
Writing to Bathurst in January, Campbell informed him that the measures he took had 
produced ‘already the most successful results’. The practices of ‘separation, segregation, and 
expurgation … affords an infallible remedy against its baneful operations’.559 Tully, along with 
other officials surveyed various villages approximately every two days, and gathered statistics 
on the number of patients and the dead. Their numbers were announced in ‘bulletins of the 
sick’ that circulated the islands. Although from the sample that is kept today in the archives 
there seems to be slight progress, the sample is nevertheless small and covers a small period of 
time.560 There was even a warrant offering 1,000 dollars for anyone who could deliver any 
information about the causes of the plague.561 By February 1816, Campbell wrote to Bathurst 
                                                     
554 Harrison, ‘Representations’, p. 68. 
555 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 90. 
556 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 98. 
557 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 101. 
558 Tully, The History of Plague, p. 101. 
559 TNA CO 136/4, no. 74, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 20 January 1816. 
560 TNA CO 136/4, no. 1 enclosure, ‘Bulletin of the sick in the District of Lefthimo’, Corfu, 8 January 1816. 
561 TNA CO 136/4, no. 8 enclosure, Proclamation, 17 January 1816. 
   
167 
 
that ‘the disease has been retained where it originally was discovered, but not before some 
examples of capital punishment were inflicted for notorious breaches of discipline and the 
sacred laws of quarantine’.562 The governor performed his duties, but in reality, disease spread. 
His emphasis was on setting sentries across the cordons, using local authorities and in 
investigating the nature of the plague.  
 Medical officials, like Tully, who served under Campbell’s administration were essential 
in accumulating vital statistics by close observation, gathering information about the geography 
of the islands or the potential environmental origins for the development of plague. Moreover, 
as we will see later, medical accounts sought to contribute to metropolitan debates on medical 
knowledge, using cases of practical experience abroad, like the plague in Corfu. Maitland, 
however, who became High Commissioner of the islands in 1816, had acquired substantial 
‘practical’ experience in disease-control, and his views on the nature of the plague were 
different. The next section examines first his experience in plague outbreaks, and how his 
imperial career was shaped by previous commands and colonial administrations, notably in 
Saint Domingue and Malta. Then, his stance during the plague of Corfu will be studied.     
 
Maitland’s career and plague outbreaks 
Maitland’s life and career have been the subject matter of two biographies and 
countless mentions in works on the Ionian Islands or Malta. One of his biographers described 
him in a typically hagiographic and didactic manner, according to the Victorian historiography 
of ‘great men’, as ‘a great human force controlled and driven by a will of iron’.563 Much less 
romanticized, he was described by one of his contemporaries, James Charles Napier, as 
‘insufferably rude’ and ‘particularly dirty in his person’, the commissioner used to indulge in 
bouts of excessive drinking and used to disappear for several days in a row. Maitland often used 
official channels of communication with London to send bottles of Maraschino to his 
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colleagues. All accounts, however, point to him being a competent and effective colonial 
governor; perhaps the most characteristic type of ‘proconsular despot’ that Bayly sought to 
describe564 Maitland then, was the ‘human force’ that replaced Campbell. For many British 
officials, Britain’s Mediterranean possessions were acquired during the Napoleonic wars ‘by the 
right of conquest’. However, governing the British possessions in the Mediterranean was not ‘a 
very easy job’ for a governor, and required someone with equal military and civil capabilities.565 
Coming from the old Scottish nobility, Maitland was born in Ratho, Edinburghshire (today’s 
Midlothian), at the seat of Lauderdales. After taking up a commission at the age of 18, he 
served as a young officer in India (1778-1790) and later in Saint-Domingue (1795-1798). A much 
different man than the later imperialist ‘King Tom’, Maitland was from the beginning among the 
very few who were critical of the occupation of Saint-Domingue.  
It was in the West Indies and the harsh conditions of the evacuation of Saint-Domingue 
where Maitland acquired his first experience dealing with plagues: after the ‘tactical abdication’ 
of the senior officer, Major-General John Whyte, Maitland – then appointed brigadier-general 
in the West Indies (1 January 1798) – succeeded him, and entered into negotiations with the 
later famous rebel leader, Toussaint L’Ouverture. These negotiations led to the evacuation of 
Saint Domingue.566 Considering the British losses in this expedition, this was a rather successful 
outcome.567 On his return to Britain, Maitland had a short political career after being elected 
Member of Parliament on three occasions, supporting the Whig Charles Grey.568 Having spent a 
life in soldiery in India, the West Indies and Europe (i.e. Minorca, even Britain), he was also 
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considered a capable governor, and was appointed to Ceylon (1805-1811). His experience in the 
West Indies, however, has not generally been neglected in relevant works about him.569  
Disease became a major challenge for the British in the West Indies, and particularly 
during the evacuation of Saint Domingue. Suffering from a yellow fever epidemic, as well as 
other diseases, British casualties in the island reached a death toll of 5,730 by 1796, estimated 
by Maitland himself under very harsh conditions. Counting was based on two sets of 
calculations, with Maitland making his own from personal observation which confirmed the 
dead. More recent historical research on the topic has nevertheless questioned the accuracy of 
such numbers, but has acknowledged Maitland’s relatively accurate estimates.570 His 
observations on Saint-Domingue stood out for their ‘originality and boldness’. In any case, after 
investigating the causes of mortality, these proved to be much more due to disease than 
fighting. In fact, up to November 1795, Maitland calculated that out of the total amount, only 
100 British soldiers died in battle.571 Disease and the failure of the expedition stirred much 
debate and resulted in the publication of many treatises on the causes of mortality, such as 
Hector McLean’s Enquiry into the Nature, and Causes of the Great Mortality among the Troops 
at St. Domingo (1797).572 
 
Plagues in the Mediterranean and military measures 
Maitland was later appointed governor of Malta, where he managed a plague outbreak 
successfully in 1813. The plague in Malta is well known in historiography, but is perhaps worth a 
brief mention here as well.573 Following the instructions of his predecessor, Sir Hildebrand 
Oakes, Maitland established cordons and divided the cities into districts. Goods that were 
                                                     
569 But David Patrick Geggus, ‘The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793-98’ (unpublished PhD thesis, York 
University, 1978), passim.  
570 Geggus, ‘The British Occupation’, p. 334. 
571 Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution’ pp. 359, 364. 
572 Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, p. 348; Hector McLean, An enquiry into the Nature, and Causes of the Great 
Mortality among the Troops at St. Domingo: with Practical Remarks on the Fever of that Island; and Directions for 
the Conduct of Europeans on their First Arrival in Warm Climates (London, 1797). 
573 Dixon, The Colonial Administrations, pp. 131-134; Lord, Sir Thomas Maitland, pp. 142-147. 
   
170 
 
suspected of infection were destroyed, while patients who were suspected were segregated.574 
‘Segregation and a change of air were the cure’, according to Maitland.575 Cutting all 
communication and shutting up individuals and families in their homes, in order to avoid social 
interactions and the spread of disease, was the essence of government instruction to the 
public. 
Even before Maitland landed on the islands, he suggested to Bathurst that he exchange 
troops between Malta and the Ionian Islands: 
it is my intention forthwith to move the whole of the troops at present in the 
Ionian Islands to this place, and to replace them by pretty nearby a similar 
number (probably a few more) from this island – and my reason for this 
measure is, that no man can be aware of the mischief that at times is done in 
small possessions, by that constant little … communication that results alike 
from the limited state of the society and in islands, from the limited nature of 
their communications by sea – except a person who has lived in them and felt 
it.576 
Maitland continued his interesting suggestions on how to contain the plague. Some of 
the garrison on the islands had been there since the occupation in 1809, and had formed ‘local 
connections with women’, ‘local habits’ and ‘local opinions about political questions’. ‘It is my 
wish’, Maitland continued, ‘that we should at least start clear upon all these points, and that 
whatever is British there should take their feelings from the state in which things actually now 
stand – and not from what was formerly speculated upon – and I, therefore, think this measure 
one, if not of primary necessity, at least of fitness and expediency under the circumstances’.577 
Referring to the plague in Corfu, Bunbury wrote to Maitland that ‘no one knows so well 
how to meet and arrest this formidable evil’, informing him that Bathurst gave him ‘every 
power to act as the King's’ commissioner’.578 It was clear from before the commissioner arrived 
on the Ionian Islands that he would bring a great change of scenery. On his arrival to Corfu, he 
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rushed to rearrange the cordons and control of disease. While rearranging the cordons he 
quickly became disillusioned with Campbell’s supposed ‘successful results’. Almost as soon as 
he arrived in Corfu, Maitland wrote to Bunbury: 
I arrived here two days ago – having visited on my way Zante, Cefalonia, and 
Santa Maura, - of these places I can only at present say, that I could form no 
other opinion than what arose from a cursory view of the principal inhabitants 
and members of government - and the short conversation I had at each with 
the commandant and principal officers … I found that the plague unfortunately 
prevailed, and has not in the smallest degree been got under, in about a third 
of the island – the rest of the island is stated to be uncontaminated and I hope 
it may prove so – tho’ at present I can give no further opinion than simply to 
state this facts. I found Campbell perfectly well disposed, but certainly sore in 
an idea that the intrigue of the people of this island had had an effect to hurt 
his character in the opinion with those with whom he wished to stand best. 
And from this feeling he was extreme anxious to get away immediately.579  
Maitland’s ‘decided opinion’ on the plague was completely different to Campbell’s a 
couple of months before. According to the former, the precautions that were taken were 
‘loose’, and some considerations needed to be taken into account: eradicating the plague, high 
expenditures of the measures which were ‘beyond the limited means of the revenues of the 
islands’ and to prevent a further increase of the disease.580 For Maitland, the nature of the 
plague ought not to be investigated, as it was not a medical but a military and political issue. 
Furthermore, it was proof according to him that Ionians could not deal with the plague 
effectively. ‘At the very outset’, Maitland wrote, ‘we have the strongest practical instance of 
the inability of the Ionian Republic to carry on itself – and if the plague increases, I can have no 
doubt not only that they will apply to us, but that in fact aid must be given to them’.581  
Maitland’s dispatches to London regarding the plague and the conduct of other British 
officials were far from medical theories or consistent, empire-wide strategies in dealing with 
disease, but were about the implementation of military measures. His observations were based 
on the practical experience he acquired during his service as a commander and governor 
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overseas, in Saint-Domingue and Malta two years before. It was on this basis that medical and 
military officials collaborated when dealing with plagues on the islands. Somewhat 
disheartened over the conduct of the military and medical establishment on the islands, 
Maitland wrote to Bunbury:  
the truth is Campbell [confided] as he must do having no experience of it 
himself to a young man of the name of Tully here – a doctor – completely 
uninformed of the common practical rules upon the occasion – active enough 
but sanguine and ignorant to a degree – in truth in the way he was going on he 
never could have got rid of it – nor will that be an easy job now.582 
Maitland’s measures produced good results and managed to effectively contain the 
plague until its eradication in March 1816. Unlike Campbell, Maitland’s policy was to involve 
the British garrisons in order to impose the quarantine to greater effect, and to trust local 
authorities even less. In March of the same year, control of the medical establishment in Corfu 
passed from Tully to Staff Surgeon Andrew White. As the ‘uninformed’ Tully said in his account 
to the formidable governor:  
The experience of these plagues also shewed   that the faithful execution of the 
duties of the subordinate classes employed, under the critical circumstances of 
plague, was rarely, indeed never, to be relied upon; and that nothing short of 
the jealous eye of authority, and the overawing presence of a military force, 
thrown up to every door in an infected town, could ever ensure safety, or 
guarantee the due fulfilment of those measures, which were necessarily 
resorted to for the extinction of the contagion of plague; principles, I confess, 
that at the first view of the subject, appeared to me to be fraught with the 
utmost danger, but which, upon trial, fortunately proved otherwise.583 
Tully, who devoted his account of the plague (1821) to Maitland, conceded to the 
governor’s ‘axiom’ by giving more emphasis to practical experience than medical principles. By 
the end of the plague outbreak in March 1816, according to Tully’s calculations, 375 people had 
died in approximately four months in the area of Lefkimmi alone.584 Furthermore, it needs to be 
stated here that the plague in Corfu gave ample opportunities for promotion to medical 
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officials. For example, Dr. Joseph Thomas, a surgeon who was educated in Ireland (Galway), had 
served in Malta and the Ionian Islands during the plagues of 1813 and 1815, respectively. 
Thomas had been repeatedly superseded by junior officers, so he asked Maitland to 
recommend him to London for promotion. Despite his initial reluctance, Maitland nevertheless 
admitted to Bunbury that Thomas had ‘very strong claims’, and asked for ‘a personal favour’ if 
‘Lord Bathurst would be good enough to interfere so far as to get him that step to which he is 
entitled by his length of standing’.585 The surgeon was finally appointed as head of the 
quarantine in Zante.   
Maitland’s measures in controlling the disease were effective. The plague in Corfu 
received publicity in Britain and proved to be a political triumph for Maitland, ensuring his 
commanding presence in Ionian politics and administration in the early years of the 
protectorate. It would be wrong, however, to equate all the efforts of medical and military 
officials as aspects of the same policy, aiming to impose control over the Ionian society. Simply 
put, plague outbreaks across the early-nineteenth century empire were nodal points where 
medical and imperial interests converged. Such cases did not simply aim to promote Britain’s 
presence in scientific knowledge, but also gave opportunities for career advancement or the 
testing of medical theories in Britain. Maitland’s practical experience and the knowledge he 
acquired abroad were endorsed by medical officials like Tully, also for their medical value and 
Maitland’s efficiency when dealing with disease:  
I am clearly of the opinion that, in the general treatment of plague, these two 
branches become totally inseparable from each other, as we assure ourselves 
that, by the proper application of both one and the other, we can reduce the 
whole matter to the certainty of a mathematical calculation, thus rescuing from 
inevitable misery, whole communities of human beings.586 
Medical professionals like Tully and Hennen were also operating within the broader 
medical community, at a time when a strong belief in scientific reasoning and ‘objective’ 
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knowledge was rapidly gaining ground among the public in Western Europe.587 Statistical 
information and practical experience in the colonies, which were important attributes in this 
process, were consistently utilized in these scientific debates. It was due to this belief in science 
that medical officials devalued local superstitions and questioned the reliability of 
intermediaries like village priests. In the remaining sections of the chapter we turn to Britain, 
where we can study these debates more closely.  
 
Medical topographies and colonial experience 
Taking the Corfu plague as a case study, this study tries to show how medical officials 
interacted with the colonial administration in their attempts to control the disease. Collection 
of information on the numbers of dead and infected, as well as on geography and climate, was 
undertaken with the aim of preventing the plague from spreading to British troops as well as 
within Ionian society. The aims of medical officials were not necessarily imperial in the same 
sense as political administrators, and they often sought to contribute to recurring medical 
debates in Britain by contributing their own practical experience. In plague outbreaks, 
nevertheless, their interests converged. Physicians or surgeons – often from similar social and 
intellectual backgrounds, and often from the ‘Celtic’ periphery in the British Isles – travelled 
with the British army abroad, gathered the results of their observations and published these as 
memoirs. These ‘medical topographies’, as they were called, evaluated soils, vegetation and 
climate in terms of the health of British troops and European populations in the tropics or 
newly colonized regions’.588 Medical topographies gave rich information about populations and 
customs, geography and climate – everything that could explain causes of disease – and were 
often published in journals or individual studies, thus becoming available to the British 
public.589 As we saw before, medical officials had also travelled and published memoirs on the 
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Mediterranean and the Ionian Islands.590 Sparking genuine scientific interest over the nature of 
the plague (causes/methods of transmission), these topographies produced proof at the same 
time, and were vital in creating ‘imperial geographies’ and providing indispensable information, 
like geography or vital statistics, to colonial governance overseas.591   
Medical officers in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century came from distinct 
social and economic backgrounds. They often sought opportunities for career advancement and 
to improve their social status through medical service ‘on the spot’.592 They ‘worked within a 
colonial society that was not only fragmented along the axis of “colonizer/colonized,” but also 
among the British colonizers themselves, according to social, professional, and educational 
hierarchies. Despite working alongside the troops, military officials were often suspicious of the 
effectiveness of medical personnel. Differences between military and medical officials and 
suspicion towards medical theories are evident in official correspondence on the islands too, 
especially in Maitland’s dispatches. As we saw in the case of the plague in Corfu, collecting 
information on disease through personal observation was a way to bridge such differences, and 
for medical officials to integrate into colonial governance. Historians have shown, for example, 
how the medical profession had a ‘long, hard struggle to demonstrate to the military 
authorities its competence as a therapeutic and prophylactic agency’.593 Similar suspicions were 
shared by British officials who served in the Mediterranean. Often hailing from a lower social 
class and the ‘Celtic’ periphery in the British Isles, medical officers saw the collection of 
information and the assimilation of statistics in times of plague as a way to advance their 
careers, or even more for ‘claims of authority within the army and the colonial state 
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apparatus’.594 Moreover, colonial service and experience with disease were not only used for 
career advancement, as the cases of Thomas and Tully have shown. Medical accounts published 
later also aimed at contributing to the development of medical knowledge in Britain. 
What, then, constituted medical knowledge on plagues? In regards to the aetiology of 
the disease, medical opinion was divided into two main ‘camps’, with other variations in 
between: on one side of the medical spectrum were the ‘contagionists’, who believed that 
plagues and infectious diseases in general were the result of contagion. On the other side of the 
spectrum were the ‘anti-contagionists’, or proponents of the ‘miasmatic theory’, who blamed 
the soil, air, and the environmental conditions overall.595 It was a common characteristic of 
works on ‘medical topographies’, including works on the Mediterranean, for authors to situate 
themselves somewhere among these, or to adhere to different variations of these theories. As 
Jepson explains, ‘metropolitan medical professionals developed a new “contagionist” theory, 
which was based on the person-to-person spread of disease’. Medical officers who had held a 
colonial post, however, ‘ascribed to the more conservative paradigm of miasmatic etiology, the 
spread of disease by air and vegetation’.596 Emphasizing contagious or environmental causes 
explains a recurring tendency of medical topographies, for example Davy’s Notes and 
Observations (1842), to examine climate or the change of seasons.597  
Medical debates are not the main subject of this study, but rather how they contributed 
to information-collection abroad for administrating the Ionian Islands.598 Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out two characteristics in information-gathering here: the social context in 
which the gathering of medical data occurred, and the growing significance in metropolitan 
debates of locally-obtained medical experience in treating plagues. Methodologically, 
distinguishing between genuine scientific interest and political incentives for medical 
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knowledge is essential, and this is why medical topographies need to be contrasted, or read in 
parallel with official correspondence.599 
Where it is obvious that medical topographies converged with imperial interests is in 
their ideas regarding Britain’s role in disease-control, particularly in contrast to the 
inefficiencies of previous administrations, i.e. Venice. As mentioned previously, British officials 
went to great effort to differentiate the protectorate – and therefore to justify their own 
presence in the islands – from all previous administrations, most often Venice and her 
‘corruptive influence’. In fact, ‘liberating’ the islanders from Venetian corruption and 
‘protecting’ them from external threats was the raison d'être of the British presence as it was 
presented to the Ionian public. Health policy in Venetian times was a great point of difference: 
Hennen mentioned the quarantine establishment where, ‘previous to the islands coming under 
British government, reformation was most loudly called for in this department’.600 ‘The most 
absurd and nugatory regulations’, the surgeon continued, ‘were formerly in force, while the 
corruption of those who regulated, and the poverty of those who carried their orders into 
execution, were much more calculated to spread than to check the progress of contagious 
disease’.601 He proceed to give an example:  
Under the former regime, persons who had to perform different periods of 
quarantine were mixed indiscriminately in the same place, so that it often 
happened that in the same apartments were individuals who had finished their 
quarantine, and were on the point of being restored to free communication 
with the community, and others who had just arrived from suspected ports, 
and had to undergo the whole period of foul quarantine ; an arrangement 
contradictory to the rules not only of quarantine, but of common sense. The 
poverty of the guardians was so great as to expose them to every temptation, 
and, instead of being selected from respectable persons, they were generally 
picked from among the vilest characters in the community.602  
Medical topographies provided some credible raw data to colonial governance on 
populations, geography, climate, customs etc. Depending on the experience or the theoretical 
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600 Hennen, Sketches, p. 201. 
601 Hennen, Sketches, p. 201. 
602 Hennen, Sketches, p. 201. 
   
178 
 
dispositions of the author, there was a significant emphasis on the local environment or only 
the plague. Clearly, more research is needed in this direction in tandem with official 
correspondence. In terms of historical analysis, the present study argues that medical 
topographies as a literature, genre, and primary source, provide more accurate evidence on the 
development of medical knowledge on disease and scientific reasoning at large, than on 
colonial governance. 
 
The aftermath of the plague and Maitland’s observations 
Maitland was adamant that the plague was not a medical but a military problem, using 
effectively the old methods of segregation and isolation. In this sense, the combined use of 
institutions, like quarantine stations and the troops, would prove effective. Even though 
quarantine was an ancient system ‘with a degree of cruelty and tyranny, unparalleled in the 
annals of the world’, Maitland wrote to Bathurst, it was nevertheless a necessary one in 
isolating the infected from the healthy, and stopping the spread of disease.603 After the plague 
in Corfu, the commissioner implemented measures to reform the quarantine system, mainly to 
fix ‘a sink of corruption, dangerous to the health of the community’, as Hennen saw it604: 
Maitland divided the lazarettos into separate apartments, and raised the pay of the guardians 
so that they would be less inclined to accept bribes. Finally, as the guardians of the lazaretto 
were poor and ‘from among the vilest characters in the community’, their ‘characters’ were 
‘most rigidly investigated before they [were] appointed to act’.605 Owing to Maitland’s efforts, 
Hennen wrote in his book, ‘the quarantine establishment’ was ‘placed upon a respectable and 
efficient footing’, yielding ‘a considerable revenue’ from a percentage on expurgated goods or 
tax on the individuals who stayed at the lazaretto. The establishment was, according to the 
medical official, ‘to the highest state of perfection’.606 When disease struck again in Cephalonia 
soon after, the Ionian state was better prepared to control the plague.  
                                                     
603 TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, p. 124b. 
604 Hennen, Sketches, p. 202. 
605 Hennen, Sketches, pp. 201-202. 
606 Hennen, Sketches, p. 202. 
   
179 
 
After the plague outbreak in Cephalonia, a select committee was appointed in the 
British parliament in order ‘to consider the validity of the doctrine of contagion in the 
plague’.607 The question was brought before Parliament by Frederick Robinson, President of the 
Board of Trade since early 1818, and was widely publicized in newspapers. Much evidence was 
brought from the plague in Malta in 1813, such as Maitland’s writings to Bathurst on the matter 
in April of the same year, with specific mentions of the plague outbreaks in Malta, Corfu and 
Cephalonia. His observations were a testimony to the close connection between scientific 
debates and the practical experience acquired in the colonies. Above all, with the frequent use 
of statistical evidence, such debates had shown how more ‘objective’ forms of knowledge could 
be shared across the medical and military establishments.  
As was often the case in debates about the causes of the plague between supporters of 
one theory or the other, much controversy was sparked: a doctor called Augustus Bozzi 
Granville, for example, published an open letter to Robinson a couple of months later, 
‘championing’ the case for contagion. We should add here that experience ‘in the field’ – 
whether of medical or military officials – overseas was called upon in medical debates in Britain. 
Moreover, the participation of locals in dealing with plagues was routinely neglected. 
Granville’s account, for example, although drawing data from British officials like Maitland’s 
dispatches or Meyer’s information, had consistently ignored the participation of Ionian doctors 
when dealing with the plague of 1815-1816, despite the fact that their practical experience was 
acknowledged by medical officials like Tully who served on the spot: it was to Campbell and 
Maitland’s measures, Granville wrote, that ‘the islanders owed their salvation’.608 
Data that was collected from plague outbreaks across Malta, Corfu or Cephalonia was 
most frequently mentioned to support medical opinion. Maitland’s conduct in controlling the 
plague was praised by many. Referring to the plague in Cephalonia, for example, Granville 
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wrote in his open letter to Robinson: ‘This is the third plague which Lieut.-general Sir Thomas 
Maitland has succeeded in completely stopping and in preventing its propagation, while 
commanding in the Mediterranean; and no measures have ever been enacted better calculated 
for that double purpose’.609  
However, for Maitland the quarantine system was ineffective and the problems caused 
by quarantine laws ought to have been the main concern, not the causes of disease. Explaining 
the need to significantly reform the quarantine laws, but also the necessity of isolation in 
stopping the spread of disease, Maitland wrote to Bathurst: 
The quarantine law too in the instance of plague, actually existing, is not only 
most arbitrary in itself, but to the full as indefinite as it is arbitrary, and the 
whole of the circumstances attached to it, are so revolting to the feelings of 
every man looked at in any way, that I apprehend this is one of the principal 
reasons why, in almost every instance that can be mentioned, this fatal malady 
is allowed at a great height before it is even declared to be plague, and in the 
two great instances of the plague at Messina and at Marseilles, we accordingly 
find that no reliance was placed on it being the plague, till it got to that dreadful 
head that occasions those miserable scenes which afterwards ensued … the 
same was considerably the case at Malta.610 
 Precautionary measures, according to Maitland, were the ‘cure’. ‘The whole’ of Mr. 
Robinson’s statement in the parliament’, Maitland wrote, ‘solves itself into the one examining 
whether ‘the plague be acquired by infection or contagion’. In many publications, he continued, 
infection or contagion were not defined at all, questioning the validity of medical authorship 
altogether: ‘in some they are most strangely jumbled together, and in not a few, they are 
altered exactly as suited the argument of the individual at the moment.’611 Maitland’s 
intention, was not to enter into any ‘theoretical or medical discussion … but to limit myself 
simply to facts – which facts I think (and I am ready to prove them) must lead every … person to 
concur with one in opinion, that the plague is only acquired by contact and that therefore the 
treatment which has hitherto been followed, is the only mode of arresting so dreadful a 
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calamity’.612 His opinion on medical professionals and metropolitan debates is most 
illuminating:  
I carry my opinion and on this lead so far, that I have always held and now hold, 
that medical advice with regard to the preventive treatment of plague is not 
only of no use, but is almost invariably attended with evil consequence, 
because I have rarely met with any medical practitioner who had not some 
favourite theory to which he … always endeavoured to reduce the plague under 
this theory, and who never contemplated it in the only view in which I consider 
it, as the direst visitation of God: - with the original cause of which we are 
hitherto ignorant; but the progress of which is may arrest by measures 
recognized by experience, acted upon for centuries, - and of the effect of 
which, I think I can bring forward the strongest and most incontrovertible 
proofs.613 
As for relevant publications, Maitland referred to Doctor Maclean’s work where ‘there is 
not a single instance quote in it, which come to my knowledge that is not most strongly 
presented and most unfairly stated’.614 Charles Maclean (1788-1824) was a famous ‘anti-
contagionist’ and enemy of quarantine laws.615 Maclean attended to a plague outbreak in 
Constantinople in the service of the Levant Company. However, despite Maitland’s pronounced 
differences with medical professionals in general, Maclean played an important role in 
relocating medical debates of contagion from medical practitioners to the public sphere, thus 
challenging the exclusivity of medical knowledge.616 The commissioner criticized McLean’s work 
for the lack of persuasive evidence on Turkey and lack of practical experience:  
We have none of those data to go on so essentially necessary for the fair 
understanding of the question. It leaves the whole thing so loose, that every 
individual who writes upon it will find cases sufficiently strong to support his 
immediate view of the subject, but we cannot come to a knowledge from the 
returns of the government or the police of the country how far such cases, are 
exceptions to a general rule, or partake of the general rule itself. In the 
instances, however, I am about to quote to your Lordship, we are considerably 
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relieved from this difficulty, for though I am far from saying that the returns I 
have had in the various plagues I have seen, are accurate, or that such returns 
ever can be accurate; yet I think I am perfectly borne out, when I say, - they are 
more accurate than any others that ever have or could have been exhibited.617 
 Concluding his letter, Maitland admitted ‘we are just as much in the dark in respect to 
any cure of this terrible disease, as we were at the moment it broke out at Malta’.618 His 
observations seem to be in line with Tully’s conclusions after dealing with the plagues in the 
Mediterranean:   
Our views of the system requisite for the eradication of plague, unschooled as 
we were, in the management of this disease, were directed by the principles 
generally laid down in all cases of absolute contagion; both hospitals and camps 
were established for the comfort of the sick and security of the suspected; and, 
although every effort had been directed to that great end, seclusion and 
separation, we had yet to learn those grand principles which were to place us 
upon a firm and solid footing, and give security to all.619 
From medical topographers, Hennen’s work was perhaps mostly followed by later 
writers. For example, Robert Montgomery Martin, a civil servant and a founding member of the 
Statistical Society of London (1834), followed the data collected by Hennen, which was 
transmitted to the Army Medical Board. But, as Montgomery wrote of Hennen’s statistics, 
these ‘refer to the military sick  which, however, in some measure, is not a fair criterion of the 
healthiness of an island, or station, as soldiers are exposed to fatigues and to nightly dews, 
which civilians frequently avoid’.620 Aside from disease control, it was this consistent use of 
statistics and mentioning practical experience that was acquired in the colonies that fostered 
debates on disease in tandem with discussions over the perceived successes of British 
administrators when dealing with plagues.  
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Aside from the humanitarian crisis, plague outbreaks and, subsequently, the quarantine 
laws significantly disrupted economic life, including communications and trade. This chapter 
argued, mainly, two points: first, despite delays or disruptions of trade and communications, 
the ‘ancient’ quarantine system was the first line of defence. In the first stage of the plague in 
Corfu under Campbell’s administration, British officials relied on the quarantine system and on 
the combined efforts of medical and military officials. In the second phase, under Maitland’s 
administration a significant weight was put on the military; and efforts were aimed at 
segregation and tight surveillance of the cordons. Maitland found the quarantine laws inherited 
by the Venetians an arbitrary system, and he took efforts to reform them. For the 
commissioner, controlling the disease was mainly about segregation and implementing military 
measures.  
Secondly, the chapter explained how statistical information, which was collected by 
medical topographers, was more a tool for containing the disease at the time, or for scientific 
debates in Britain, than elements of a well-thought out strategy from the metropole. Overall, 
the relationship between gathering information and state measures was more related to 
disease control in the islands, or to medical debates in Britain, and more loosely related to the 
growth of the Anglo-Ionian state and institutions in the islands. In this way, the chapter finds 
more common ground with relevant studies in eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain, 
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Cordons of British troops (red lines) and quarantine areas, southern part of Corfu, January 1816 
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Chapter 5: Penetrating the ‘impenetrable scene of intrigue’? 
Organization of information and security imperatives, 1816-1819 
 
By 1816, Maitland’s authority in the Mediterranean islands was well-established. 
Despite the end of the war and the Vienna settlement between the coalition powers, which 
ensured peace in Europe, uncertainties still remained. These uncertainties were economic and 
related to the costs that came out of the Napoleonic Wars, or were ideological and connected 
to threats posed by revolutionary movements, they were therefore widespread across the 
empire. On the Ionian Islands, British officials were caught between two equally undesirable 
outcomes, which were related to the unchecked power of the elites as well as what the British 
perceived as the threat of foreign intervention, which would result in intervention from Russia 
based on a perceived breach of the international settlement on the islands. The latter threat 
was minimal in 1816 but, as we will see in the next chapter, became greater from 1819 
onwards. On the one hand, this chapter looks at how dependent the political and constitutional 
character of the protectorate was on the character and ideology of the new High 
Commissioner. On the other hand, it examines in more detail these uncertainties, which were 
related to the extraordinary expenditures that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars across 
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Representations of Ionian character and rule in early nineteenth century colonial 
governance: some methodological problems 
The correlation between stereotypes, institutions and colonial rule is frequent in 
imperial historiography.622 Historical writing on the islands has discussed at some length how 
cultural difference and rule were related, especially in regards to the constitutional aspect of 
British rule on the islands, and the Ionians’ supposed inability to rule. As elsewhere in the 
history of the empire, identity-formation and representations of ‘Otherness’ in Ionians have 
been perceived as important tools in governing the islanders. Paschalidi’s main thesis, for 
example, explores how representations of the Ionians influenced various forms of rule during 
the protectorate (1815-1864), based on the conviction – by the British and several Ionians alike 
– that the Ionian character would not allow the people to rule themselves by ‘good 
government’.623 Similarly, Gallant’s book explains how the Ionians were perceived as 
‘Mediterranean Irish’, ‘European aborigines’, ‘noble savages’, ‘Black Irish’ etc.624 However, 
these works on the islands encountered similar issues to a range of works on colonial 
knowledge and rule, which is the fact that they have not explained sufficiently how this 
‘colonial knowledge’ was able to shape social realities in the colonies and dependencies.625 This 
thesis argues that cultural representations of Ionians were mostly effective as an internal 
dialogue between British officials, or in a metropolitan context, from Maitland and the Colonial 
Office responding to parliamentary pressures, than as actual ways to produce dominion on the 
ground.   
There is no doubt that the empire was to a great extent, an empire based on a ‘rule of 
difference’, or that overall, stereotypes and racism were no less real than material conditions. 
However, this study argues that in the case of the early-nineteenth century Ionian Islands, to 
suggest that stereotypes about the Ionians were the sole organizing principle of British rule, is a 
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gross exaggeration. To start with, differences between ‘lower orders’ and ‘nobles’ played a 
much greater role in official correspondence than any stereotypes about Ionian society as a 
whole. Moreover, cultural representations and character were rarely mentioned for their own 
sake, but were almost always heightened when more pressing issues were at stake, such as 
threats to the security of the state or lack of information.  
Historiography of the British Empire has referred often to the ‘unsystematic’ and 
performative character of colonial governance in the early nineteenth century, instead of being 
‘rigidly institutional’; a crucial difference which is not acknowledged or taken into account in 
Ionian historiography.626 Common tendencies in colonial governance were associated with the 
free rein that colonial governors had across the empire, especially after 1815. In many ways, 
Maitland’s centralizing approach to governance was similar to the new imperial ethos of 
revivified conservative, militarist and royalist values, what Bayly defined as ‘proconsular 
despotism’.627 This new ethos was shared by other governors and officials across the empire, 
such as Lord Charles Somerset (Governor in the Cape between 1814 and 1832). Yet colonial 
governance was not merely about similarities across the empire or political cultures. Despite 
the similarities between colonial regimes, governors were never free from local peculiarities, 
institutions and legal traditions, which inherited, for example, the machineries of Dutch, 
Russian, or French despotism, or Venetian devolution of power.628 Emerging politically 
triumphant from the plague of 1815-1816, and with his authority in the Mediterranean 
secured, Maitland was able to dictate the political life of the protectorate, writing at the time to 
Bathurst that the plague had given the British ‘the strongest practical instance of the inability of 
the Ionian Republick to carry on itself’.629 Here, the commissioner did not attribute ‘inability’ to 
the character of the Ionians in general, but in regards to Ionian political bodies.  
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During his administration on the islands, Maitland thoroughly justified his 
characterization as a ‘rough old despot’, as Charles James Napier called him, in the eyes of the 
islanders.630 We have already seen in the previous chapter that he was a very capable 
negotiator, colonial governor, and methodical in the keeping of statistical information, which 
was particularly evident in plague outbreaks. An authoritarian in governance and a 
disciplinarian in the army, he received the nickname ‘King Tom’ (or ‘Sultan Maitland’ from the 
Greeks after the cession of Parga) from both the people he ruled as well as his troops. Coming 
from the Celtic fringe in the British Isles, he served under the Scottish Henry Dundas and 
belonged to his social circle. Maitland was personally acquainted with Adam Smith; in fact, he 
later admitted to his friend, and British ambassador to Naples, William A’ Court (later Lord 
Heytesbury), that the British constitution and Adam Smith’s ideas were ‘possibly the two things 
on earth’ that he considered ‘proofs of human wisdom and human ingenuity’.631 His contacts in 
the army, navy and Parliament secured his appointment and allowed him to circulate local 
knowledge and share ideas with other officials regarding the region.  
 By the time Maitland became High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, he was 
extremely well paid. His lavish lifestyle, the ‘new and useless offices’, and the multiple offices 
Maitland held himself, were criticized mercilessly by his opponents in Parliament in the post-
Napoleonic era. He received a salary totalling between £13,000 and £15,000, ‘upon the most 
moderate computation’, according to his Radical opponent in Parliament Joseph Hume (also a 
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Scot).632 In fact, this kind of critique of large expenditures by the British government was part of 
a broader attack by parliamentary critics, and increasingly the wider British public, against ‘Old 
Corruption’ in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.633 Parliamentary critique was relentless, 
particularly on expenditures on foreign or colonial policy. By 1816, for example this had 
resulted in considerable retrenchment at the Colonial Office, which was reduced from 25 to 15 
clerks, a considerable change for an establishment at the time.634  
When Maitland was appointed Governor of Malta, he already had impressive 
credentials in Britain as well as overseas: Madras, Saint-Domingue, Ceylon, in all of which posts 
he had significant duties. Ionian historiography has shown at length how Maitland’s 
authoritarian ideas were important to the origins of the protectorate and the creation of the 
colonial state, but less attention has been paid to the imperial networks he was connected 
to.635 Politically, Maitland started as a Whig, advocating parliamentary reform in Britain, 
delivering his first speech in 1791 against the war with Tipu Sahib in India.636 But over the years 
he changed from a Whig into an ‘imperialist’ and an authoritarian, advocating the suppression 
of sedition in Britain. Surprisingly, it is rarely mentioned in historiography that before Maitland 
became a governor in Malta and the Ionian Islands, he was the leading officer who suppressed 
a Luddite rebellion in Yorkshire in 1812-13. When he was appointed High Commissioner in the 
Ionian Islands in February 1816, Maitland was already the most powerful and well-paid British 
official in the Mediterranean: holding a post as governor in Malta since 1813, he also became 
commander-in-chief of British forces in the Mediterranean, and (a position which is often 
neglected) in charge of all Barbary consulates excluding Morocco.  
One of the closer connections was William A’ Court, a diplomat with many years of 
service in different stations in the Mediterranean, from Palermo and Naples (1801-1807) to the 
                                                     
632 Maitland received annually as a Governor of Malta £5,000, as Commander-In-Chief in the Mediterranean £3,500, 
as High Commissioner  £1,000, as pension from the revenues of Ceylon as having served as a governor previously 
£1,000, and a variety of allowances (Hansard T. C., Parliamentary debates, New Series, VII, 14 May 1822, p. 567). 
633 Philip Harling, The waning of 'Old Corruption': the politics of economical reform in Britain, 1779-1846 (Oxford, 
1996), pp. 1-8. 
634 Thompson, Earl Bathurst, p. 111. 
635 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, pp. 89-95. 
636 W. C. Dixon, The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland (New York, 1939), p. 4. 
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Barbary States (1813).637 It seems Maitland acquired a great deal of local knowledge from his 
friendship with the ambassador, including on constitutional matters and the legal history of the 
Ionians, and the ‘Mediterranean people’ at large. Through his private correspondence with A’ 
Court we know that the governor was particularly critical of William Bentinck’s failure in 
Sicily.638 Bentinck was appointed governor of the Two Sicilies during the Napoleonic Wars, and 
tried to gain the support of the Sicilian elites by giving them a constitution in 1806. This 
experiment quickly failed, and Bentinck was recalled in disgrace to Britain prompting criticism 
from many of his colleagues. Complaining to Lord Liverpool about Bentinck’s conduct for 
example, Castlereagh mentioned ‘how intolerably prone he is to Whig revolutions 
everywhere’.639  
By the time Maitland went to the islands, he was a renowned 56-year old war veteran 
with plenty of administrative and military experience. His post and his connections with high-
ranking veterans of the Napoleonic Wars in London allowed him significant free rein as 
governor. It would be hardly surprising, then, to say that his experience was crucial to the 
consolidation of British power in the political and constitutional character of the protectorate. 
In the eastern Mediterranean, Maitland considered British possessions (Malta and the Ionian 
Islands) as a unified geostrategic space. Emphasizing contingency and the militarist culture of 
‘reinvented conservatism’, instead of consistent efforts to create abstract categories of rule, 
this chapter explains first the broader British policy in the eastern Mediterranean and security 
considerations that followed the Napoleonic Wars. These concerns, more present than ever in 
the period immediately after 1815, played an important role in how British officials conceived 
of their presence in the Ionian Islands. Then, this chapter explains how closely related these 
considerations were in the British administration in the islands.   
                                                     
637 Muriel E. Chamberlain, ‘A' Court, William, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford, 2004), available online:  
http://www.oxforddnb.com.bris.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-70?rskey=khJBix&result=1 (December 2017). 
638 Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, pp. 100-101; BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41529, Maitland to A’ 
Court, Malta, 16 October 1815, f. 9a. 
639 Quote in Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 103. 
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Napoleonic concerns? Security and retrenchment 
Along with the militarist ethos and reinvented conservatism of ‘proconsular despotism’, 
there were security concerns in the Mediterranean originating from the wars. As the case of 
Exmouth’s expedition had shown, these concerns were related to British naval presence in the 
Mediterranean ‘policing the seas’, particularly since the abolition of slave trade in 1807. In the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, security imperatives related to the defence of British 
possessions in the Mediterranean, for example, involved maintaining garrisons in both Malta 
and the Ionian Islands. Strategically, as we saw in the first chapter, the Ionian Islands (along 
with Malta) were part of a unified geopolitical space of island outposts, forming Britain’s 
defence in the Mediterranean. As Castlereagh said in 1816, ‘our policy had been to secure the 
empire against future attack. In order to do this, we had acquired what in former days would 
have been thought romance-the keys of every great military position’.640 Maitland’s 
appointment as a governor of both places is a case in point. Broadly stated, he was not overly 
concerned about a sudden renewal of war in Europe, although he would not exclude the 
possibility.641  
Surprisingly, until recently the aspect of security – especially after a 25-year period of 
war – has been altogether neglected in Ionian historiography.642 Yet, as this thesis argues, 
security concerns were paramount in the earlier period of the protectorate. In regards to the 
need to maintain a garrison in the Ionian Islands, Maitland wrote to Bathurst:  
In respect to the necessity of having troops here on a peace establishment, I 
can only say that the internal state of these islands is not at this present 
moment in a situation – even supposing that we had got rid of the plague – and 
had got rid of their present military establishment (which is neither more or 
less than an efficient military force acting indirect opposition to our views) I do 
not think we could with safety to ourselves – or with security the well-disposed, 
diminish the garrison a man under 3,500 – which allowing the whole to be 
6,000, would only leave a residence of 2,500 men for Malta.643   
                                                     
640 Peter Burroughs, ‘Defence and Imperial Disunity’ in Porter, OHBE, III, p. 323. 
641 TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 7 May 1816. 
642 Except Gekas, Xenocracy, pp. 174-183. 
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Although perceived as potential threats by the British, such concerns over an ‘efficient 
military force’ in the islands threatening the British presence and islanders supposedly being 
under ‘a permanent martial law’ would be exaggerated from time to time by Maitland and his 
supporters in Parliament to defend military expenditures and martial law. In fact, ‘between 
1815 and 1848’, Gekas wrote, ‘the Ionian State [protectorate] spent £456,311 on artillery and 
defence; of these Britain paid only £148,684 and the Ionian State the remaining £307,627’.644 It 
was in these parliamentary proceedings on retrenchment and Maitland’s conduct, rather than 
in the actual British administration of the islands, that characterizations of Ionians as ‘violent’ 
and ‘unable to rule themselves’ would be most effective against Maitland’s opponents in 
Parliament.   
Threats to ‘public tranquility’ would resurface often on the islands, especially after 1819. 
But there were perhaps other, more immediate and local concerns regarding the maintenance 
of troops at the expense of the British government. Surprisingly, although Ionian historiography 
has discussed at length the issue of extraordinary military expenditures in the islands, it has not 
offered any explanation or speculation as to why this was the case.645 While a sudden renewal 
of a major war was to a large extent excluded, the possibility was always considered, 
particularly in the case of a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which would bring 
the former to the Mediterranean: 
 In regard to the military establishment now at Malta and the islands, I must 
consider them in two points of view – in relation to their military establishment 
if should war break out suddenly as things now stand in Europe and secondly, 
with regard to their state even supposing no such unfortunate event to take 
place. I shall not take into the scale at all their military situation with the 
present force supposing war actually to exist – the necessity of having large 
military establishments at either in that event will rest totally at the supremacy 
of our navy, but it is fair to say that even making every due consideration for 
that supremacy, I hold 7,000 men to be too little under any circumstances in 
time of war. 646 
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Certainly, security incentives regarding potential internal threats played a role in 
Maitland’s consideration of a garrison of 7,000 men on the Mediterranean islands, which would 
be shared between the strategically important Malta and Corfu. But, despite what Maitland’s 
supporters were alleging in the British parliament about the ‘violent’ character of Ionians, 
experienced British military officials like Maitland were well aware of a potentially rebellious 
garrison. Premeditated movement of troops was suggested in times of crisis, or when troops 
remained for too long in one place. Such was the example of troop replacement between Malta 
and the Ionian Islands during the plague, which we mentioned in the previous chapter. One 
example of dire consequences was the so called ‘white mutiny’ in 1809, when rebellion 
threatened the Company’s possessions in India: the insurrection spread across southern India 
and was quelled by troops coming from the Cape.647  
Coincidentally, when the ‘white mutiny’ was active in southern India, Maitland was a 
governor in Ceylon. On the opposite shore at the time of the rebellion, he was writing to 
Castlereagh from Point de Galle in February 1810: ‘All cordiality and unanimity are totally 
extinguished, and the degree of jealousy, discord and dissatisfaction on all sides in the army has 
got to such an extent as must lead to the most serious consequences, if not put an end to by 
the government in England’. Maitland was ‘astonished’ that the government in Madras was 
referring to ‘a state of perfect calmness and quiet’, at a time when governance was subject to 
the ‘extraordinary lengths in which insubordination is manifested every day’.648 
But of course, not all British incentives were about security in the islands. After showing 
the pressing concerns of British officials in the islands, we now move to the political status of 
the islands and the extent to which the collection and organization of information was 
unsystematic. We only need to mention here that Maitland’s concern over potential 
disturbances was always present.  
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‘To make a mountain out of a mole hill’: Ionian elites, wartime origins and the 
establishment of Maitland’s system 
In many ways, Maitland was an ideal example of the phenomenon that Bayly described 
as ‘proconsular despotism’. By centralizing power in his own hands, in the places he governed 
he implemented similar changes in economy and law, but in societies radically different from 
one another: Ceylon, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. Recent work on the islands has explained 
these similarities in policy as signs of colonial modernity.649 Yet, as the next two sections show, 
there was little novelty in Maitland’s approach to keeping track of political developments and 
organizing information on the islands. As we will see, the collection and organization of political 
information did not involve abstract categorization of Ionian society, but on the contrary 
involved dynamic processes and close observation, aiming specifically at Ionian nobility. At the 
same time, due to the peculiar settlement of the islands in the Treaty of Paris, British officials 
were not only concerned with controlling the elites but also with identifying how they were 
connected with Russia. This thesis argues that such anxieties about external influence in the 
political and constitutional development of the protectorate, whether perceived or real, 
preoccupied British officials to an extent, and should not be neglected in Ionian historiography. 
Moreover, as Bayly explains, proconsular despotism was also a reinvention of a militarist ethos 
and a particular political culture, the military was not so distinct from the civil establishment.  
British attempts to give constitutional charters in various cases across the 
Mediterranean – be it in Sicily, Malta or the Ionian Islands – took place in strategically 
important island outposts. Consolidation of British rule meant establishing garrisons which 
would, according to the Treaty of Paris, be paid out of the Ionian state’s revenues.650 Initially, 
the civil and military affairs of the islands and Malta were to be kept distinct, where Campbell 
was to be appointed Lieutenant Governor in Malta so that he would relieve Maitland from the 
‘pressure of military business’.651 It is important to mention that Maitland became a governor in 
Malta (1813) and the Ionian Islands (1816), as well as Commander-In-Chief of British land forces 
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196 
 
in the Mediterranean. Forming a common geostrategic space, issues of military expenditure or 
manpower were usually discussed along similar lines in official correspondence between 
Maitland and the Colonial Office. Stemming from the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna 
settlement, it was also with a concern over internal security and ‘public tranquility’, and 
anxieties about the nature of connections between Ionians and Russia that shaped imperial 
thinking on the islands. Recurring problems that British officials encountered in the islands, like 
the lack of information, or challenges – real or perceived – threatening ‘public tranquility’ 
heightened stereotypical notions about the Ionian character. 
Maitland did not trust the ‘Mediterranean people’, particularly the elites. Although he 
found his predecessor Campbell ‘well disposed’ in conducting his duty, he did not approve his 
stance towards the nobles: ‘I have already seen enough of the Mediterranean islands and 
people to say, that in his situation it was hardly possible to steer clear [for the Ionians] of an 
opportunity to traduce him’, Maitland wrote to Bunbury. ‘There was’, Maitland continued, 
‘quite industry enough and a spirit of low intrigue so sufficient to have made not only a 
mountain out of molehill, but a serious charge’.652 Upon his arrival, Maitland surveyed the 
islands in order to interview the wealthier and most influential of the Ionian elite. The 
information he collected was not the result of abstract theorizing in a manner of 
‘governmentality’, but a product of close involvement. Looking for potential collaborators 
among the islanders, he turned first to the island of Zante, where commercial connections had 
existed with England since the sixteenth century, as we already saw. Describing ‘a very different 
class from those of Corfu’, Maitland referred to existing aristocratic factions in Zante, naming 
for example the powerful Comuto or Martinengo family: ‘Comuto is decidedly with us, but I 
expect nothing from him he is so excitingly feeble. Martinengo professes much – and they all 
generally hold the same language – but I cannot see a great deal further below I can give a 
decided opinion with regard to it.653  
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Frustrated, Maitland wrote to Bunbury that ‘the whole’ was ‘such an impenetrable 
scene of intrigue’.654 Such representations of Ionians as ‘intriguers’, ‘unreliable’ or liars, have 
been associated by previous work on the islands as being used by the British to support their 
claims about the supposed unsuitability of the Ionians to self-governance.655 In the period 
under study, however, these stereotypes hardly formed a more pervasive model for ruling the 
islanders. Stereotypes were often deployed by frustrated officials, exasperated by knowledge 
gaps and potentially significant threats to imperial authority. Historians of the empire have 
warned us of how we should interpret the use of stereotypes by colonial officials elsewhere. 
For example, in India of the nineteenth century, ‘orientalist stereotypes … were not tools of 
epistemological conquest, so much as conceptual fig-leaves to conceal desperate ignorance’.656 
A similar picture comes to mind when considering Maitland and his relation with Ionian nobles, 
despite Maitland’s absolute domination of Ionian politics.  
Furthermore, frustration came from previous experiences: Maitland’s time in Ceylon, for 
example. It was there that Maitland noticed the ‘corrosive effects’ on British authority that local 
elites had through the legal system.657 Maitland hoped to alter the situation by implementing 
deep changes in the legislature, and by employing men loyal to the empire. We have already 
seen how tightly connected the Ionian elites were to the legal system.  
In any case, Maitland’s writings to London marked a significant departure from Britain’s 
relationship with local information brokers in wartime; Foresti’s case, which has been analysed 
before as an instance of the shift in Britain’s policy towards Ionian sources of information in 
wartime. Foresti was surely not the only one, as other Ionians were excluded from high offices, 
much like colonized peoples were excluded from colonial administration elsewhere in the 
empire. In a characteristic early-nineteenth century type of colonial governance – and in a 
typical Maitland fashion – the High Commissioner had a free rein in deciding who stayed in 
                                                     
654 TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 4 April 1816. 
655 I.e. Maria Pashalidi’s thesis, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, passim. 
656 Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 52. 
657 Benton, Rage for Order, p. 8. 
   
198 
 
office and who did not, despite Bathurst’s calls to collaborate with locals who played a role in 
the occupation of the islands in 1809. Wherever he went, Maitland saw scenes of intrigue:  
 Because I wish to annihilate … that animosity and rancour which have 
prevailed here, and do not throw myself … into the hands of those who now 
hold the different offices – that therefore I am going to throw myself into what 
they call the opposite party – to their … and destruction. But the truth is … that 
if I am right in my conjecture, there is such a radical difference between me 
and those who have hitherto governed in the places upon the … of government 
itself – that it is impossible we could ever agree – their mode of getting a party 
in favour of the British interests was bottomed certainly in a most desirable 
view of the subject – that of raising the lower orders of the people and 
diminishing the power of the nobles – which power … principally in their 
corrupt influence in the courts of law – and so far I perfectly concur with those 
– but the manner of doing this is where I differ with them.658 
To a large degree, partly due to a lack of reliable sources of information and partly due 
to prejudice, Maitland was concerned throughout his administration that he would be ‘thrown’ 
into party politics in the islands just as his predecessor had been. He often implied that 
Campbell was well-intentioned but naive. The High Commissioner wrote to Bunbury about a 
system of governance where state officials would check the power of the nobles, the standards 
of living in the rural areas would be improved, and at the same time, it would abstain from any 
local power dynamics like for example the English political party in the islands. At the centre of 
all these, would be the governor, the central authority of the protectorate:  
The only mode in which I am aware we can make a decent government here, is 
in the first place to allay all the spirit of party that has existed – whether arising 
from speculative feelings with regard to other powers, or from hostility to our 
… rule – that we may at length lend them to come into our views with regard 
to a constitution – and that we must manage so as to get all the parties to agree 
to enact a constitution.659 
And of course, Capodistrias was perceived to be the ‘archenemy’ of Maitland’s 
administration. For Maitland, Russian intervention was not something London ought to be 
worried about in 1816. On the other hand, the commissioner kept Capodistrias at arm’s length 
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throughout his administration. This would change in 1819 and after that, when the possibility of 
Russian interference became more real than ever.   
Maitland took it upon himself to get to know more about the Ionian elites as well as the 
Ionians in general. Libraries in the islands contained valuable knowledge on the customs, 
geography, the climate and politics of the islands; there had been many works published in 
Corfu or by publishing houses in Europe. According to a traveller, no public library existed for 
the natives in Corfu, but a collection of books founded at Messina in 1810 was transferred to 
Corfu. The library contained 2,500 volumes and 20 atlases, and British military and naval 
officers, officers of the civil departments or respectable inhabitants had easy access to this 
collection and could become members ‘at a moderate entrance’ fee and a small annual or 
monthly subscription.660 Even Maitland begun studying ‘most attentively’ the ‘disposition and 
character’ of the Ionian nobility since the period of the Septinsular Republic.661 Maitland 
himself seemed to possess a great deal of private and public papers, including information on 
dealing with plagues, having provided free access to medical officials, like the medical 
topographer John Hennen, who were interested in the matter.662 Other libraries existed on the 
islands, formed by noblemen or wealthy individuals. Dissemination of information was also 
centralized in the hands of Maitland and the Ionian Senate. The only printing press was in 
Corfu, under censorship and was employed in publishing the Ionian Gazette, official documents 
and acts of Parliament.663  
Knowledge gaps between the central administration and local communities were 
fraught with danger for British officials, enhanced by problems in transportation, due to the 
weather and the problematic communications between the islands. Geographical distances in 
insular communities, like the Ionian Islands and Malta, created real problems and frequently 
appear in official correspondence. Often, officials mention delays of letters, or bad weather. 
Concluding the previous sections, stereotypes and colonial rule were undoubtedly connected. 
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But these were hardly the sole organizing principle of colonial governance. As we will see next, 
state surveillance was based more on close surveillance of ‘figureheads’ or individual acts of 
insubordination, than with institutionally-based categories of rule, whether based on 
stereotypes or otherwise, hence why it makes notions of nineteenth century rationalities of 
governance – or as it is called, ‘governmentality’ –  difficult to apply to the islands between 
1815 and 1824. Throughout the period under study, British officials were constantly translating 
wider geopolitical concerns and anxieties into usable knowledge that could assist with aspects 
of colonial governance.  
 
The Constitution of 1817, Ionian politics and state surveillance  
  Maitland’s system was based on close monitoring of the Ionian elites. When 
considering state surveillance, intelligence services and state storage of information more 
broadly, there is a wide assumption — extending beyond imperial historiography — that the 
modern state was more centralized and perhaps more effective in surveillance.664 This study 
finds this assumption erroneous in many ways, building upon previous work on cases in early-
modern India or, indeed, Venice.665 The Ionian Islands, which were under Venetian control for 
centuries, can contribute to such discussions in both imperial and Venetian historiography. 
Generally, the thesis has tried to show how elements of Venetian surveillance strategies 
survived on the islands. This section examines how British officials devised strategies for the 
surveillance of Ionian political bodies, and particularly how central the role of the High 
Commissioner was in this. Despite the attention paid by historians to the constitutional 
workings of the protectorate, relevant works have shown much less interest in Maitland’s 
earlier experiences in ruling, or the broader context of early nineteenth century colonial 
governance.666  
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 In the context of international relations, the state on the islands was built under the 
principles of the Treaty of Paris, creating an enduring legal ambivalence regarding the 
protectorate which continued until the cession of the islands to Greece in 1864. For Maitland, 
however, there was no such paradox. Before he landed on the islands, he knew about ‘an 
intrigue going on to make them into a Republic under our protection’, referring to Capodistrias 
and Russian pressures in Vienna to increase Russian influence in the islands. Writing to A’ Court 
from Malta when the cession of the islands to Britain was not certain in late 1815, he was 
convinced that ‘if they [the Russians] don’t give them in sovereignty, we are certainly better 
without them all’. Maitland had Bentinck’s failure in Sicily in mind.667  
Peter Burroughs on imperial institutions writes that ‘Britain’s governance of Empire 
involved dynamic processes, not static structures and inert constitutional frameworks, as some 
earlier imperial historians imagined’.668 The constitutional status of the islands, and particularly 
the Constitution of 1817, have been amply analysed.669 Although it will examine the political 
and constitutional nature of the protectorate, this chapter is essentially covers the extent to 
which imperial authority was consolidated through the British governor. Although Maitland 
considered the British constitution as ‘proof of human wisdom and ingenuity’ the kind of 
society he hoped to create, through the constitution, on the islands seems less certain in 
retrospect.  
Constitutional power did not operate in a vacuum. This chapter argues that, contrary to 
the assumptions that shape several works in Ionian historiography, it was not the Constitution 
of 1817 that the political power of the commissioner emanated from.670 Rather the other way 
around: the ambiguities of the Constitution of 1817 allowed Maitland to take control and 
pursue his own personal strategies. Character played a role, as we saw before, and Maitland in 
theory shared other officials’ notions of the superiority of the ‘rule of law’ over other legal 
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cultures: his contemporary, William Horton, considered the ‘Dutch laws of the Cape or the 
Spanish laws of Trinidad’, ‘scandalous’ and contrary to his ‘feelings and prejudices’.671 
According to the commissioner, ‘extrajudicial interference … in criminal or civil cases’ 
was a necessary measure for Ionians.672 After all, he was in absolute agreement with Bathurst, 
who advised Maitland to ‘get them [Ionians] to slide into a constitution’.673  Essentially, the 
principles as set out by the Colonial Office were the same since the first troops landed on the 
islands: the islands were considered too strategically important to be left to any system of local 
representation, or to share power with local representative bodies. Constitution-making on the 
islands has been rightly identified by historians with Maitland’s despotic ideas and 
administration. The Constitution of 1817 was theoretically based on its predecessors, for 
example the Constitution of 1803: the main difference was the extensive power of the governor 
and the ability of one individual to dominate all political bodies, including the legislative and 
executive.674 There was an Ionian Senate of six members (divided into three departments, the 
Political, the General and the Financial) – with an Englishman appointed as the Senate’s 
Secretary – and a Legislative Assembly of 40; the Ionian Senate being, theoretically, the 
executive part of government.675 The High Commissioner had the power of veto in all decisions 
taken by the Senate as well as in legal proceedings; his signature was final, with no right for 
appeal afterwards. In short, Maitland’s rule reigned supreme; the Ionian State was, in theory, 
considered a protectorate, but in reality was governed as a colony.  
Theoretically, the protectorate was organized as a federal state, but Maitland and 
Bathurst were well aware that the federal character of the state was merely a façade, masking 
British power. Based on the ambiguities of the Treaty of Paris, governance seemed to be 
organized based on a parallel dual-system: one which consisted of the local governing bodies of 
                                                     
671 Burroughs, ‘Imperial Institutions’, p. 175. 
672 TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Corfu, 18 February 1816. 
673 The emphasis is on the original. Quote in Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 96. 
674 Calligas,’Maitland’s Constitution’; Dixon, The Colonial Administrations, p. 186. 
675 The Senate approved the civil lists, nominated local officials and controlled the expenditure of the Ionian State 
(Gekas, Xenocracy, pp. 57, 58); Paschalidi, ‘Constructing Ionian Identities’, p. 106; The Senate (Chapter II) and the 
Legislative Assembly (Chapter III, Section I) in the Constitutional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands 
(Jervis, History of the Island of Corfu, Appendix G, p. 297 and p. 300, respectively). 
   
203 
 
each island and another one which consisted of British military officers: at the head of the local 
government on each of the islands was the Regent. Under the Regents were a secretary, an 
advocate-fiscal, an archivist and a treasurer, along with a British military official called the 
Resident, whose exact responsibilities were not clearly defined in the constitution.676 Needless 
to say, the official local government – both municipal administration and Regencies – were 
politically decorative. Even for Maitland, ‘the whole of these articles relative to the municipal 
body are more for show than substance’.677 ‘It is quite possible’, Dixon mentioned, ‘to read the 
writings of the Residents without discovering that a local municipality existed’.678 Despite the 
decorative nature of the municipal councils and Regencies, they were in direct and frequent 
communication with the Commissioner, providing essential information on each island. 
Maitland’s reaction to ‘low intrigues’ and party politics was to bring political bodies like 
the Ionian Senate under his tight control, and to monitor closely the Ionian elites’ conduct. In 
1816, for example, he dismissed four members of the Senate – practically dissolving it – 
because they were causing ‘dissensions in the government’. Writing to Bunbury in the same 
year, he explained that the dismissed senators were ‘a set of corrupt and insufferable 
intriguers’ and ‘creatures of Capodistria’. Dixon mentioned the fact that on top of corruption, 
Maitland implied that the senators were also involved in communications with Russia and 
copies of their treasonous correspondence were sent to Bathurst.679 The senators were 
replaced by people who conformed more to Maitland’s wishes, a person he trusted was 
appointed to the head of the Senate. 
 How, then, did Maitland seek to make this ‘impenetrable scene of intrigue’ more 
‘penetrable’? How did he seek to create reliable collaborators? One way to achieve his aims 
was to closely monitor the activities of Ionian political bodies. In this peculiar, ‘dual’ system of 
government, the role of the commissioner in state surveillance and the monitoring of Ionian 
political bodies like the Senate was more nuanced than it is often assumed to be. Despite 
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considering many of the Ionian elite intriguers, Maitland was nevertheless personally involved 
in information-gathering, and thus kept in close contact with many of the local elites. His 
relationship with them is rather comically depicted in an episode that took place in Corfu during 
the early years of the protectorate: his bedroom was next to the chamber where the Ionian 
Senate used to gather for their assemblies. One morning, he was awoken by the Senators as 
they gathered to convoke a meeting. After a night of heavy drinking – one of many – Maitland 
appeared in the doorway in his night attire telling Hankey, his officer: ‘Damn them, Secretary. 
Tell them to go to Hell’.680 We can easily imagine how surprised the senators would be – 
schooled in the ways and delicate manners of Venetian aristocracy – by this authoritarian, 
‘frequently drunk’ and ‘dirty’ governor. But at the same time, Maitland’s hard-working 
administration was also acknowledged by Napier and others.681 Indeed, the authoritarian 
governor had appointed Frederick Hankey, a person of trust and his right hand in the islands, as 
a Secretary of the Senate.  
The commissioner knew that by appointing Hankey he would ensure a physical presence 
in all the Senate’s proceedings.682 Hankey had to ensure that ‘nothing can be done from day to 
day without it being reported to the Lord High Commissioner’.683 Similarly, the High 
Commissioner surrounded himself with close associates, veterans of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Frederick Adam for example, also a Scot and Maitland’s successor as a High Commissioner in 
the islands, served with Maitland, and was, typically, appointed commander of the forces in the 
Ionian Islands in 1817, and second in command to the High Commissioner.684 
Creating connections with members of the Ionian elite was also crucial. In March 1816, 
Maitland appointed Baron Theotoky as a president of the Senate. Baron Emmanouel Theotoky 
(1777-1837) came from a powerful noble family in Corfu and was an active supporter of Greek 
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education. Theotoky was able to provide Maitland with up-to-date information on Ionian 
politics within official political bodies, as well as among the Ionian aristocracy and the 
subsequent access they had to rural communities. Also, the Senator had compiled valuable 
quantitative and qualitative data on population, land and economy, in his book Details Sur 
Corfou. In his opening speech in the Senate, Theotoky himself praised Maitland’s conduct and 
proclaimed the new era: 
The time of troubles is over, and we should not reminisce about them. We are 
happy that our interests happened to be under the protection and the 
guarantee of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, and of the honourable Thomas 
Maitland as guarantor of our good fortune. The testimonies of [Maitland’s] 
qualities are his predictions over the plague, the protection and establishment 
of our Church as a dominating religion of the state, the security of our property, 
and ensuring us our essential needs.685   
Along with the Residents, Maitland worked closely with the Ionian police. Policing on 
the islands was organized at a local level and according to the principles of the constitution of 
1817. A bill for the organization of police was brought by Maitland to the Legislative Assembly 
in March 1818, and was a rather indicative example of the continuous interventions of the High 
Commissioner in the Ionian legislature, as well as the silent compliance of Ionian legislators. The 
police department was organized into two branches, the Executive and Judicial police: the latter 
was appointed by the Regents who ‘were able to sentence without appeal in cases involving not 
more than thirty dollars at Corfu, Cephalonia and Zante, and correspondingly lower in the other 
islands’. The executive police ‘fulfilled the duties of police constables’.686 At the same time, they 
were crucial in the registration of occupational titles and individuals in Corfu, such as 
shopkeepers, merchants, brokers or manufacturers.687 Constables were called for, in cases 
ranging from neighbourhood differences to plots and rebellions threatening public order. In all 
cases, the Commissioner was to be informed, even in trivial alterations of the system.688 
Overall, Maitland’s personal strategies and surveillance of individual Ionian politicians were 
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tactics employed to control the local political scene as a whole, along with censorship of the 
press, and effectively stifling anything resembling public opinion. 
In many ways, Maitland put effort into upholding the traditions of the local aristocracy, 
and exchanged lengthy correspondence with A’ Court because of the latter’s knowledge of 
customs and political traditions in the Mediterranean. The commissioner decided to respond to 
the requests of Ionian nobles who were ‘plaguing’ him ‘with all kinds of offers, quite ridiculous 
of themselves’,  ‘from all these [gifts and offers]’, Maitland wrote to A’ Court, ‘I have shrunk and 
hold back as much as I possibly could; - but the impression on my mind has always been that it 
would be unwise policy to place ourselves so much beyond them, as to state at once that I 
would receive nothing of any kind at their hands’.689 Despite having ‘an aversion on foreign 
titles’, Maitland gave his consent to establishing, in 1818, the English peerage under the Order 
of St. Michael and St. George and by consenting to spend £10,000 for expenses.690  
Relevant works in Ionian historiography are at pains to understand the social and 
cultural mechanisms of information-gathering, either in the form of examining rumours or 
British officials exchanging information with Ionians informally. Some tendencies of linking a 
‘reinvented’ nobility to colonial administration can be traced across the British Empire – to 
possessions like Ireland, South Africa and Malta – or even to European colonial rule elsewhere. 
Similarly, as elsewhere in the empire, efforts were taken by both British and loyal Ionians to 
associate the imperial enterprise with Ionian society through military parades, public 
ceremonies and ‘viceregal display’.691 The most obvious architectural display of British rule is 
the neoclassical palace of St Michael and St. George, the High Commissioner’s residence and 
home of the Ionian Senate, which today overlooks the Spianada, the main square of Corfu 
town.  
In any case, Maitland established a network to monitor the Ionian elites in 
circumstances of great distrust and suspicion. The anxieties over Russian agents and suspicious 
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figureheads are indicative, most notably in the case of the Corfiote noble, Capodistrias. Another 
example of Maitland’s surveillance strategies being used control the central political scene in 
the islands, was the Lepegnotti affair in 1816-1817.692 Lepignotti, who was Frederick Hankey’s 
secretary, spread false information that a plot had been devised by a group of nobles to poison 
Maitland. British and Ionian constables were ordered to arrest the suspected individuals, all of 
which were Theotoky’s political opponents.693 The plot seemed to be finally exposed, and after 
consideration, Maitland made amends by releasing the nobles and ‘professions of goodwill on 
both sides ended the affair’.694 However, as Maitland’s opponents testified a couple of years 
later in the British parliament, the plot was fabricated in order to destroy Theotoky’s political 
opponents. Despite Lepegnotti’s personal motives for profit, he was turned into a convenient 
political scapegoat. But generally, few Ionian nobles had caused Maitland as much concern as 
Count Capodistria, who was also the head of the Russian party in the islands. Maitland wrote to 
Bathurst and Castlereagh at length on the measures that he adopted in order ‘to defeat 
[Capodistria’s] cabals’.695 Considering this climate of ‘intrigues’ and the ambiguities of the 
international settlement, then, it is hardly surprising that the constitutional background would 
be even less representative.  
Along with surveillance strategies, British officials came to rely on the collaboration of 
local politics and institutions. As we already saw, before the British had established their 
provisional government in the islands, Ionians had been commissioned to conduct statistical 
accounts during the French administration. Similarly, infrastructure works like roads and 
administrative buildings were part of a project that Ionians also promoted. Surveys of the land, 
such as the marshes in southern Corfu which were seen as a factor to plague outbreaks, were 
conducted by French engineers with local help and funds from the Ionian government.696 Later 
forms of information collection in the empire, like the Blue Books of Statistics, ‘collected by the 
British authorities for colonial administration purposes, documents of the Ionian State 
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bureaucracy and accounts of Ionians and British contemporaries reveal a colonial modernity 
that found fertile ground among the educated Ionians who followed the logic of accountability, 
transparency and found innovative expressions of interests in the public sphere, but also 
through collective petitions’.697  
 
Collection of information: counting the Ionian population or treating opinions?  
Many of the practices in information collection mentioned above were also adopted 
during Venetian administration, including the accumulation of quantitative information and 
surveys. Therefore, more contextualized research needs to be done before we can safely say 
that the Venetians had not achieved a ‘sophisticated level of nineteenth-century colonial 
governance’, or that they had not used ‘population as a resource for economic development at 
an empire-wide level’.698  
Apart from Maitland’s experience on measurements and statistics in general, since the 
expedition in Saint-Domingue, we saw how the compilation of statistical tables was the act of 
pioneering individuals: British medical topographers like Hennen, or Greek officials like Plato 
Petrides. Following tendencies of official information gathering in Britain, these individuals ‘had 
the potential to ‘illuminate aspects of society that government was not well equipped to survey 
directly’.699 Such enquiries provided ‘the most direct precedent for the activities of early 
Victorian statistical societies’.700 
But gathering information had its limitations. We saw, in the previous chapter, Tully’s 
efforts to gather information from priests on the plague, and his subsequent frustration when 
villagers in rural areas concealed this information. This frustration was understandable from 
Tully’s perspective. As we saw before, priests in the islands – like in Venice – were ‘depositories’ 
of knowledge about the community, and state officials in the islands – both British and Ionians 
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from Corfu – were dependent on them. State officials did not manage to free themselves 
entirely from these kinds of local sources of information in the period under study, and any 
surveys conducted by state officials involved local actors. In any case, as we saw in the 
introduction of the thesis, accounts from even the mid-nineteenth century had not reached 
consensus over the actual measurement of the population. Limitations in counting the 
population were even greater in terms of population movement.  
Demographic change and the recording of the population are often associated with 
state mechanisms of surveillance, as well as the rise of the modern state. In the case of highly 
mobile societies like the Ionian Islands, this could cause a constant headache to state officials 
should they decide to count the population, and especially if they keep track of incoming 
foreigners.701 The second French administration maintained the policy of passport controls as 
the previous one of 1797-198.702 Recording the presence of foreigners on the islands was 
systematized in the course of the nineteenth century, although these procedures were prone to 
circumstance and political change: during the Septinsular Republic in 1805, for instance, the 
police commission announced that ‘within five days all foreigners would be traced and 
recorded, with the assistance of hotel and other property owners in and around the city and its 
suburbs’. In the context of a climate of political instability in the islands, ‘this practice of 
surveillance’, Gekas noted, ‘was introduced for the first time and it was considered so 
indispensable that it lasted until the end of British rule’.703 Certainly, British officials took 
‘precautionary measures’ to regulate population movement in the port-towns and coasts of the 
islands, but usually on a small scale and for specific purposes, for example in order to contain 
the transmission of plague to the island of Cephalonia from the mainland.704 Similarly, 
maintaining an old practice, men and women who were crossing the borders between the 
islands and the mainland had been a source of tension between the British and the local pasha 
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since British troops landed on the islands in wartime, especially in the case of individuals fleeing 
Ottoman authorities.  
In most cases, counting the population did not necessarily involve control, but followed 
previous standard policies of Ionian administrations when naturalizing foreigners, or, to put it 
differently, ‘making new subjects’.705 Few demographic changes were greater during 
Anglokratia than the arrival of 3,000 refugees from the small town of Parga, who were forced 
to migrate and to settle on the islands of Corfu and Paxoi in a matter of weeks. This particular 
case shows how information collection processes followed previous patterns of integrating 
foreigners, but were nevertheless shaped by new geopolitical imperatives, notably the links 
with Ali Pasha.   
 
The cession of Parga in 1819 
 In a way, in 1819 the British were still involved in the wartime connections they had 
established with Ali Pasha in the mainland. As we will see, the scandalous case of Parga is 
illuminating in many ways, not only in terms of the wartime connections the British fostered 
between the mainland and the islands, but also in regard to the British presence in the 
Mediterranean at large.   
Geographically, the small coastal town of Parga is in northwestern Greece, opposite the 
small island group of Paxoi in the Ionian Sea, consisting at the time of 4,000 to 5,000 people. As 
was described by an author at the time, ‘without being so useful to the provisioning of Corfu … 
was nevertheless of infinite importance, owing to the connections its inhabitants then did and 
still continue to keep up with … independent clans of the Cassiopian mountains [in the 
mainland, opposite of Corfu]. This was one of the principal seats of the insurrectional 
movements which agitated the Epirus, and a secure asylum for the enemies of Ali Pacha’.706 The 
cession of Parga, as the ‘incident’ was rightly named by contemporaries, bought 
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embarrassment to British foreign policy. It created one of the greatest humanitarian crises in 
the British Mediterranean at the time. Initially, the British government tried to withhold 
information from the British public in regard to the case, but news leaked due to the efforts of a 
particular officer in the British army, Charles De Bosset, who published, almost immediately 
after the cession of the islands, his Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands (1819).707 News 
also travelled through Greek networks between the islands and London.  
Historically, Parga along with other coastal towns in the region, which are divided 
between modern-day Greece and Albania (Butrint, Preveza, Vonitsa), were heavily-fortified 
Venetian enclaves on the continent. During the brief occupation of the islands by French (1798-
1799 and 1807-1809/1815) and Russian (1799-1807) troops, these same troops also occupied 
Parga, along with the Ionian Islands. British troops also occupied the town at the time of the 
French retreat in 1814, and informal promises of protection were given to the worried 
Parguionotes by Campbell, who mentioned that ‘this small Greek community has been rescued 
from the impending ferocity of its powerful and relentless neighbour, the Vezir Ali Pacha … 
[who] would undoubtedly have exterminated the inhabitants, regardless of age or sex’.708 
Campbell was not merely concerned with protecting the inhabitants of Parga, however genuine 
his comments may have been, but also an expedition in the mainland would, according to him, 
consolidate a ‘weak and fluctuating’ British presence in the islands, in the face of Russian and 
French intrigues throughout Greece.709  
After the occupation of the islands by British troops between 1809 and 1815, however, 
both Ottoman and Russian claims over western Greece were officially renounced.710 British 
officials like Campbell mentioned the strategic influence of the town to London, considering it 
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‘an outwork of the garrison of Corfu’.711 Or, as already mentioned in this study, such towns in 
the mainland could contain plague outbreaks from reaching the Ionian Islands.712 European 
troops were welcomed warmly by the inhabitants of Parga, who looked on them as offering 
protection against the nearby Ali Pasha’s expansionist vision of filling the power ‘vacuum’ – and 
conquering territories – as he saw fit, after the collapse of the Venetian Republic in 1797. 
Despite Campbell’s assurances to the Parguionotes, the town was ceded to the Ottoman 
government in 1817 under a secret agreement between John Cartwright – consular official in 
the Morea at the time and later a political reformer – and Ahmed Bay, on behalf of the British 
and the Ottoman governments respectively.713 Parga was finally delivered to Ali Pasha in 1819 
for £142,425. Having waited in a state of anxiety for news of the town’s fate, the nerves of 
3,000 inhabitants broke in May 1819, and they fled the town to look for refuge in the nearby 
Ionian Islands.  
News of the cession of Parga caused public outrage in Britain as well as the rest of 
Europe. De Bosset, who sympathized with the people’s plight and protested to Maitland, was 
swiftly recalled.714 Fierce clashes took place in the pages of the Quarterly Review and Edinburgh 
Review, The Times, and in Parliament in May 1819. Most characteristically, one of Maitland’s 
critics, Joseph Hume, called Maitland ‘a disgrace to England’, when the incident was discussed 
in Parliament two years later.715 Across Europe, poems were written and paintings were 
produced depicting the plight of the people of Parga, such as the Parguinote, drawn by John 
Cartwright (1822) which is kept today in the British Museum. The Scots Magazine lamented:  
The facts speak for themselves. Great Britain has condescended to an act which 
Venice, Russia, and France, shrunk from with horror. We have abandoned a 
free people, whom we had solemnly and unequivocally pledged ourselves to 
protect. We have actually sold their homes and their altars, and have 
surrendered to a ferocious barbarian the last inlet through which the arts, the 
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religion, and the commerce of civilized Europe could make their way into 
Greece.716  
The case of Parga is still debated in historiography, but it is certain that geopolitical 
imperatives, maintaining good relations with the pasha, and the agreement on timber since 
wartime played crucial roles; the town was not even included in the Treaty of Paris that gave 
the islands to Britain.717 After agreeing to cede Parga for ‘a quantity of timber’ from Ali Pasha, 
and to maintain good relations with the Porte, the town was finally delivered to the pasha in 
July 1819.718 Above all, for British officials the town of Parga had no strategic use.  
Maitland shared his thoughts on Parga in a lengthy report he sent to Bathurst in 
November 1819. For the commissioner, Parga was ‘a barren rock’ of no strategic use, 
‘possessed … of no means of resistance, of no funds to create such means – with no possibility 
of being of the smallest utility to us, and with the certainty of generating a spirit of hostility and 
disgust on the part of our ally the Porte’.719 Keeping Parga, Maitland wrote to Bathurst, would 
involve establishing garrisons in the town, and covering an ‘enormous expense of new [military] 
works’ that would cost the British government more than £50,000. Maintaining a garrison in 
the mainland would produce a sense of tension and a ‘series of complaints and quarrels 
between the British and Ottoman authorities … shaking that connection that I am sure I need 
not state to your Lordship’.720 Maitland continued: 
I contend that a mere garrison would have been inadequate to the protection 
of its territory – that we could not have prevented them from being placed, as 
it were, in a state of constant siege, cut off from all communications with the 
interior, and as completely isolated, if it had been a rock in the ocean. … with 
the certainty (which has been sufficiently proved My Lord in the course of this 
proceeding) of indisposing the Ottoman Porte towards us, with the certainty of 
violating the system of general policy, which formed the bases of all our 
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engagements a the reestablishment of the general peace, - with the certainty 
of entailing upon ourselves a very heavy annual expenditure.721 
 Strategically, Maitland, particularly because of his tenure in Ceylon, was well-aware of 
what it meant to govern in the frontiers. From the perspective of Britain’s ‘blue-water’ strategy, 
his observations were reasonable. The anxiety of putting the garrison in Parga in a situation of 
‘constant siege’, and the fear that a British military presence would ‘violate the system of 
general policy’ and become a cause for war was characteristic of the state that British officials 
were in on the islands. The commissioner also mocked the ignorance of his critics in England:  
[who] had never had any knowledge of Mohomeddan power, or of 
Mohameddan authority, except from two or three months residence in the 
place of Parga, stating broad doctrines with regard to the policy Great Britain 
ought to entertain relative to countries of which they pretend to have gathered 
sufficient knowledge from the slight and casual opportunities of such 
momentary residence. The others in England are pleased to maintain the usual 
political notion, to this miserable place, and its more despicable inhabitants.722 
Finally, on Parga: there is another important conclusion that can be drawn from the 
cession, directly related to the place of the islands as an ‘observatory to the whole of Turkey’. 
First, Maitland’s concerns about the inability of the Parguinotes to defend themselves in case of 
invasion, and the fact that it would need more than ‘a mere garrison’ to protect the town723, 
show the ambivalence in the relationship between British authorities on the islands and the 
powerful Ali Pasha up until 1819, a point which is downplayed in relevant historiography.724 
Maintaining at least an entrepôt like the Ionian Islands, and a naval force to secure them, would 
give to the British an important advantage, allowing them to collect intelligence and to 
communicate between both the pasha and the Porte.  
Alternatively, should the British have maintained a garrison in the mainland they would 
have met with unprecedented difficulties. As Maitland wrote to Bathurst, ‘either a very short 
space of time must have undergone the disgrace of ceding it, or embarked ourselves in a 
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system of what I may truly call, Asiatic Polities; similar to what which has so long prevailed in 
our possessions in the East’.725 Maitland’s concerns on the strategic place of Parga have 
stemmed from his colonial service as a governor in Ceylon or Madras, and the ‘corrosive 
effects’ that local elites had on British authority.726  
Lastly, the cession of Parga created problems in housing, provisions and, of course, 
personal distress to the refugees.727 The issue raised a significant problem in the form of the 
integration of the refugees into Ionian society. Recordings of Parguinotes, and naturalizations 
that the Ionian State offered to them, followed previous practices of information collection, as 
mentioned above. By 1827, for example, Parguinotes made up 22% of the population of Corfu 
not originating from the island.728 Grants of land were offered to them, and the British 
government intended to grant them ‘a large additional sum beyond there which they have 
received for their property in Parga’.729 According to Maitland, the refugees had become ‘very 
fat, well fed, and rich – they have made an advantageous sale of their property, and the ready 
money they have got, in a country where it is very scarce, enables them to domineer and 
command in these islands to a great degree, where they have taken out of the hands of the 
Corfiotes, a great deal of the little trade they had and these latter are …, and the Parganots 
laugh at every body, particularly at their zealous British advocates’.730 These reports were of 
course exaggerated, and much less convincing to justify the cession of Parga, other than 
Maitland’s conduct. His comments on the ‘fat and rich’ Parguinotes seemed to be supported by 
another author who wrote on the islands, Tertius Kendrick: ‘the Parguenotes are brigands both 
by inclination and trade; and, whenever an opportunity offers, directly avail themselves of it; 
seemingly disdainful of improving the natural advantages accorded to their territory by the 
bounteous hand of Nature. … Why Parga came to be a nest of banditti and villains, can be 
accounted for by the open manner in which all who fled from Ali Pacha were received by the 
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natives’.731 Nevertheless, the majority of these ‘very great rogues’ and ‘very fat’ Parguinotes 
were filing complaints about living in absolute poverty in 1837, and many of them had become 
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Clearly, as previous historical works on the islands have suggested, the Constitution of 
1817 provided a basis for the future political and constitutional development of the Ionian 
Islands as a British protectorate. But as this chapter argued, Maitland’s system was created 
before the constitution, and under the formidable governor’s authority: the press was censored 
and the commissioner dissolved the Senate, reconvening it with persons more friendly to him, 
while keeping the Senators under close surveillance and Ionian political bodies under tight 
control. Maitland, who had already acquired significant experience from the colonies, was 
already familiar with local ‘intrigues’ and Mediterranean politics. But at the same time, he was 
too confident in his ability to transform Ionian society in his image, by ‘ameliorating the lower 
orders’ and by establishing a loyal aristocracy through the Order of St. Michael and St. George. 
The consequences of this were the exclusion of a significant portion of the nobility from power, 
the disruption of Britain’s steady sources of information from wartime due to the 
marginalization of the English party, and the stifling of public opinion as a result. Ironically, 
Maitland’s interventions in Ionian political life did not allow for the very thing he claimed he 
aimed to build: a society liberated from Venetian corruption, intrigues and local ‘vices’.   
Finally, this chapter took issue with approaches emphasizing ‘colonial governmentality’, 
and a particular logic in governance that would differentiate between Maitland’s personal 
involvement in governance and any independent state mechanism: regardless of political 
economy, or the ideology of separating Ionian society into economic divisions that British 
officials brought to the islands. In the period under study they were not willing to, or the 
circumstances did not allow them to, create a civil society free of patronage, corruption or the 
interventions of the governor.     
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Chapter 6: The end of illusion? The Santa Maura rebellion and the 
beginning of the Greek revolution, 1819-1822 
 
After 1819, one rebellion followed another in the Ionian Islands and British officials dealt 
with a prolonged political crisis, whose peak was the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in the 
mainland in 1821, where this thesis ends. During this crisis British authorities became 
increasingly alienated from many Ionians across the social strata, with the cession of Parga 
being considered one reason, as many Greeks accused Maitland for giving up the town. British 
officials in the islands decided to deal with the revolutionaries in the mainland by proclaiming 
martial law. In the end, British officials managed to enforce ‘public tranquility’ but as this 
chapter argues, the circumstances that made the islands a protectorate had changed 
irrevocably.  
 
Official anxieties, rumours and the rebellion in Santa Maura, 1819 
As is mentioned in recent work on the islands, British officials indeed sought to influence 
Ionian society through a particular set of changes to the economy and politics, which bore 
similarities to projects elsewhere in the empire as well as in Britain. Besides an increase in the 
use of statistics and censuses, which were the recent legacy of the Napoleonic period, colonial 
officials sought to transform colonized societies and dependencies by implementing changes in 
local legal cultures and economies, encouraging a new legal order and political economy to 
emerge. In the islands, these tendencies were compatible with a process of systematizing the 
collection of information that had started at the turn of the nineteenth century, and which 
created a fertile ground for ‘the construction of colonial modernity’.733 But this project to 
construct colonial modernity was rarely homogenous. Aspects of British rule in the islands were 
indeed new, yet British officials dealt with contemporary problems in a characteristically 
‘traditional’ way. Repressed social problems, generated by war and political transition in the 
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islands, re-emerged in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, when peace and relative stability 
was restored. Such were the origins of the crisis that began in 1819, starting with a peasant 
rebellion in Santa Maura.  
Rural protest has been the subject of many interesting works in imperial historiography 
and anthropology, usually as a contest between colonized and colonizers.734 Influenced by 
relevant debates in history and anthropology, works on the Ionian Islands have examined 
similar issues in symbolic forms of resistance and the ‘war of words’, such as the peasant 
rebellion that took place on the island of Santa Maura in 1819.735 To some extent, the rebellion 
of 1819 has also concerned Greek historical literature.736 Examining the period of Anglokratia as 
a whole, previous works have emphasized the anti-colonial context of the rebellion, but have 
neglected aspects of popular protest that were addressing older problems and class 
antagonisms which were apparent before British rule: for example, chronic indebtedness and 
the firm grip of moneylenders and landlords on the peasants. This thesis addresses these 
problems, and also examines significant continuities in peasant resistance since the Venetian 
era, considering similar debates in imperial historiography.737 In this way, it examines peasant 
resistance not only as a challenge to colonial rule, but also as a (failed) attempt to establish 
lines of dialogue between distant rural areas and the central government. This chapter analyses 
the multiple levels on which this dialogue operated, and the ways in which British officials 
collected and processed information about the events that followed. The rebellion is worth 
describing here, as it illuminates crucial aspects of Ionian society which have not been 
examined yet in this thesis.  
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In 1819, the Anglo-Ionian state dealt with a direct challenge to its authority. As we saw 
before, Maitland’s despotism may have imposed firm control over Ionian political bodies, but 
many villagers on the islands were still far out of reach of British troops and tax-collectors. Rural 
areas were also culturally distant from the seat of the state in Corfu, as the majority of the 
countryside consisted of a Greek-speaking population. This was especially true of mountainous 
islands like Lefkada. Moreover, with a great portion of the population being mobile seasonal 
workers, it was impossible to exert control without the aid of local collaboration.  
As the expenses of the civil establishment of the Ionian State had to be paid out of the 
state’s revenues, according to the Constitution of 1817, local constabularies were also assigned 
to collect revenues in Santa Maura, under instruction from the general government in Corfu. 
The Senate had approved a tax on the numerous flocks and herds of the island, in order to fund 
the dredging of a canal through the salt-flats of the northern part of the island.738 The canal tax, 
as it was called, was intended to benefit local commerce and transportation, and answered 
local demands that had existed since the Septinsular government in 1806. However, when local 
constabularies came to the small village of Sfachiotes, in Lefkada, to collect the tax in 
September 1819, they found villagers taxed to the point of starvation following a bad harvest, 
and exasperated by rumours that they would be sent as militia to the West Indies.739 Soon, the 
state officials sent to collect the tax were chased, and fled to a local monastery, where they 
were saved by the local priest.740 Shortly afterwards, a British detachment under Colonel 
Frederick Stovin arrived at the village in order to prevent the situation escalating further. 
Stovin, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, was the Resident in Santa 
Maura at the time.741 The protesting peasants claimed that they had no quarrel with the British, 
but were in dispute with the local landlords who 'wanted to starve and make them poor'.742  
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Stovin asked for the peasants to write down their demands in a petition, assuring them 
that it would be ‘carefully examined’ by the Ionian government.743 The peasants’ demands 
were written down by Count D’ Orio and Thomasso Vaffea, two aristocrats who could translate 
the petition from Greek and who were trusted by the insurgents. Referring to Stovin, the 
petition started with the peasants acknowledging their respect for the ‘august empire which 
deigns exclusively to protect them, and they protest themselves ready to shed the last drop of 
their blood to defend the government and their country in this island’.744 The petitioners asked 
for a fair price on salt (which was the main export of Lefkadites), fairer rates of tax as the nobles 
were exploiting them, the replacement of constables from Corfu in Santa Maura with ones 
originating from the island, and to receive a proper education. Protection of their private 
property from seizure in the payment of debts, by the elites or moneylenders, was another 
important point. The local priest who acted as an intermediary between Stovin and the 
peasants warned the officer that the grievances of the peasants were real, and he should in 
‘due course of time' redress them, feeling that Stovin did not take the peasants' problems 
seriously.745 After that the British force left, asking for reinforcements from Corfu at the same 
time.  
From the beginning, Stovin wrote to Frederick Adam (also a Scot), who was deputy for 
Maitland in his absence in Malta, about the seriousness of the situation: ‘the people [had] some 
ground [for] complaint, and that their distress arose in some measure to satisfy a lavish 
expenditure on some very worthless functionaries of the government', meaning the exorbitant 
expenses for the newly built Palace of St. Michael and St. George in Corfu. The officer noted 
that 'not one person bearing the reputation … of the gentleman' offered to accompany him 
from the town with a view to conciliating with the insurgents, which proved 'the little 
connection or kind feeling … between the People and higher classes.746 His observations, 
however, fell on deaf ears. Stovin’s conduct in the rebellion was later praised by Maitland, but 
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his observations were not taken into account. The situation quickly escalated, and the rebellion 
spread across the island to other villages. A British detachment was forced to retreat by the 
insurgents, and the armed villagers entered the town of Lefkada.  
Causing panic among the middle and upper classes of the town, the peasants burnt 
down some of the houses of the supporters of the canal tax, and attacked the municipal 
building where taxes were kept. Soon, however, a larger detachment of 350 soldiers arrived 
from Corfu, with Frederick Adam at its head, and quelled the rebellion.747 British officials, and 
Stovin in particular, received the gratitude of the ‘citizens of Lefkada’, who sent him a letter 
offering him a gold medal of honour ‘for his bravery by which he drove away the villagers who 
flooded the city, with the purpose to destroy the citizens’.748 Ironically, the aristocrats who had 
been trusted by the armed peasants to write down the initial petition, were also included as 
signatories of the letter, as concerned citizens of Lefkada. The rebellion in Lefkada was the first 
direct challenge to British authority in the islands, causing a great number of British 
casualties.749 Adam declared martial law for the first time during Anglokratia, which came into 
force on all the Ionian Islands and was prolonged until May 1820.750 Nine of the insurgents 
were arrested and four of them were hanged as ringleaders.   
How did the rebellion affect British rule on the islands? For an island of 16,000 
inhabitants, the impact of the rebellion on Britain was great. The Times estimated that 6,000 
men were under arms, with women playing a very active role in the rebellion. It is, however, 
unlikely that almost 40 percent of the island’s population was in fact armed!751 But as the 
perception of Ionians as an armed population was a recurring anxiety among British officials, it 
is very possible that newspapers like The Times were receiving their information from official 
sources. The majority of the insurgents fled to mainland Greece, and some of them later took 
part in the Greek Revolution of 1821.752 From the time that the rebellion was crushed, Maitland 
                                                     
747 TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, 21 November 1819, p. 471. 
748 Chiotis, History of the Ionian State, p. 220. 
749 The number is estimated at about 200 dead, but is probably exaggerated. The number of dead, however, should 
be high due to the exposed position of the British troops (Chiotis, History of the Ionian State, p. 213). 
750 Chiotis, History of the Ionian State, p. 220. 
751 The Times, 8 Dec. 1819. 
752 TNA CO 136/1270, Adam to Travers, St Maura, 20 October 1819, p. 217. 
   
224 
 
wrote to Goulburn regarding his suspicions about the real instigators, mentioning a particular 
individual and implying that Capodistrias was ‘a considerable sharer in the occasion’.753 
The rebellion alarmed the authorities: martial law was proclaimed, and the size of the 
permanent garrison was increased from 307 in 1818 to 495 troops in Lefkada in 1819, until 
authorities considered the crisis over and ended martial law in May 1820.754  British officials 
saw the whole ‘incident’ as instigated by external forces instead of as a result of poverty, lack of 
education and indebtedness. Hume mentioned in the British parliament later, for example, that 
there were 45 people who were found incapable of paying their debts.755 Claims that the 
insurrection was instigated by an external source were repeated by Maitland to Ionian Senators 
in one of his speeches to the Ionian Senate.756 In one of his earlier instructions, after the 
rebellion, Maitland wrote to Adam that to examine the causes more closely would force the 
British to endeavour into ‘slow and uncertain grounds’, meaning that inquiries into the origins 
of the insurrection would be lengthy, and have a small chance of ever getting to the bottom of 
things.757 Adam was convinced of Capodistrias’ involvement.  
In retrospect, Capodistrias most probably knew about the political turmoil in Lefkada, 
but there has not been any evidence that he participated in any way. The only evidence is 
circumstantial: he was present at the time in Corfu for personal reasons, which by itself hardly 
constitutes evidence of his involvement in the rebellion. This, however, gave sufficient 
justification to British officials like Adam and Maitland. After interrogating the culprits of the 
rebellion, Adam wrote to Maitland that Capodistrias’ name was ‘in everybody’s mouth here; 
and rumours of changes soon to take place more spread’, despite him ‘marrying his brother to 
a Santa Mauriote’, implying that Capodistrias could easily be the instigator of this change.758 
Believing that these ‘uncertain grounds’ represented the entanglement of the dense network of 
connections and misinformation between the elites and the peasants, Maitland was more 
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certain of Capodistrias’ involvement ‘in direct hostility’ to British interests.759 As for the canal, it 
took 30 more years for it to be completed.760 
 
The aftermath of the rebellion: public inquiries, rumours and official anxieties 
Close inspection, led by Adam, followed. Public enquiries were established in order to 
collect information about the causes of the rebellion, although with very clear instructions not 
to enter into ‘slow and uncertain grounds’, from before these interrogations even started. 
Instead of delving in any way into the actual standards of living in rural areas or the legal 
context of debt payment, Adam’s inquiry was into the connections of the aristocrats involved, 
all pointing to Capodistrias.  
Following the insurgency, a strong sentiment against British rule spread across rural 
communities on the island, and Santa Mauriotes were the first to fight as volunteers in the 
Greek Revolution two years later. If sentiments were not clearly anti-British at the outset of the 
protest, they certainly became so thereafter. Enquiries met with local resistance when many 
peasants who were interrogated concealed crucial information from the authorities. The 
inspector of the village, for example, was due to be executed for inciting the people of his 
village ‘to take up arms’, but the executioner of the island refused and ‘neither threat nor 
reward could induce him to act’. The British had to bring a hangman from Corfu to execute the 
inspector.761 Village priests played a crucial role in the insurrection, as the ‘leading priest’ was 
arrested and hanged for giving false testimony.762 The insurgents who fled the islands for the 
mainland had their property confiscated.  
When interrogated, the villagers repeatedly referenced the long-lasting economic and 
social issues in the islands, referring to their exclusion and exploitation by the upper classes. 
They spoke about the daily struggle for survival, problems of scarcity and low incomes, high 
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taxation and their aspirations for themselves and their children. They ‘were happy before with 
taxes and laws … during the rule of Venice, and the French and the Russians,’ because their 
former rulers did not ‘annoy’ them with unreasonable demands: they knew that they ‘could not 
handle more’. Although they found the construction of the canal ‘beneficial’, they suggested 
that there could be fairer ways to pay for it than by levying heavy taxes on them. They also 
asked why there could not be a ‘public school … in a monastery,’ so that it could be ‘accessible 
to all inhabitants’ of Santa Maura, even the poor.  
But Adam would have none of it. In the end, he wrote to Maitland that ‘nothing 
transpired which could at all lead to the conclusion that the new taxes were in any degree 
unpopular, at least among the peasantry’.763 Adam was not eager to examine the case more 
thoroughly. More misinformation followed, when British officials started to speculate about 
external factors, and perhaps the role of Russia and her agents in the islands. Frederick Adam, 
in particular, was convinced that the main instigator was Capodistrias, based on the latter’s visit 
to Santa Maura for entirely personal reasons before the insurrection. When the ‘business of 
Santa Maura’ came at an end, Maitland wrote to Henry Goulburn – Bathurst’s Under Secretary 
– on the causes of the ‘tumult’, appraising at the same time Stovin’s conduct. Informing 
Goulburn so that he would contradict any ‘idle rumours in London’ about the disturbances, 
Maitland confirmed Bathurst’s suspicions that instigators of Ionian origin, working for Russian 
interests, were to blame, without ‘the smallest doubt’.764 Capodistrias’ name was mentioned 
frequently in Maitland’s correspondence to the Colonial Office: ‘I have every day an 
opportunity of knowing there is no engine of any kind that is not now at work to poison the 
minds of the people here, and to convince them that an immediate change is going to take 
place in favour of the Russian party; and I have no doubt all this proceeds solely and alone from 
the intrigues of Capo D’ Istria himself’.765 In the following months, Maitland concluded that all 
these were attempts to ‘awaken the old Russian interest’, separate from social or political 
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problems.766 It was a while before the canal tax was withdrawn, or any concerns of the villagers 
regarding the excesses of the elites were addressed.  
Official ignorance or indifference were certainly not unique to the islands. Comparisons 
with developments in Britain in the post-Napoleonic era can be drawn here: in 1819, the year of 
the rebellion in Santa Maura, Manchester had also become a scene of social and economic 
crisis with the Peterloo massacre.767 As Boyd Hilton wrote, ‘for the political nation as a whole 
fear of the mob outweighed acknowledgment that on this occasion the local authorities had 
overreacted. Ministers were privately appalled by their ‘precipitation’, but endorsed their 
actions publicly’.768 In the Ionian Islands, however, the authorities were dealt with differently: 
the Regent who abandoned his post to take refuge in the fortress was removed from office.769 
What was perceived as an attempt to overthrow British administration, allowing Maitland to 
declare martial law, convinced Bathurst that ‘no alternative is left to him but that of either 
abandoning the protection of the Ionian States, or asserting his determination unalterably to 
maintain that authority which the Treaty of 1815 and the charter have conferred upon him’.  
London approved of Maitland’s conduct on the islands.770 In many ways, the problems of 
peasants in Lefkada constituted a lower priority for British officials compared to Corfu, and 
British officials would soon enter into a vortex of disinformation across the Adriatic with little 
legitimacy in the countryside. In a letter sent to Goulburn, the commissioner mentioned that he 
received information a couple of months earlier from a captain called Smith, who was stationed 
in the island of Lissa in the Adriatic, that there was ‘at Santa Maura an insurrection, or that one 
would soon take place’. Moreover, the captain informed him that the British consul, Henry 
Kane, a native of Ancona, ‘was at the time absent in some attempt to organize the 
insurrection’. The commissioner’s suspicions of Kane’s perceived involvement stemmed from 
the beginning of his administration, and were aimed particularly at consuls. Maitland concluded 
in his letter: ‘this is all extraordinary and tends to strengthen the idea that the disturbance 
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arose from no tax in respect to the canal, but was owing to the attempts which have been so 
generally lately made by all the adherents of the Russian government in these islands to stir up 
the people by every species of misrepresentation and misstatement’.771 
 
Parliamentary criticism of Maitland’s conduct 
During the period that this study examines, Parliamentary criticism began to press the 
British government to obtain information on the colonial governors’ conduct in the colonies. 
For example, from 1817 onwards, requests were made of the Colonial Office to deliver 
almanacs and lists of civil and military offices from the colonies, with detailed dates of 
appointment, methods, and salaries, a process which became formalized after 1822 as the ‘Blue 
Books of Statistics’.772 Parliamentary criticism, pressing the government to cut costs and to 
minimize the armed forces, became increasingly effective overall.773 The same was true of 
British affairs in the colonies. Unlike economic lobbies, public opinion and parliament were 
oscillating between pride and embarrassment about Britain’s colonies, depending on the 
political parties in Parliament. At the same time, colonial governors abroad had significant free 
rein from the Colonial Office in the early-nineteenth century, in the fashion of ‘proconsular 
despotism’ as Bayly had shown.774 On the other hand, even very powerful political figures were 
not immune from criticism: for instance, Henry Dundas was impeached in the midst of the 
battle of Trafalgar in 1805, on the charge of misappropriating public funds. In order to respond 
effectively to parliamentary criticism, and to secure personal networks and patronage, control 
of information from the colonies was of primary importance to British officials, both in London 
and the colonies.  
In the case of the Ionian Islands, it was also in the period between 1819 and 1824 when 
Maitland’s conduct would be questioned, and the relationship between Britain and the islands 
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became clearer. Yet his free rein was constantly negotiated with Britain and his conduct was 
often in question. Accusations of despotism in the early nineteenth century could endanger 
colonial appointments. Criticisms of Maitland’s despotism often came from inside the colonial 
establishment. For example, in the islands his authoritarianism made William Henry resign his 
post as a member of the Supreme Court of Justice on the islands in 1820. He felt that Maitland 
was ‘obsessed with holding authority over the Ionian State and acted as a law unto himself’.775  
His opponents in Parliament, like Hume and Monck, pressed for a commission of inquiry 
in the islands in 1821, in order to investigate allegations concerning the commissioner’s abuse 
of authority.776 Apart from parliamentary criticism, we saw how Capodistrias had become a 
great adversary of Maitland, especially associated with the rise of Russian influence.777 Often, 
there is a tendency in Ionian historiography to treat the clash between the two men as a 
diplomatic rivalry, the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris and the European ‘balance of power’. 
Yet it was indicative of the way that the British saw the Ionians, and how they sought to control 
the flow of information from the islands. In this sense, state surveillance, foreign policy and the 
production of colonial knowledge in regards to the islands were almost indistinguishable. 
Capodistrias’ movements, for example, were monitored as early as 1816, as well as those of his 
‘creatures’ activities in the islands.  
After the Constitution of 1817, Capodistrias protested that Maitland’s powers over 
Ionian political bodies were too great, and that the commissioner’s frequent interventions 
constituted abuses of the Treaty of Paris. The Corfiote politician regularly received news from 
his extensive network of correspondents in the islands and the mainland, including the poet 
and writer in the Edinburgh Review, Ugo Foscolo, as well as the later-famous Greek general, 
Theodoros Kolokotronis. Compiled after personal observation, and with information he 
received from his contacts, Capodistrias travelled to London and submitted a memorandum 
which outlined all his points to Bathurst in August and forwarded a copy in October 1819. In the 
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memorandum, Capodistrias wrote at length to Bathurst about Maitland’s abuse of authority.778 
Maitland in turn exchanged lengthy correspondence with Bathurst about Capodistrias’ 
accusations.  
The Colonial Office tried to keep discussions with Capodistrias confidential, and 
Maitland was never really threatened. Bathurst responded to Capodistrias officially in February 
1820, after a long delay of many months.779 The former dismissed the latter’s accusations, 
pointing to the fact that any defects of British ‘protection’ owed to the character of the people 
and the recent history of the islands: ‘the great evil with which the Ionian States have had to 
contend has been the rapid succession of different systems of government … hence the 
unsettled habits of the people, and the perpetual recurrence of cabal and intrigue, which your 
excellency may remember were not less deplored when under Russian protection …’.780  
According to Bathurst, any arbitrary measures against the Ionians were justified due to 
their character and recent history. Capodistrias’ charges were dismissed as misinformed. 
Essentially, for the Colonial Office it was Capodistrias’ word against Maitland’s. The real issue at 
stake, however, was not the charges against Maitland’s conduct specifically, but the potential 
charges of a violation of the Treaty of Paris by Emperor Alexander of Russia. Such accusations, 
ministers in London feared, would bring Russian intervention, with complications which were 
difficult to predict. Writing to Castlereagh a month after the charges, Bathurst seemed to 
confirm Maitland’s fears about Capodistrias’ role in this.781 Castlereagh and Bathurst tried to 
keep this confidential. Even Capodistrias was put under close surveillance by British officials, 
with Frederick North, the previous commander of Ceylon and part of Maitland’s circle, 
reporting on the Corfiote’s movements to the commissioner. A copy of Bathurst’s reply was 
forwarded to Maitland by Goulburn, cautioning him ‘not to make it known to any person in the 
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islands’, to keep this communication ‘confidential’ overall.782 But research has shown at length 
that Capodistrias was no revolutionary.783 Ideologically, he was a conservative and not a 
supporter of violent insurrection against Turkey. Reflecting the views of many Greeks at the 
time, he believed in ‘moral improvement’ first; that Greeks should improve themselves by 
education, before any plans for independence were considered.784 He was even asked to take 
part in a patriotic secret organization, the Philiki Etairia, between 1816 and 1820, requests 
which he rejected.785 
Of course, it would be an exaggeration to view state surveillance, or information 
collection in the islands more broadly, only through the lens of Maitland’s convictions about 
Capodistrias. Either way, Maitland had established an effective police system, later 
characterized by his opponents in Parliament as ‘a system of revolting espionage’, where ‘no 
one durst speak his mind’.786 But Maitland’s anxiety lay in his fears about the ‘impenetrable 
scene of intrigue’ consisting of disaffected Ionian nobles and opponents of his administration, a 
network whose leader was thought to be Capodistrias. Seditious correspondence was easier to 
control in the Mediterranean islands where Greek, and specifically the Ionian diaspora, 
constituted a significant percentage. In any case, the anxiousness to trace the source of 
‘falsifications’ that could be used to harm British authority in the islands, or in fact present 
evidence for Russian intervention, is evident in Maitland’s dispatches from 1815 until his death 
in 1824. 
Despite Maitland’s suspicions about Capodistrias, less than six months from the end of 
the rebellion, the commissioner became aware of the wider implications of political turmoil in 
the region: ‘looking at the situation’, Maitland wrote to Bathurst, ‘Santa Maura was actually in 
state of rebellion and convulsion’.787 The centralizing tendencies of the commissioner would 
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only alienate the majority of Ionian society further, potentially multiplying the number of 
disaffected people joining later Greek political nationalism. At the same time, the case of Parga 
had shown how Maitland enjoyed practical immunity, and protection from the British 
government.  
 
The cession of Parga and monopoly of information  
  Parliamentary criticism was, perhaps, more severe in the case of Parga, ‘one of the 
darkest blots upon our national reputation’ as Hume called the cession.788 The previous chapter 
looked at the cession of the town as a humanitarian and demographic crisis on the islands. It 
also examined Maitland’s considerations of the strategic value of the town in regard to British 
presence in the region. The case of Parga shows that Maitland’s conduct was in line with 
Bathurst’s and Goulburn’s opinions: ‘I press His Lordship to permit this to be public, to a certain 
extent, for I constantly think the best way to pave the way for the introduction of a complete 
and useful exposition of the whole affair of Parga’.789 In fact, parliamentary criticism of his 
conduct by his opponents, Hume and Charles Monck – and particularly the fact that De Bosset’s 
‘misrepresentations’ of Maitland would be published – hardened Maitland’s stance even more, 
heightening his recourse to stereotypical characterisations in official correspondence: 
responding to claims that 4,000 Parguinotes were starving on an island for example, Maitland 
wrote to Goulburn about 2,700 ‘high minded Parganotes, but in truth very great rogues’.790 
As was already mentioned, news of the cession of Parga was leaked to the British public 
by a Swiss officer who had served for in the British army for 24 years, Charles De Bosset. This 
officer is known in Ionian historiography and the Ionian Islands mostly because of his public 
works during his short tenure as a Resident in Cephalonia, but is less well-known for his role in 
making the case of Parga public.791 After the cession of Parga was decided, De Bosset was sent 
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to the town by Maitland at the head of 300 troops, with the task of informing the inhabitants 
that they could emigrate to the islands should they chose to do so.792 His testimony was thus 
one of personal observation. Nevertheless, he was soon relieved of command of Parga, as he 
was acting in opposition to British views. In fact, he was replaced by Maitland’s own nephew, 
James Maitland.793 De Bosset wrote in one of the editions of his Proceedings in Parga and the 
Ionian Islands that ‘very extraordinary exertions were made to obstruct its circulation, and 
prevent the diffusion of truths contained in it. But the impartiality of a British public defeated 
these interested efforts, in spite of the influence of those with whom they originated … a 
second edition of this work has indeed been for some time demanded; but, in deference to 
superior authority, it has been withheld’, and De Bosset referred to consistent anonymous 
attacks in the Quarterly Review seeking ‘to traduce his character and destroy that of my 
work’.794  
Perhaps the substance of the case De Bosset brought before the British public was 
encapsulated in his words: ‘it should not be forgotten that the issue is between a man holding 
one of the highest offices under the government, enjoying some of its greatest distinctions, and 
strongly supported by family and parliamentary influence, and an isolated officer, who, for the 
strict and conscientious discharge of his duty, has become the object of the most 
unaccountable and inveterate persecution, instead of receiving, in recompense for his services, 
civil as well as military, the means of enjoying an honourable retirement’.795 De Bosset’s 
sympathy for the Parguinotes was genuine; he risked too much by making the case public. 
What this case of early-nineteenth century colonial governance shows, and what was essential 
in De Bosset’s proceedings, was the key role of the British governor. In the case of Parga for 
example, Maitland did not act like he was subordinate to Bathurst but rather his acquaintance.  
Maitland’s anxiety derived also from the fact that news of the case came to Britain via 
communication channels that he could not control, through ‘Milan, Florence, and Naples, 
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where discontented Italians and renegade Greeks misrepresent and distort everything’.796 
Above all, the whole case of Parga, for the High Commissioner, was a matter of 
‘misinformation’ of the British public: ‘There has been no question brought before the public 
within my memory, which has been more completely misunderstood, or more generally 
misrepresented than the measures adopted by His Majesty’s government in regard to the 
cession of Parga to the Sublime Porte’.797 Exaggerations and misrepresentations in regards to 
the actual ‘value, its mean, and its capacities’ of Parga had been characteristic in the 
proceedings of the case for Maitland. The commissioner also referred specifically to De Bosset’s 
accusations regarding Parga. These, he claimed, had been the products of ‘a great degree of 
pernicious industry … employed to mislead the public mind’. On the other hand, ‘there has not 
been even the most trifling attempt to detect the fallacies published and the misstatements 
which have been sent forth’.798 Maitland concluded his letter to Bathurst, ‘that the Policy which 
dictated the cession of Parga, was wise in itself, and necessary under the existing 
circumstances, - that the arrangements for the accomplishment of that object originated in a 
principle of humanity,- that they were conducted uniformly throughout in a spirit of conciliation 
and equity’.799 As Paschalidi mentioned, the British government put ‘everyone … confined 
within a labyrinth set of ‘incorrect representations’ or ‘erroneous and insidious’ quotations’’ 
with Britain possessing the monopoly on information, especially in her colonial affairs.800 
Furthermore, the Parga case shows the importance of newspapers, rising in their 
significance to scandals and politics. Contrary to information coming from government insiders, 
colonial governors often rejected newspaper reports as ignorant and prejudiced: as Laidlaw has 
shown, governors whose reputations were perceived to be under threat, restricted the press 
during the 1820s in the Cape, New South Wales or Van Diemen’s Land.801 Maitland’s censorship 
of the press in Corfu, and his attempts along with Bathurst to control information about the 
Parga case, is not much different. Therefore, the case of Parga can also be studied in the 
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broader context of parliamentary pressures taking place during the 1820s between Britain and 
the colonies.  
 
The islands a hub of intelligence-collection, 1820-1822 
By 1820, circumstances had changed dramatically in the eastern Mediterranean and the 
Balkans since the British took over the Ionian Islands. The Serbian revolution in 1817 had won 
against the Ottoman Empire and resulted in the establishment of the Principality of Serbia. In 
1820, Ypsilanti, a famous Greek revolutionary and a senior Russian officer, established a press 
in the city of Kishinev (in today’s Moldova), inhabited by numerous members of the Greek 
diaspora. From there, Greeks maintained correspondence and circulated patriotic 
proclamations across the Ottoman Empire.802 
By occupying the islands, the British had acquired a significant advantage in information 
collection both in the islands as well as the wider region. Maitland was at the hub of 
information collection in the eastern Mediterranean. As during the Napoleonic Wars, British 
officials received information which was forwarded to the Colonial Office mainly through two 
channels: one from the British embassy in Vienna and the other from Ali Pasha’s court in 
Ioannina. This section examines how the circulation of information inflamed official anxieties, 
causing misinformation and further broadening the gap between the Ionian society and British 
officials. The communication channel between Vienna and Corfu played a crucial role in the 
negotiation between the British and the Austrians in terms of surveillance and exchange of 
information on revolutionary movements.  
It is well-known to historians that the period after 1815 marked the ‘age of revolutions’. 
British officials in the islands were no less preoccupied with Russian influence and Ionian plots, 
even more than state officials across Europe were preoccupied with revolutionary movements, 
with Austria’s Metternich among the first.803 Plots that were discovered by state officials were 
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perceived to be parts of a large ‘directory’, operating at a universal level. By now, historical 
research has shown convincingly that while secret organizations and societies existed, and plots 
did indeed take place, their aims were more conflicting and their organization poor.804  
In Vienna, Metternich exchanged information with the British ambassador, Charles Vane 
(Castlereagh’s half-brother), who forwarded Maitland information ‘relative to the state of 
affairs in the Ionian Islands’.805 ‘Unfounded rumours’ and conflicting reports about Russia’s role 
came to Vienna from regions under Ottoman rule with significant Greek populations, which 
were confirmed by supposedly more credible information in Corfu.806  As we saw from the case 
of the rebellion in Santa Maura, Maitland did not need convincing about the existence of ‘a 
deep laid system which is in agitation and is aided by the Greeks, to place not only all the Greek 
islands but Moldavia and Wallachia in the hands of the Russians’.807 ‘Amongst other things’, 
Vane continued,  
Prince Metternich mentions a secret interview which … the Turkish charge d’ 
Affaires at Paris (who is a Greek) had with count Capo d’ Istria ____, which 
however he concealed from his government (Prince Metternich … this from a 
letter which was intercepted in September last). On which occasion advice was 
given for the Greeks to temporize for the present, that the time was not far 
distant when they would enjoy all the wished other circumstances in this letter 
prove an active agency to be on foot, but His Highness did not wish to produce 
it alone.808  
In terms of British governance in the islands, Maitland’s suspicions about Ionian 
‘intriguers’ and of Capodistrias in the background of all political and social turbulence, were not 
merely stereotypical characteristics, nor signs of Maitland’s personal ‘vendetta’ with the 
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Corfiote politician. In any case, it seems that Capodistrias was not exactly the all-time favourite 
of Europe’s leaders: Metternich referred to him as the ‘scourge of Europe’ and to Castlereagh 
he was a ‘mongrel minister’.809 Ironically, it appears the Corfiote was the least revolutionary in 
a country that was in a state of revolutionary fervour. Certainly, the conspiracies were not pure 
fiction, and they have been a subject of discussion among historians for years. On the Ionian 
Islands, many connections were established with Italy through Greek connections in the 
universities. Rumours, exaggerated official anxieties and often highly speculative information 
created a sense similar to ‘information panics’, as historians have described. Maitland himself 
was regularly receiving information, particularly through consular networks in mainland Greece. 
For example, in May 1821 he learned from Philip Green, the British consul in Patras, that ‘there 
is no doubt of a general insurrection in the Morea’810. 
Corfu was the nodal point of information networks from Vienna, but also from 
Constantinople and Ali Pasha’s court in Ioannina. As is already mentioned, William Meyer was 
the main link to the mainland, and to Ali Pasha in particular, for both the British on the islands 
and in London. As was mentioned before, Meyer was a Consul-General at the time, and a 
resident for many years in the region. He travelled between the islands and the pasha’s court in 
Ioannina, Epirus on a regular basis, so he had first-hand information for the High Commissioner. 
Being able to speak and read Greek, Meyer had good local knowledge of the area and its 
people, hence he often corresponded with Maitland, as well as Strangford Canning in 
Constantinople, on various matters of local interest. Above all, Maitland had a knowledgeable 
‘interpreter’ of the politics of the Porte as well as of Ali Pasha, in close proximity to the islands. 
For example, collecting information in the pasha’s court, he sent information to British officials 
about the growing opposition and ‘disposition to act’ among Greek officials employed in the 
pasha’s service, whose sentiments were shared by many in Albania and the Morea.811 
Occasionally, even experienced British officials with a long service in the region 
completely misinterpreted the collected intelligence. It was from Meyer that London learned 
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about the existence of Philiki Etairia (Friendly Society or Society of Friends), the secret society 
bearing resemblance to secret societies in Spain or Italy, and ‘whose object is the liberation of 
Greece from the Turkish yoke’. In the original it is written as Etareia, and Meyer mentioned to 
Castlereagh that it had been in existence for many years, and ‘it appears to have been 
reorganized after the subversion of the late revolutionary government in France in 1814’.812 In 
fact, one of the founders of Etairia was initiated as a freemason in the island of Santa Maura. It 
is most likely that Maitland learnt the information from Meyer. However, it is entirely possible 
the consul confused the secret organization with a cultural institution devoted to the 
promotion of classical studies that was established in Athens a year prior with a similar name, 
Philomousos Etaireia. Or with another organization which was entirely different, also with the 
same name (Rigas Feraios). Ironically, the founder of the educational institution was 
Capodistrias. This confusion about the Corfiote politician’s actual role in Ionian politics has been 
emphasized in previous historical work.813 
 
Ionian neutrality, martial law and Maitland’s negotiation with London 
In March 1821, a general uprising broke out in the mainland and Frederick Adam 
declared Ionian neutrality in June of the same year.814 Many Ionians went to the mainland to 
fight as volunteers, and even the islands were in a constant state of uprising. After a boat of 
Muslim refugees tried to land in Zante, the passengers were slaughtered in retaliation for 
Ottoman atrocities against the Greek population. For Maitland, the episode represented a 
premeditated attack and not an isolated act of violence. He declared martial law, as he had 
done after the rebellion in Santa Maura, and circulated a proclamation demanding the 
disarmament of the islanders. The arms would be returned after register books and licenses 
were prepared.815 The names and residences of license holders were to be published in the 
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Government Gazette annually.816 For the commissioner, as well as for Frederick Adam, the 
islands were in a state of emergency, and British officials in the islands asked for additional 
troops from London. The commissioner wrote to London claiming that 130,000 Ionians with 
firearms could overcome the 3,500 British soldiers, and that he had therefore decided to disarm 
the population, abandoning plans for the creation of an Ionian militia. Disarming the Ionian 
population according to Maitland ‘was no measure adopted in one island, because a necessity 
had arisen for it another – but that it was one most deeply considered, with a view to the 
general situation of our affairs in those possessions, antecedent to its execution’.817 The 
disarmament of the Ionians precipitated a reaction from Hume in Parliament, who argued that 
the act disregarded the liberties of Ionians and their ‘cultural identity’.818 
Writing to Bathurst, Maitland continued to emphasise the severity of the situation: ‘The 
truth of the matter is that the principal reason for its adoption was not so much the necessity 
arising out of any individual act, as one emanating from a grave and serious consideration of 
the whole state and condition, into which the gov. of the Ionian Islands was placed in 
consequence of the revolution in Greece, and of the activity of various emissaries employed to 
revolutionize the islands’.819 For Maitland, this state of emergency should bring an end, 
temporarily at least, to the nominally independent British protectorate:  
To me the strict view of the subject (and what appeared to me was my business 
to consider) was exactly this, - whether with our eyes open we should be 
carrying on a nominal government, with the certainty of petty rebellions and 
revolutions occurring in all the greater islands daily, according as events gave 
the infatuated population reason to believe the Greek Revolution was 
succeeding; - or whether it was not both a necessary and an expedient measure 
before it came to a crisis (to which it was hourly approaching) of a much more 
violent nature – whether it was not to say both expedient – and advisable to 
place ourselves in a situation so as to prohibit – the possibility of those constant 
scenes of disturbance and tumult, by showing to all parties that we had the 
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power (and were determined to exert that power) of protecting the 
government of the country against revolution and rebellion.820 
Bathurst was reluctant to proclaim martial law, or put the islands into a state of 
emergency for a prolonged time, but finally trusted Maitland to keep his word. In retrospect, 
the period of the Greek revolution brought an end to a historical phase that started in wartime. 
By 1822, circumstances were dramatically different: Foresti was dead, after being marginalized 
by Maitland’s administration, Antonio Martinengo one of the strongest supporters of British 
protection in 1809 was imprisoned as an instigator of a rebellion against Maitland in Zante, 
while the Ionian Senate was dissolved and replaced by Ionian nobles loyal to the High 
Commissioner. In the mainland, Ali Pasha had died after an unsuccessful rebellion against the 
Porte, and another pasha replaced him who was loyal to the Ottoman government. Britain’s 
major wartime collaborators and sources of information were gone.  
At the same time, in Britain a revolution in administration started to take place.821 
Detailed recording was often more a result of parliamentary criticism than a sign of emerging 
growth in the use of statistical knowledge in colonial governance.822 Colonial expenditure in the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic wars was associated with ‘Old Corruption’, and led to criticism in 
Parliament. In this sense, the regulation regarding receiving information from the colonies 
came as a response to such criticisms. For example, referring to Malta, Bathurst wrote to 
Maitland in 1822 that ‘the want of a regular form of transmission to my office of detailed 
information, respecting the financial resources of the island, and the several branches of its 
expenditure, is a deficiency which is calculated in some instances, to embarrass the 
deliberations of His Majesty government’.823 Therefore, he wrote to Maitland that the latter 
should transmit to Bathurst, at the close of each succeeding year, ‘abstracts of the revenue and 
expenditure of your government, which shall exhibit, distinctly and separately, the sources from 
which the receipts have been derived, together with the total amount of expense incurred by 
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each department of the government’. Moreover, Maitland was to include with these abstracts 
‘such observations … sufficient to explain the causes, and point to the remedy of any deficiency 
in the revenue, or excess in the expenditure’. Complete returns of civil servants, financial 
abstracts and schedules of every department of government, as well as of the military defence 
of the islands in a separate return, were to be recorded at the close of every year, printed and 
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The rebellion that took place in Santa Maura in 1819 was the first in a series of recurring 
crises that followed. While the peasant rebellion was perceived by the British as ‘a single act of 
insubordination’, the turmoil that followed in 1820, and particularly during the revolution on 
the mainland in 1821, threatened to throw the islands into a full-blown revolution. Maitland 
treated the issue as he had done in the past: pragmatically, but despotically. The crisis after 
1819 that followed, this thesis argues, was the outcome of two processes: first, of Greek 
political nationalism, whose influence British authorities could not confine to the mainland, 
especially after 1819. Second, because of Maitland’s administration during 1816 and 1821, 
which effectively stifled all opposition, but which in so doing cut crucial channels of 
communication with local society. To control the Ionian political scene, the High Commissioner 
had drawn all his focus on creating a loyal aristocracy and to strengthen the ties between 
central administration and loyal Corfiote aristocrats like Theotoky. But this stance, which 
Maitland kept from the beginning of his administration had effectively isolated him from other 
parts of the Ionian society, and particularly Britain’s wartime collaborators, as we saw in 
previous chapters.  
Despite the growth of metropolitan pressures which increased during the revolution in 
information that started to gain ground in Britain, other factors protected Maitland from 
parliamentary pressures, like personal networks, the importance of the islands as a strategic 
outpost, and subsequently Maitland’s particular ability as a colonial governor. However, the 
circumstances that made the islands a protectorate in 1815 had dramatically changed in less 
than ten years later. This thesis argues that the period 1819-1821 truly marked the end of an 
illusion that started with British officials serving in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic 
wars that the islands would become a productive colony in the east. 
  




Firstly, this thesis has challenged the tendency among historians of Anglokratia to view 
the protectorate as a failed colonial experiment: as Napier’s typology would have it (and as 
discussed in chapter one of this thesis), the importance of the islands to contemporaries lay in 
their potential to become a model colony in an indefinite future. If the British protectorate is 
viewed solely through its problems and controversies – already evident from the moment of its 
creation, and particularly after 1819 – the real question would not be why the protectorate 
failed as a colonial experiment, but rather why the British decided to keep the islands in the 
first place. Focusing on the early period of British rule, the thesis has pursued two aims: first, 
aside from strategic considerations to turn our attention to issues of political culture, militarism 
and the emerging importance of ‘objective’ knowledge to metropolitan contexts during the 
early-nineteenth century.  
Secondly, this thesis aims to contribute to relevant studies in imperial and 
Mediterranean history, as well as on colonial knowledge in the early-nineteenth century. The 
protectorate was created in a period of great transitions, marked by rapid change alongside the 
persistence of conservative mentalities. British rule in the islands presented many cultural and 
political characteristics that were common elsewhere in the early-nineteenth century. This was 
true during the post-Napoleonic period in particular: the growth of the ‘fiscal-military’ state, a 
militarist ethos, the despotism in colonial governance and the desire to address security 
concerns related to the possibility of war (especially between Russia and the Ottoman Empire) 
or the supposedly violent character of Ionians.  
Traditionally, historians of the protectorate start their analysis from the Treaty of Paris 
in 1815, concluding with the cession of the islands to Greece in 1864. This thesis argues that 
while the protectorate was formally ceded to the British in 1815 its origins could be traced 
further back in the past, in the wartime and in the Russia’s withdrawal from the Mediterranean. 
The immense strategic importance of the islands as a centre of communications and 
information-gathering about enemy movements first became known to Nelson during 
Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt in 1797-1798. From the period of the Septinsular Republic in the 
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islands (1798-1807) until the Treaty of Tilsit when Emperor Alexander signed an alliance with 
Napoleon, the islands belonged (according to the European powers) to the Russian sphere of 
influence. This accepted condition was not challenged by any of the coalition powers. British 
and Russian officers combined forces in joint operations in the eastern Mediterranean in order 
to counter the perceived threat of a French invasion of the islands and the mainland between 
1803 and 1805. However, under the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia withdrew from the Mediterranean 
and the Ionian Islands were annexed by France. Even though Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations 
were restored later on, this move strategically isolated Britain from the mainland and the Porte. 
Moreover, it threatened the British naval presence in the Mediterranean. Secondly, the Treaty 
of the Dardanelles two years later solidified the place of Britain as a mediator between the 
Ottoman Empire and other European powers. After these two treaties, Collingwood’s initiative 
to occupy the islands in 1809, was almost inevitable.   
The thesis has also examined how ‘go-betweens’ like Foresti acted as brokers between 
British officials and local actors like Ali Pasha, even before British troops landed on the islands. 
Many of these actors or their families were involved one way or another in promoting the idea 
of British protection, before the British came: either through old commercial connections with 
England, or by being members of the English party during wartime. These actors belonged to 
the information networks that obtained intelligence for the British from the battle of Aboukir 
onwards and worked closely with the British after they occupied the islands. The interests of 
these Ionians were to ensure Britain’s maritime and political protection of the Ionian Islands 
and to promote deep reforms in Ionian politics and society, especially in the legislature and in 
education. They asked for greater intervention by central administration in both fields, in order 
to curtail the power of the elites, particularly those coming from Corfu. The first British 
administrations of the provisional government under Oswald, Airey and Campbell worked 
closely with Foresti for example. However, these Ionians were gradually marginalized during 
Maitland’s administration. Ironically, Maitland focused his efforts to establish a constitutional 
regime and to create a nobility loyal to British interests. However, Maitland’s centralizing 
tendencies finally stifled public opinion and excluded a class of collaborators and modernizers 
which British rule could potentially have been based upon.  
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The thesis has also examined how the British managed their wartime connections with 
the Greek mainland, a factor which was integral to the creation of the protectorate but which is 
often downplayed or neglected in Ionian historiography. The boundaries between the islands 
and the continent were always blurred, as the islanders were dependent on the mainland for 
foodstuffs and labour for years before Anglokratia. But as chapters two and three showed, 
British diplomacy could not but take into account these local parameters: Castlereagh’s 
negotiations in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars were substantially shaped by the British 
penetration of local networks, a change that started to take shape particularly after 1803.  
British presence in the eastern Mediterranean redefined these local networks with the 
mainland through agents and consuls like Foresti, by essentially replacing the influence of 
previous powers in the region, such as Venice, Russia or France. One example was the relation 
with Ali Pasha: the British provided ammunition and assurances that they would come to the 
pasha’s need in case of French invasion, in exchange for information and naval stores. The 
relations between the British and the pasha even cumulated to 1811, with the pasha confiding 
to British agents his willingness to abandon the Porte, in order for his pashalik to be guaranteed 
as an independent state and a permanent ally of the British in the region. And in fact, 
connections between the British and the pasha continued after the war as the case of Parga 
had shown, until 1822 and the death of the pasha.  
This thesis thus builds on previous historical works to highlight the key role of 
information networks and the importance of war in the establishment and maintenance of the 
British position. The thesis also builds on previous historiography to highlight the key role of 
information networks and war in the establishment and maintenance of the Ionian 
Protectorate.825 
Statistical information was utilized and surveys were conducted well before the 
establishment of French or British rule in the islands. The thesis has examined briefly the role of 
information-related networks and institutions during Venetian and French rule. However, as 
Anglokratia was the topic of this study, the thesis’ main emphasis is on the employment of new 
                                                     
825 Chessell, ‘Nelson's Ionian Agent; ‘Britain's Ionian Consul’. 
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forms of knowledge in administration, including a more specific focus on objective knowledge 
and ‘facts’. Relevant literature on ‘colonial governmentality’ and the use of statistics in British 
administration of the Ionian Islands has been less clear over the exact use of accumulated 
statistics in the empire in the broader context during the period under study. Although medical 
officials like Tully compiled statistical tables based on the plague of 1815, there is little evidence 
that this information was used by any Ionian state institution: medical officials like Hennen 
mentioned that they obtained the information on the plague from Maitland’s papers for 
example, or by other medical officials like Davy.  
On the other hand, medical officials like Tully accumulated experience in controlling and 
understanding the disease. This knowledge included statistical information and careful 
examination of symptoms of the plague and measures to contain it. It was the information that 
these officials had collected on the spot, alongside Ionian medical officials, which was used for 
scientific debates in Britain to support different medical opinions like the supporters of the 
‘contagionist’ or ‘anti-contagionist’ theories we saw in the debate of 1819.  These debates 
cemented the connections between empire, science and ‘objective’ knowledge.  
Security concerns were paramount in disease-control. For Maitland, based on his own 
experience dealing with plagues like St. Domingue or Malta, disease-control was not a medical 
but a security matter. According to him, and other medical officials they served under him like 
Tully, the role of the military was paramount, in order to enforce quarantine laws and cordons. 
The commissioner implemented various measures according to these priorities, such as putting 
the cordons under tight surveillance and suggesting the replacement of troops in the Ionian 
Islands with troops from Malta, as the former were in the islands since their occupation by 
British troops and had become compromised by their forming of ‘local connections with 
women’. Furthermore, these measures were not merely for protecting the Ionian society and 
the troops from the plague, but also to reinforce discipline and control within the garrison: as 
Maitland mentioned to Bathurst when he suggested the movement of troops during the 
plague, the soldiers had also formed ‘local opinions about political questions’. 
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Chapter five examined the dissolution of the Ionian Senate by Maitland, and how 
information-collection about Ionian politics was characterized by ‘affective’ knowledge and 
tight surveillance of the commissioner’s political opponents. Maitland’s centralizing tendencies 
in governance were characteristically conservative. At the same time, Maitland tried to create a 
class of loyal aristocracy through the Order of St. Michael and St. George. As previous work on 
the islands has shown, the Constitution of 1817 was a façade covering British power, rather 
than the mark of an independent state. Accusations of intrigue and connections with Russia 
allowed Maitland effectively to neutralize Ionian political bodies and to impose his control in 
government.  
After 1819, the enduring social problems of the islands came to the surface. British 
officials put the islands into a prolonged state of emergency, after a series of rebellions took 
place in the islands, starting from Santa Maura and lasting until the Greek Revolution. Martial 
law was declared on different occasions and the authorities in the islands became anxious that 
political turbulence would spread. Ionians with connections with Russia, such as Capodistrias, 
were suspected of acting as instigators of rebellions and of being Russian spies.  
In this climate of instability, personal antipathies and security concerns dominated 
information-collection. We saw for example how, in the aftermath of the rebellion in Santa 
Maura, Maitland and Adam were discussing Capodistrias as an instigator of most political 
turbulence in the islands. It was also in the context of Ionian disturbances that the Concert of 
Europe was put into effect in the islands, and Austrian and British authorities actively 
collaborated to prevent the appearance of further revolutionary movements. In this sense, as 
we mentioned before, the British Protectorate was indeed an observatory over the mainland 
and the traffic in the Adriatic, giving the British a significant advantage in information-collection 
in the wider region, particularly when the Greek Revolution of 1821 broke out. 
Meanwhile in Britain, the critique of ‘Old Corruption’ was gaining ground. Parliamentary 
pressures on public spending were particularly persistent in the cased of Britain’s colonial 
policy, to some extent forcing Bathurst to focus his efforts on minimizing expenses. Radicals like 
Joseph Hume accused Maitland’s administration of despotism and extraordinary expense. 
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Nevertheless, despite the accusations and the calls for sending a committee of inquiry to 
investigate his conduct in the islands, Maitland was well-connected and was not placed under 
scrutiny.    
The thesis also argues that a phase that started in wartime and in 1815 with the creation 
of the protectorate ended in 1822 with the Greek Revolution, when political turmoil and 
security concerns reached their peak in the islands. British officials who took over the islands of 
course could not predict that a Greek state would be created later on; a factor that British 
foreign policy could not ignore. In all cases of political turbulence and crisis, British officials 
were ambivalent about the protectorate. Maitland was very reluctant to accept his 
appointment as a High Commissioner in the first place, unless the British had absolute control 
over Ionian politics. Political independence of the islands and Ionian representation was also 
discouraged, with an independent Ionian State being considered by the British as the worst 
outcome, allowing Russia to re-enter the Mediterranean.   
We mentioned before how an overwhelming emphasis on cultural representations and 
stereotypes, and their connection to structures of British rule, has been central in much 
historical-writing about the islands. Undoubtedly, for Maitland and Bathurst authoritarian rule 
was certain justified in part by the character of the Ionians: official correspondence is full of 
such characterizations. But as the thesis has shown, British officials hardly thought that such 
cultural depictions justified British rule in and of themselves. The supposed inability of Ionians 
to rule themselves – and their character as ‘intriguers’ and ‘liars’ as well – certainly set the tone 
for an internal dialogue among British officials, perhaps legitimizing the amount of troops and 
money the British government spent in order to secure Britain’s naval hegemony in the 
Mediterranean, or in defending Maitland’s conduct when criticized in the British parliament. 
But as this thesis has argued, stereotypes heightened other, perhaps more significant, official 
anxieties. One major anxiety, for example, was a genuine concern about the lack of accurate 
information available to the British. Another was the threat of a large-scale rebellion in the 
islands, which became more evident during the last part of the period this thesis is concerned 
with, between 1819 and 1822. Moreover, as previous works on imperial historiography have 
also shown, cultural constructs ‘frequently overlapped with concepts held previously’: with pre-
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existing and very real structures and divisions.826 Difference in the islands was not only 
constructed by British authorities but also reflected centuries-old class antagonisms and local 
differences between the islands. Such differences were most pronounced between urban and 
rural areas in the islands. They were also pronounced in discussions over defence of the islands, 
when individuals like Foresti admitted the islanders could not protect themselves from the 
many threats that they faced.  
Future research might profitably extend some of the insights put forward in this thesis 
to the later period, especially in terms of strategic considerations: how did, for example, Anglo-
Russian relations evolve, particularly at the level of officials in situ, in the eastern 
Mediterranean throughout the nineteenth century? The thesis also offers additional new 
avenues and fresh contributions to explore some closely related topics. For instance, further 
research might also examine comparisons between the Venetian, French and British 
administrations of the Ionian Islands, particularly in terms of collecting and organizing 
information, and mainly, integrated into the state. The Ionian case, as well as the 
Mediterranean at large, can provide ample opportunities for further research starting for 
example with disease-control, medical knowledge and local institutions: how did medical 
officials gather information on plagues during Venetian or British administrations in the Ionian 
Islands? Were these individual endeavours or state-sponsored? Such research questions could 
illuminate crucial aspects of Venetian and British information systems. Examining comparatively 
how these administrations accumulated data would provide a valuable insight on the worth 
these governments put on quantitative information and the ends to which it was put.  
The thesis has drawn our attention to a usually neglected period in Greek as well as in 
imperial history. With little doubt, the period between 1797 and 1822 was characteristically 
chaotic and experimental as historians of the Ionian Islands have also shown, but also incredibly 
formative in the history of Anglokratia. In this period of political and social experimentation, 
the thesis focused on personal and professional networks to study colonial governance, as well 
                                                     
826 David Washbrook, ‘Orients and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British 
Empire’, OHBE, V, p. 604. 
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as the ways that British officials collected and organized information. Finally, while the British 
protectorate was indeed a peculiar creation of wartime, the Ionian Islands became also part of 
a greater imperial project. From the outset, it was a central aim of this thesis to situate the 
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